Chinese
以三者清净的佛陀教言，对于圆满具足的正量之行持加以阻断的魔之大秘密语是：佛陀薄伽梵如实照见事物之实相，以慈悲为怀向他人开示，对于生起此种定解之门，如果存在任何贬低理性的言辞的真实性，那么颠倒之言辞将根本不可能存在。因此，必须了解如此运用理性来决断，这在二量之场合中至关重要。在普遍了解此理之后，于此处分析因果之时，由于业的停止和业之果之间存在漫长的时间间隔，因此会产生因与果如何关联的疑问，因此，实事论者们为了使二者之间产生关联，会承认获得和不浪费的物质等。然而，中观宗仅仅宣说缘起，因此二者之间不需要任何其他关联的物质，由于先前之业，在何处集合的条件完备，果就在那里成熟，由于不浪费，作为因果非常合理。如此，即使是像种子和幼苗这样看似连续不断的现象，由于相遇之后无法产生，因此像种子和幼苗一样连续不断，作为因果是可行的。而像业和果这样并非连续不断的现象，也丝毫不存在因为不是连续不断就不能作为因果的情况，平等地理解这两者是最重要的理解之一。因此，认识到种子本身能够产生幼苗是作用的道理，这也是种子的自性，就像火的自性是热一样。因此，具有无碍能力的因不产生自己的果，或者混乱地产生，或者无止境地产生等等，这不是事物的自性。因此，如果考察幼苗是从坏灭的种子中产生，还是从未坏灭的种子中产生，二者都不合理。然而，仅仅是从因，即先前已逝的种子之刹那中产生。并且，也将先前已逝的种子假立为产生幼苗之因，而不是将未坏灭的实物和已坏灭的非实物二者分开后，由任何一方来产生。
English
The great secret mantra of the demons that obstructs the perfect practice of the Buddha's teachings, which are pure by the three aspects, is this: If there is any truth in the words that denigrate reason, which is the gateway to generating certainty about the meaning that the Buddha, the Bhagavan, has shown to others with love, having seen the reality of things without error, then there will be absolutely no possibility of inverted words. Therefore, it is important to know how to make decisions using reason in both cases of valid cognition. Having understood this in general, when analyzing cause and effect in this context, since there is a long time interval between the cessation of action and the fruit of action, doubts arise as to how the cause and effect are related. Therefore, in order to relate the two, the realists admit things like obtainable and non-wasting substances. However, the Madhyamikas only speak of dependent origination, so no other substance of connection is needed between the two. Because of the previous action, the fruit matures in the lineage where the assembly of conditions is complete, and because it is not wasted, it is very reasonable as cause and effect. Thus, even if it is like a seed and a sprout, which appear to be continuous, since it cannot be produced after meeting, it is continuous like a seed and a sprout, so it is feasible as cause and effect. And there is not the slightest possibility that things like actions and fruits, which do not occur continuously, cannot be cause and effect because they are not continuous. Understanding these two equally is one of the most important understandings. Therefore, realizing that the seed itself can produce a sprout is the reason for the action, and it is also the nature of the seed, just as the nature of fire is heat. Therefore, it is not the nature of things that the cause, which has unobstructed power, does not produce its own fruit, or produces it in a chaotic way, or produces it endlessly, and so on. Therefore, if we examine whether the sprout arises from a destroyed seed or from an undestroyed seed, neither is reasonable. However, it only arises from the cause, that is, from the previous moment of the seed that has passed. And that previously passed seed is also designated as the cause of producing the sprout, rather than separating the undestroyed entity and the destroyed non-entity, and producing it by either one.
Chinese
因此，不能认为种子的原因仅仅是幼苗的种子。就像不能把种子之上的形状部分或与非事物相反的对立面单独作为原因一样。如果把方向和时间分开作为原因，那么除了被指定的原因之外，其他的都不能作为原因的名称结构就会崩溃。这就像说瓶子只是形状的粒子一样。因此，无论原因和结果是否相遇，都是不合适的。原因产生结果是不虚妄的规律。例如，当日月的光影倒映在水中时，会显现出日月本身所具有的各种形态。虽然形状和光影是否相遇的道理是缺乏的，但以显现的现象为例，原因和结果的方式也是依赖于此而产生的。正如所说的那样，仅仅是原因本身的力量产生结果，这是依赖产生的规律，无论如何承认都是不合适的。种子产生幼苗，业产生果报，如果仅仅是这样，而把毁坏和未毁坏分开，那么对于未毁坏的部分，如前所述，有原因和结果同时的过失。如果从毁坏中产生，那么在种子和幼苗之间，毁坏被刹那所阻断，因此存在原因和结果不能连续产生的过失。如果在其间没有被毁坏的刹那所阻断，那么原因又怎么能被毁坏呢？而且，第一个毁坏的刹那，是像未毁坏一样产生幼苗，还是毁坏后产生？如果像第一个那样，那么原因的毁坏和结果的幼苗同时，这是不合理的。如果像第二个那样，那么第一个毁坏的刹那停止后，又产生第二个毁坏的刹那，如果这和幼苗同时，那么原因和结果就会变成同时，这是不合理的。因此，最终从任何毁坏中产生都是不合理的。如果毁坏不是刹那，那么就是常和实体的基础相同，或者是因为没有作用的能力，又怎么能成为产生结果的原因呢？这样，即使让种子停止，毁坏也会阻碍，幼苗永远不会产生，毁坏会达到存在的极限而产生等等。此外，所有原因和结果都会中断，一切所知都会变成完全不存在。因此，正如《难解释》中所说的那样，不能从种子毁坏和未毁坏的两个部分产生，因此从原因产生结果是规律。
English
Therefore, it is not reasonable to consider the cause of a sprout to be merely the seed. Just as one would not single out the part of the form on top of the seed, or a contradictory aspect that is the opposite of non-things, as the sole cause. If one separates aspects of direction and time and posits them as causes, the structure of terminology that prevents anything other than the specifically designated thing from being a cause will collapse. This is similar to saying that a pot is only made of particles of form. Therefore, it is not suitable whether causes and effects meet or do not meet. The unfailing nature of cause producing effect is a natural law. For example, when the reflection of the sun and moon appears in water, the forms that exist in the actual sun and moon are visible. Although the logic of whether form and reflection meet or not is absent, the way causes and effects arise in dependence is exemplified by that manifest appearance. As taught, the arising of effects from the power of the cause itself is merely the nature of dependent arising, and it is not permissible to assert anything beyond that. A sprout comes from a seed, and a result comes from an action. If one separates destruction and non-destruction, then for the non-destroyed part, there is the fault of cause and effect being simultaneous, as previously explained. If it arises from destruction, then because destruction is interrupted by a moment between the seed and the sprout, there is the fault that cause and effect do not arise continuously. If it is not interrupted by a moment of destruction in between, then how can the cause be destroyed? Furthermore, does that first moment of destruction produce the sprout as if it were not destroyed, or does it produce it after being destroyed? If it is like the first, then the destruction of the cause and the sprout of the effect are simultaneous, which is unreasonable. If it is like the second, then after the first moment of destruction ceases, a second moment of destruction arises, and if that and the sprout are simultaneous, then cause and effect become simultaneous, which is unreasonable. Therefore, in the end, it is unreasonable for anything to arise from destruction. If destruction is not momentary, then is it the same basis as permanence and substance, or is it empty of the ability to perform a function, and therefore how could it be a cause for producing an effect? Thus, even if the seed is allowed to cease, the destructions would block the way, and the sprout would never arise, and destruction would reach the ultimate limit of existence, and so on. Furthermore, all causes and effects would be interrupted, and all knowable things would become completely non-existent. Therefore, as stated in the Difficult Explanation, it is not reasonable for it to arise from both the destroyed and non-destroyed parts of the seed, therefore the arising of an effect from a cause is a natural law.
Chinese
应当仅仅相信这种道理。比如，对于像地芽一样的（事物），在名言上承认从某个因产生或者因灭而产生果，这仅仅是从排除因在果位时没有灭坏而安立的。如果考察因的刹那坏灭和果的刹那产生二者之间，没有被其他事物阻断而生灭，则是空寂的。除了先前的因之外，说有能生果的坏灭，因灭之后并没有变成实有之物。虽然果是从先前的因产生的，但要知道，所谓先前，是指除了因之外，没有任何能生果的实有之物。第二，确定显现之基为空性：因此，如果世俗没有因，说“不可能”也不好。如果这个的近取因是真实的，那就说出来。如是，在没有丝毫自性的情况下，作为因和果的方式无碍显现，因此，这些法在自性不成立的情况下仅仅是显现。如果实事论者认为，对于像这样现量经历的世俗，如果没有显现之基或真实的因，说“不可能这样显现”也不好。如果这个世俗的显现之基或近取因是真实存在的，那就说出来，如果在理证上没有妨害而成立，我也承认那是因。但由于如上所说的道理，已经成立了一切所知都不成立实有，因此无法安立真实的因。对此，圣者龙树以咒语、药物和幻术的比喻，用偈颂成立缘起，如《偈颂》中说：“一个字也不是咒语。”等等，如从名言成立中所说的那样。对此，实事论者认为，就像没有纬线的毛毯一样，如果没有显现各种世俗显现的因，则不可能显现，因此他们承认无分微尘和意识，或者二空的意识等作为显现之基或因。他们说，就像世尊以车子的支分作为依据而安立为车子一样，（佛）是说以蕴作为因来假立为有情。中观
English
One should only trust in this kind of reasoning. For example, with regard to something like a sprout, nominally acknowledging that a result arises from a certain cause or from cessation, this is merely established from the aspect of eliminating that the cause does not cease at the time of the result. If one examines the arising and ceasing between the moment of the cause's cessation and the moment of the result's arising, without being interrupted by anything else, it is empty. Apart from the previous cause itself, saying that there is a destruction that can produce the result, there is nothing that becomes a real entity after the cause has ceased. Although results arise from previous causes, one should know that the so-called previous refers to the fact that there is no real entity other than the cause that can produce the result. Second, demonstrating the certainty that the basis of appearance is emptiness: Therefore, if conventionality has no cause, saying "it is not possible" is also not good. If the proximate cause of this is real, then speak of it. Thus, in the absence of even a little bit of inherent existence, appearing unrestrictedly as cause and result, therefore, these phenomena are merely appearances while not being established by inherent existence. If the proponents of realism think that for these conventionalities experienced manifestly like this, if there is no basis of appearance or true cause, saying "it is not possible to appear like this" is also not good. If the basis of appearance or proximate cause of this conventionality is truly existent, then speak of it, and if it is established without being harmed by reasoning, I also acknowledge that it is the cause. But because of the reasoning spoken of above, it has already been established that all knowable things are not established as truly existent, therefore it is not possible to establish a true cause. On this, the noble Nāgārjuna, using the examples of mantras, medicines, and illusions, established dependent origination with verses, as in the verses: "Not even a single letter is a mantra," etc., as taught from the establishment of nominalities. On this, the proponents of realism think that just like a blanket without weft threads, if there is no cause for the appearance of various conventional appearances, it is not possible to appear, therefore they acknowledge indivisible particles and consciousness, or the consciousness of the two emptinesses, etc., as the basis of appearance or cause. They say that just as the Blessed One established a chariot based on the limbs of the chariot, (the Buddha) said that sentient beings are imputed by taking the aggregates as the cause. Madhyamaka