English
Moreover, here, taking the unspeakable meaning as a symbol of expression, and promising the meaning of no promise with words of certainty, these two should not be regarded as contradictory, but it is very important to understand them as one key point. Like this, words such as unborn show all objects of focus to be empty. Any dharma that is empty, attachment to it will cease, so it is merely showing that there is no focus. Therefore, the term "unreal" merely shows that things cannot be established upon examination, and it is not like emptying a vase, etc., with something else that needs to be negated. Any dharma that has no truth must have its attachment reversed. Therefore, having realized that all dharmas are without truth, all modes of grasping must be destroyed. If there is attachment to the mere meaning of the word "unreal," then the view has not yet been destroyed. On this, on whatever basis, with the reasoning that prevents the true establishment of emptiness, it can be determined that the object of attachment that grasps "it is without self-nature" also cannot be established. Even for that which is without self-nature, although there is no true establishment, if attachment to it is not destroyed, then all things such as vases are the same. In this way, the reasoning that examines ultimate truth only negates true establishment, and does not negate any phenomenon, and if it does not reverse all attachments to its object, then emptiness will not negate all the elaborations of grasper and grasped. Furthermore, the three faults, such as the samadhi of the noble ones becoming the cause of the destruction of things, will occur. If, after examining with ultimate truth, there is something that cannot be reversed or negated, then it will become truly established. Therefore, words such as unborn should be understood as entering into the meaning of pacifying all elaborations. Therefore, how can the profound Prajnaparamita, which has no object of focus, be similar to that of the Hashang? The freedom from the elaborations of the four extremes is not falling to either side of existence or non-existence. Although it cannot be shown with words and concepts as the object of individual self-awareness, the words that symbolize it are the inseparability of appearance and emptiness, or what is known as the Madhyamaka of the union of the two truths. Moreover, grasping is always connected with its object of grasping, and if one is separated from it, one will not see the true meaning. Then, with the samadhi that has the object as it is, one will not see the reality in the way that all dualistic appearances disappear.
English
Be! Those who are respectful towards this teaching should not speak in that way. Although this occasion is of great importance, no matter how the profound and difficult-to-understand essence is explained, it is like shooting an arrow into the sky; the minds of children cannot find a place to enter. Therefore, what is the use of saying much? In order not to stray from the key point of this principle, one should generate certainty in the path of reasoning that unites the two truths, relative and ultimate. First, establish that all appearances are empty. Then, have faith in the way emptiness manifests as dependent arising. Then, while being empty, it appears; while appearing, it is empty. Based on the way emptiness and dependent arising are united, experience this equality, which is free from elaboration, in a way that is without experience. Therefore, in order to negate attachment to existence, emptiness of the external and so forth are taught; and in order to negate attachment to the non-existence of what has been negated in that way, emptiness of emptiness and so forth are taught. The way in which all extremes are abandoned is this ultimate truth that is without distinctions. Among them, the Svatantrikas, by the power of their intellect, first temporarily cling to the ultimate truth that is conceptual, and are deceived into existence by this grasping at reality, and since its object is not truly real, they greatly value the apprehension of negation, thinking, "In the ultimate, there is nothing that is established by its own nature, nothing, nothing." Although this school negates all four extremes, it does not negate them without adding distinctions such as "ultimate" or "by its own nature," or "truly established." They distinguish between the two truths and then speak of how to eliminate the extremes of existence and non-existence. Because of that principle, they have an apprehension of non-existence, thinking that it is not established in the ultimate, and an apprehension of existence, thinking that things are established by their own characteristics in the conventional; and if one apprehends that they are not established, it would be slandering conventional appearances. Among them, conceptual non-arising is merely the opposite of arising. So, one might wonder, why wouldn't arising and non-arising contradict each other on the same basis in a mutually exclusive way? Just as a sprout arises from a seed, but there is no true arising, and just as self-characteristics are established in name, but are not truly established, this is because it is considered from the perspective of conventional appearances and the ultimate way of being. Not only is there no contradiction, but it is very reasonable, and it is clear from the power of the nature of things.
Chinese
因此，因为已经成立。这两种方式互不冲突，并且无论在哪一种的对境有境量面前，各自都不会成立与自己所断定的相违背的方面，因此，将各自的成立方式安立为自续也是合理的。因此，执着于两种真谛各自，并且在各自的宗派中承认，因此，也有自续的承认，虽然在胜义中没有，但在世俗中是有的，这样认为。像这样，执着于两种真谛各自的这一部分，不是应成派共同的破斥对象。如果自续派没有了执着于两种真谛各自的破斥对象，那么应成派等也无法从中获得任何见解的增益。因为用理证来成立比远离四边戏论的承认更加殊胜的断除戏论，是永远不可能的。因此，只要有执着，并且两种真谛没有成为一体，那么就无法超越分别念的境界，因此无法获得远离增益和损减二者的般若波罗蜜多的体性，也就是无分别的智慧。因此，应成派从一开始就将显空双运、离戏论确定下来。虽然其中没有胜义成立，但认为仅仅在世俗中以自己的体性而成立的执着，已经被理证驳倒。从执着于两种真谛各自安住于自身的状态，转变为两种真谛融为一体。这样，对于存在和不存在等的执着方式全部都会消失。这样，在这个宗派中，对于四边都不需要加上胜义成立和胜义等的两种真谛各自的差别，因为四边的执着对境已经被遮破，所以与有境的意识所缘以及远离一切承认的，大空性最终的实相，圣者的等持智慧相符顺，但是在后得位中，对于道和果的一切法，也像两种真谛的量所衡量的那样，毫无损害地安立，这也是非常合理的。因此，对于应成派，不应该一概而论地说有或者没有承认，而应该进行区分，这种说法是全知龙钦饶降的独特观点。他生...
English
Therefore, because it has been established. These two approaches do not contradict each other, and whichever is taken as valid from the perspective of its object, it never establishes the opposite of what it has determined. Therefore, it is also reasonable to establish one's own reason as the means of proof for each. Therefore, clinging to each of the two truths separately, and accepting them in their respective systems, there is also acceptance of self-nature. Although it does not exist ultimately, it does exist conventionally, so it is thought. Thus, this aspect of clinging to each of the two truths separately is not a common object of refutation for the Consequentialists. If the Autonomists were free from the object of refutation of clinging to each of the two truths separately, then the Consequentialists and others would have nothing to gain from that view. It is always difficult to establish through reasoning that there is something to cut off more elaborations than being free from all acceptance of freedom from the four extremes of elaboration. Therefore, as long as there is clinging and the two truths have not become one, one has not gone beyond the scope of conceptual mind, and therefore one does not attain the characteristic of Prajnaparamita, which is free from the two extremes of imputation and denial, that is, non-conceptual wisdom. Therefore, the Consequentialists have established from the beginning that appearance and emptiness are inseparable and free from elaboration. Although there is no ultimate establishment in it, the clinging that thinks that it exists merely conventionally by its own nature has been refuted by reasoning. From clinging to the two truths as if they were each in their own place, the two truths become mixed into one. Thus, all ways of clinging to existence and non-existence, etc., will disappear. Thus, in this system, it is not necessary to add the distinctions of the two truths, such as ultimate establishment and ultimate truth, to the four extremes, because the objects of clinging to the four extremes have been refuted, so the ultimate reality of great emptiness, which is in accordance with the wisdom of the noble ones' meditative equipoise, which is free from the object of consciousness and all acceptance, is praised. However, in the subsequent attainment, it is also very reasonable to establish all the phenomena of the path and the fruit without harm, just as they are measured by the validity of the two truths. Therefore, one should not take the Consequentialist as having or not having acceptance in one extreme, but should speak by distinguishing them. This view is the unique view of Omniscient Longchen Rabjam. Other births...
Chinese
如果仔细研究驳斥自立等，就会产生信任。 在堪布的这部论著中，首先以清净的智慧衡量二谛，从而成就二理。 最终，在非名言的胜义大谛中，也遮止了对二谛的分别执着，从而与等持无分别的智慧相符，断定远离一切承诺，因此这两部论著在究竟的意趣上没有丝毫差别，是相同的。 那么，有人会想，应成派的论著岂不是变得没有意义了吗？不会的，因为以理证广泛地成立了远离一切承诺的空性。 因此，着重阐述具有名言的胜义，是自续派的特征。 应当了知，着重阐述远离一切承诺的非名言胜义，是应成派。 在安立这两者的特征时，安立在名言中是否承认以自相成立，以及安立论式的方式等差别，仅仅是支分的差别，都包含在上述的特征中。 是否有承诺，是否承认名言中以自相成立，安立成立无自性的论式是应成还是自续，是否将胜义的差别附加于所破之上等要点，也是由刚才所说的道理所决定的。 因此，如果应成派安住于名言的胜义，并且在一切情况下都具有对二谛的分别承诺，那就无法与自续派区分开来。 因为在名言中遮止以自相成立的道理有多少，对于自己的世俗量成立也是相同的，因为在任何方面都是同样不可堪忍的。 仅仅因为在名言中也遮止了以自相成立，只会导致名言的安立不便，而不会获得任何功德的差别。 并且，自续派也不是要成立以自相成立的胜义可以经受观察，因此在证悟胜义的方式上，又有什么意义上的差别可以超越呢？因此，不会获得深刻的信任。 如此，堪布的这部《中观庄严论》中，应成派和自续派在意义上是相合的，因此是所有中观的庄严。 称之为应成派和自续派的理由是，二谛各自……