Chinese
这也是具称法称的观点。对此，名言和胜义的量各自有各自的证得，而精通名言安立的是唯识宗。因此，像这样的宗派容易理解名言，并且还有其他许多必要的殊胜之处，稍后将会阐述。对此，像这样的名言观点，也不是在胜义中显现的心是否成立的辨析，而是以名言的量来衡量这些无欺的显现法。例如，如果有人问，梦中的显现是内心的，还是存在于外境？有些聪明人经过观察和分析后，认为它不可能存在于外境，所以只是自现而已。然而，如果有人将两种量衡量的方式混淆，不经过观察和分析，只承认显现，却不承认经过分析的宗派，那么不要认为这与应成派的观点非常矛盾。因为，在这里，无论是谁问这些法是否以自性成立，或者问它的本体是否由量成立等等，衡量者的量至关重要。如果是从胜义量的角度来衡量，那么就像黑暗在光明面前一样，它永远无法成立，因此根本无法安立任何成立。如果是从名言量的角度来衡量，那么它在名言中是无欺且不可否认地成立的。因此，无论以符合名言显现的方式进行多少分析，都不能像量论中那样，将证明存在前后世等的分析，作为胜义的分析。总之，没有任何一位中观派会否定这种共许显现的事物，也没有任何一位中观派会承认自性实成的事物。然而，由于通达二谛双运的方式不同，在确定胜义谛的方式上存在差异，因此不能仅凭名言的观点来判断宗派的高低。因此，瓶子无自性，以及是空性等等，实际上并没有直接附加胜义的差别。但是，宗派和名言的智者们，会根据具体情况，理解为是胜义的分析。瓶子由量成立，以及由自相成立也是如此。
English
This is also the view of the esteemed Dharmakīrti. In this regard, conventional and ultimate valid cognitions each have their own distinct objects of ascertainment, and the Mind-Only school excels in establishing conventions. Therefore, adopting such a system makes conventions easy to understand, and it also has many other necessary advantages, which will be explained briefly below. In this context, such a conventional perspective is not an analysis of whether appearances in the ultimate sense are established in the mind or not, but rather it is a way of measuring these infallible appearances with conventional valid cognition. For example, if one were to ask whether the appearances in a dream are within the mind or exist externally, some intelligent people, after examining and analyzing, would say that it is not reasonable for them to exist externally, so they are merely self-appearances. However, one should not think that it is highly contradictory to the Consequentialist school if one mixes the ways of measuring with the two valid cognitions and, without examination or analysis, accepts only appearances without accepting a tenet established through analysis. For here, no matter who asks whether these phenomena are established by their own characteristics, or whether their essence is established by valid cognition, etc., what is crucial is to distinguish the valid cognition that measures. If measured from the perspective of ultimate valid cognition, then like darkness before light, it can never be established in its presence, so no establishment whatsoever can be posited. If measured from the perspective of conventional valid cognition, then it is infallibly and undeniably established in its presence. Therefore, no matter how much one analyzes in accordance with conventional appearances, one cannot use the analysis that proves the existence of past and future lives, etc., from the treatises on valid cognition, as an analysis of the ultimate. In short, there is no Madhyamaka proponent who denies merely these commonly perceived objects, and there is no Madhyamaka proponent who asserts objects that are truly established by their own nature. However, there are differences in how the ultimate truth is ascertained due to the skill of understanding the union of the two truths, and one should not judge the superiority or inferiority of schools based solely on conventional views. Therefore, there is no direct addition of ultimate distinctions to things like a pot being without inherent existence and being empty. However, scholars of tenets and conventions understand it as being under the power of analyzing the ultimate, based on the context. The same is true for a pot being established by valid cognition and being established by its own character.
Chinese
会理解为名言的。即使不会产生互相混淆的愚痴，但如果被言辞迷惑，对于那些沾染了乌鸦粪便的人，总是执着于自己的想法，只是重视言辞，那么在意义上，对于多种事物共同使用的词语，并不依赖于对意义的区分，也并不一定是指一个事物。例如，所谓的“真实成立”，通常理解为通过胜义谛的观察可以被观察成立，所以大多数情况下是这样理解的。另外，就像“真实”一词也可以理解为两种真实一样，如果仅仅认为“成立”是词尾，那么也没有理由说不能在名言上理解。同样，添加一些限定词也并非不可能产生误解，所以最好像印度大论典的风格一样，从当时的意义出发，轻松地确定名言。为了便于理解，添加限定词等也没有矛盾，因为语言是具有表达意愿的原因的。因此，在论典中，对于真实成立和自相成立等没有差别地进行破斥，以及区分差别进行解释等，为了使人们不迷惑，各自的量具有衡量方式的关键，如果不区分清楚，仅仅凭借言辞的表面意义来区分宗派，是非常可悲的。因此，在后得分别的场合，必须毫不混淆地安立两种量所衡量的体系。如果没有区分，仅仅凭借名言上的分析就走向胜义谛的分析，那么，承认进入大乘的补特伽罗能够成佛，也就像承认在胜义谛上存在一样。如果说世俗谛，也会遇到需要退缩的窘境，难以宣说道和果成立的宗派。如果认为说补特伽罗能够成佛是仅仅从名言的角度出发，那么，这样就等于承认了分别宣说二谛的宗派。通过那个宗派，也应该知道仅仅在名言上成立事物的自相，以及唯识宗的观点也是如此。如果有人说，那只是为了迎合他人而承认，并不是自己的宗派，那么对于自己来说，在后得的场合，对于道果的体系和仅仅是缘起的关系，也有承认的说法等。
English
it will be understood as nominal. Even if the ignorance of mutual confusion does not arise, if one is deluded by words, and for those who are stained with crow's feces, they always cling to their own ideas, and only value words, then in meaning, for words that are commonly used for multiple things, it is not dependent on the distinction of meanings, and it is not necessarily referring to one thing. For example, the so-called "truly established" is usually understood as being able to be observed and established through the investigation of the ultimate truth, so in most cases it is understood in this way. In addition, just as the word "truth" can also be understood as two truths, if one only thinks that "established" is the suffix of the word, then there is no reason to say that it cannot be understood in nominal terms. Similarly, adding some qualifiers is not impossible to cause misunderstanding, so it is best to easily determine the nominal term from the meaning of the occasion, just like the style of the great Indian treatises. Adding qualifiers, etc. is not contradictory for the sake of easy understanding, because language has the cause of expressing intentions. Therefore, in the treatises, there is no difference between refuting truly established and self-characterized established, and explaining the differences, etc., in order to prevent people from being confused, each valid cognition has a key to the method of measurement, and if it is not clearly distinguished, it is very sad to distinguish sects only by the superficial meaning of words. Therefore, in the context of subsequent discrimination, the system measured by the two valid cognitions must be established without confusion. If there is no distinction, and one goes to the analysis of the ultimate truth only by analyzing the nominal term, then admitting that a person who enters the Mahayana can become a Buddha is like admitting that it exists in the ultimate truth. If one says conventional truth, one will also encounter the predicament of having to retreat, and it will be difficult to proclaim the tenets of the path and the fruit being established. If one thinks that saying that a person can become a Buddha is only from the perspective of nominal terms, then this is equivalent to admitting the tenets of separately proclaiming the two truths. Through that tenet, one should also know that the self-character of things is established only in nominal terms, and the view of the Mind-Only school is also the same. If someone says that it is only admitted to cater to others and is not one's own tenet, then for oneself, in the context of subsequent attainment, there are also statements that the system of the path and the fruit and only the relationship of dependent origination are admitted, etc.
Chinese
相违背。因此，想要名言量成立的宗派，就必须区分二谛而说。如果不区分，仅仅凭借思辨，就无法通达胜义谛的道理，应当了知。总而言之，如果像等持（禅定）那样，对于超越言语和分别念的所量义，将究竟的实相真谛视为无别，那么就不需要区分二谛。因为如此显现的一切法，本来就没有有无、是非等任何遮破和成立的承诺，所以就像不说什么一样地回答。真实而言，因为超越了一切名言，不可言说，远离戏论，并且是平等性，所以成立为没有承诺。然而，如果后得（出定）成为言语分别念的对境，凭借显现的方式，自己思考基、道、果等的安立，并且也需要对他人宣说，那么就必须区分二量，除了进入遮破和成立的方式之外，没有其他可能。如果这样，就不要认为这和应成派非常不同。虽然仅仅是接受名言的方式不同，但凭借理证成立，大车轨的究竟密意在要点上是无别的。如果这样理解，那么在雪域（西藏）这里，有些智者认为世俗是量成立的，而另一些人则认为这是不可能的恶语。对于前代智者的观点，有些人指责说他们没有理解真正的应成派见解等等。此外，对于大车轨的宗派的无知之垢，很多都会自然解脱。也就是说，在确定像这样的二谛的安立时，应该这样想：如果说世俗是遮蔽或覆盖真实义，那么不清净的法是如此，但远离愚痴的清净之法，如佛陀的身和智慧等，不是世俗。因此，不要认为它不是空性的。如果这样想，那就是像“贪著国王等是细微的”所说的那样，必须舍弃实执。如果存在比殊胜之法涅槃更殊胜的法，那也就像幻觉和梦境一样，应当生起这样的定解。而且，在佛经和论典中，安立二谛的方式有两种，即：安住
English
contradicts. Therefore, those who wish for conventional validity to be established must speak by distinguishing the two truths. If they do not distinguish them, merely contemplating will not lead to understanding the ultimate truth. In short, if, like meditative equipoise, the ultimate state of affairs is considered to be inseparable from the truth, which transcends the objects of sound and thought, then there is no need to distinguish the two truths. Because all phenomena that appear in this way have no affirmation of existence or non-existence, right or wrong, etc., it is like answering without saying anything. In reality, because it transcends all terms, is inexpressible, free from elaboration, and is equality itself, it is established as having no affirmation. However, if, in the post-meditative state, which has become the object of sound and thought, one considers the basis, path, and result, etc., according to the way things appear, and needs to speak to others as well, then it is impossible to go beyond engaging in the way of refutation and establishment by distinguishing the two valid cognitions. If that is the case, one should not think that this and the Prasangika are very different. Although only the way of accepting terms is different, it is established by reasoning that the ultimate intention of the great chariots is inseparable in essence. If this is understood, then here in the land of snow, some scholars consider the conventional to be validly established, while others regard it as an impossible evil word. Some accuse the views of earlier scholars of not understanding the true Prasangika view, and so on. Furthermore, many stains of ignorance regarding the tenets of the great chariots will be naturally liberated. That is, when establishing the arrangement of the two truths in this way, one should think: if it is said that the conventional is obscuring or covering the true meaning, then impure phenomena are like that, but pure phenomena free from delusion, such as the body and wisdom of the Buddha, are not conventional. Therefore, if one thinks that it is not empty, then that is as it is said, "Attachment to kings, etc., is subtle," so one must abandon the clinging to reality. One should generate certainty in accordance with the meaning of the statement that if there is a dharma more supreme than the supreme dharma of Nirvana, it would be like an illusion and a dream. Moreover, in the sutras and treatises, there are two ways of establishing the two truths, namely: abiding