English
Eliminating the former, the latter eliminates sinking. Secondly, there are three points: refuting the view that "I" is the knower, refuting the view that "I" is matter, and dispelling disputes about the meaning of "no-self." The first point is: The Samkhya school says that all knowable things exist in those twenty-five principles. Among them, "I" is the Purusha with intelligence, the enjoyer or experiencer of all transformations, but not the author, a permanent entity, devoid of the three gunas ( गुण，guṇa， गुण， गुण德), without action. All its fields of activity arise from Prakriti, and when the three gunas of rajas ( रजस्，rajas，罗阇， 激情), sattva ( सत्त्व，sattva，萨埵， 喜悦), and tamas ( तमस्，tamas，答磨， 惰性) are equal, it is called Prakriti. Prakriti is the cause of the twenty-three transformations, just as clay is the cause of a pot. From Prakriti arises Buddhi or Mahat, from Buddhi arise the three Ahamkaras ( अहंकार，ahaṃkāra，阿含迦罗， 我慢), from Ahamkara ( अहंकार，ahaṃkāra，阿含迦罗， 我慢) arise the five tanmatras, the five elements, and the eleven senses. Both Prakriti and Purusha are permanent, and the others are impermanent. They believe that through this, one can understand "I." By refuting the view of the Vaisheshika school and others that "I" is matter, all other views will also be refuted. Therefore, according to the Samkhya school's view, the knowing nature of "I" is not permanent. If the consciousness that grasps sound is permanent, then it would grasp sound at all times. Because they believe that the consciousness at the time of grasping sound is permanent in that way. Someone says that not grasping sound at all times is not because consciousness is not permanent, but because the object, sound, is not there. If the object of knowledge, such as sound, does not exist, then what would consciousness cognize or know? And for what reason would it be said that it is the consciousness that knows that object? It should not be said that way. If even without knowing that object, it is considered that it is the consciousness that knows that object, then trees would also become consciousnesses that know sound and so on, because even without knowing the object, it is consciousness. Therefore, it is certain that without the object of knowledge, such as sound, being present, there is no consciousness that knows it. Consciousness depends on whatever object it knows, and it is impossible to have consciousness without knowing the object. Someone says that there is no such fault, because the consciousness that previously knew sound later knows other things such as form, so consciousness is permanent, but there are different focuses for different objects of knowledge.
Chinese
如果心想仅仅是这样，那么先前的声音的认识如果是常恒的，那么在认识色等的时候，为什么听不到声音呢？因为没有舍弃先前的自己的体性。如果说那个时候听不到是因为境，声音不靠近的缘故，那么没有境的缘故，对于那个境的认识也没有，道理和先前一样。另外，领受声音的自性是什么，它怎么会领受境，色呢？因为那两者体性各异。这遮止了认识是常恒和一体真实的。否则，不要认为在一个认识的相续中，认识声音就不认识色，因为无分别的认识，可以同时生起多种不相同的类别。有人说，就像一个人既是父亲又是儿子一样，境，声音和色等并不相违，从相状的角度来说，什么是色，从自性的角度来说，也是声音，因为那两者自性相同。因此，在领受色的时候，即使没有领受声音的相状的认识，也有领受声音的自性的认识，所以没有声音的认识不是常恒的过失。如果这样说，这个比喻没有成立，一个人被安立为既是父亲又是儿子，是观待两个不同的所观待而假立的，并非在胜义中以自己的体性真实成立为父亲和儿子。如果以自己的体性真实成立为父亲，那么不可能变成儿子的状态，因为父亲遍在于儿子之前。同样，如果真实成立为儿子的自性，那么不可能变成父亲，因为儿子不可能在父亲之前。因此，那是假立的。我们也不想遮止假立，但是那不能成就你的意愿。如果胜义中存在既是父亲又是儿子的东西，那么就像这样，你没有承认胜义是除了三种 गुण (梵文天城体guṇa，梵文罗马拟音guṇa，汉语字面意思： गुण) गुण (梵文天城体guṇa，梵文罗马拟音guṇa，汉语字面意思： गुण) गुण (梵文天城体guṇa，梵文罗马拟音guṇa，汉语字面意思： गुण) 之外的东西，那么必须存在于三种 गुण (梵文天城体guṇa，梵文罗马拟音guṇa，汉语字面意思： गुण) गुण (梵文天城体guṇa，梵文罗马拟音guṇa，汉语字面意思： गुण) गुण (梵文天城体guṇa，梵文罗马拟音guṇa，汉语字面意思： गुण) 之上，但是勇气，微尘和黑暗的体性不是儿子也不是父亲，如果一切相状都是它的自性，那么它在胜义中观待谁而安立为儿子，观待谁而安立为父亲呢？在任何情况下都不能安立。道理也没有成立，如果领受色也存在于声音的认识的自性中，那么在显现中
English
If one thinks it's just that, then if the previous sound cognition is permanent, why wouldn't one hear sound when cognizing forms, etc.? It's because it hasn't abandoned its previous nature. If one thinks that not hearing it at that time is because the object, sound, is not close, then because there is no object, there is also no cognition of that object, and the reasoning is the same as before. Furthermore, how can the nature of grasping sound grasp the object, form? It's because the two are different in nature. This refutes the permanence and singular reality of cognition. Otherwise, one should not think that in one stream of cognition, if one cognizes sound, one does not cognize form, because non-conceptual cognition can give rise to many different types at the same time. Someone says, just as one person is both a father and a son, objects like sound and form are not contradictory, because from the aspect of appearance, what is form is also sound from the aspect of nature, because the two have the same nature. Therefore, when grasping form, even if there is no cognition that grasps the appearance of sound, there is cognition that grasps the nature of sound, so there is no fault of sound cognition being impermanent. If you say that, that example is not established, because one person being established as both a father and a son is posited or imputed in relation to two different relata, but in reality, it is not truly established as both a father and a son by its own nature. If it were truly established as a father by its own nature, then it would be impossible to change into the state of a son, because the father is necessarily prior to the son. Similarly, if it were truly established as the nature of a son, then it would be impossible to change into a father, because the son cannot be prior to the father. Therefore, that is merely imputed. We also do not want to refute imputation, but that will not accomplish your intention. If there were something that is both a father and a son in reality, then, like this, since you have not accepted reality as anything other than the three गुण (Sanskrit: guṇa, Devanagari: गुण, Romanization: guṇa, meaning: quality), it must exist above the three गुण (Sanskrit: guṇa, Devanagari: गुण, Romanization: guṇa, meaning: quality), but the nature of courage, dust, and darkness is neither a son nor a father. If all appearances are its nature, then in reality, in relation to whom is it established as a son, and in relation to whom is it established as a father? It cannot be established in any case. The reasoning is also not established, because if grasping form also exists in the nature of sound cognition, then in appearance
Chinese
如果必须指定，那么执持色法永远不会被视为具有执持声音的自性。同样，也不会认为境色具有声音的知识。又有人说：虽然执持色法未被视为执持声音的自性，但知识的本体是一，例如，一个舞者早上装扮成天神，下午装扮成夜叉，以其他方式，即先前对声音的认知以对色法的认知的方式显现而被看到。如果这样说，那么先前的声音认知就成了非恒常，因为舍弃了先前的状态而获得了另一种状态。如果获得了不同于先前状态的后续状态，并且两者显现为分离，但仍然是先前的那个，而不是其他的，那么这种唯一性在世间是知识言说的领域中前所未有或未曾出现的唯一性。这是在说俏皮话，因为如何称之为一，是指在任何法的本体中都不可分离，并且在分离时被认为是不同的。然而，这明明看到了分离，却承认是一，这是明显的矛盾。如果明明看到了分离，却仍然是一，那么一切都将成为一个整体。因此，舞者在获得不同形式时，也是不同的刹那，而不是真正的一，如果是，那么在那里也有同样的考察。如果说，以变异的声音等区分的知识的各种显现，只是依赖于状态的表象，而不是真实的，就像用颜色改变白色水晶球，但水晶的性质不是真实的。即使以境区分的其他声音知识等部分是不真实的，也请说说真实的自性是什么样的。当被问及这个问题时，他们的回答是：没有被境区分的仅仅是知识，因为在所有先后的知识中都没有差别地跟随，所以说仅仅是知识的唯一性。如果这样，那么所有的人都将成为一体，因为不可能在所有的心识流中不跟随仅仅是知识这一点。此外，有情众生和我。
English
If it is necessary to specify, then apprehending form is never seen as having the nature of apprehending sound. Likewise, it is not seen that an object of form has the knowledge of sound. Again, someone says: Although apprehending form is not seen as the nature of apprehending sound, the essence of knowledge is one, for example, just as a single dancer dresses as a god in the morning and as a yaksha in the afternoon, in another way, that is, the previous sound knowledge is seen through appearing in the form of form knowledge. If it is said like that, then the previous sound knowledge would be impermanent, because it abandons the previous state and obtains another state. If a later state different from the previous state is obtained, and even though the two appear separately, it is still the same as before and not another, then such oneness is a oneness that has never existed or occurred before in the realm of knowledge and expression in this world. This is making a jest, because how can it be called one, which is inseparable in the essence of any dharma, and difference is posited upon separation. However, this is a manifest contradiction of seeing separation directly and yet admitting oneness. If it is seen separately but is still one, then everything would be a single whole. Therefore, even the dancer is a different moment when different forms are obtained, and is not truly one, because if it were, the same examination would apply there as well. If it is said that the different appearances of knowledge, distinguished by variations such as sound, are merely appearances dependent on circumstances and are not true, just as changing a white crystal ball with color does not affect the true nature of the crystal, then even if the other aspects of sound knowledge, etc., distinguished by objects, are admitted to be untrue, please tell us what the true nature of that true essence is like. When asked this question, their answer is: That which is not distinguished by objects is merely knowledge, because it follows without distinction in all prior and subsequent knowledge, so it is said to be the oneness of merely knowledge. If so, then all beings would become one, because it is impossible for merely being knowledge not to follow in all streams of consciousness. Furthermore, sentient beings and self.
Chinese
那些无心识的主物等二十四者，也会变成一个，因为它们全部都仅仅是存在，相同且没有差别。当认识的差别，如执取色、执取声等各种不同，是不真实的或颠倒的，因此认为在不同中没有真实时，在那时，在去除所有差别之外，作为仅仅是认识而共同相同的所依或唯一的总相，那个真实是什么呢？什么也没有。第二种是：有触者等说，我如同虚空般遍布且是常恒，因此不是认识，如果是认识，则会变成无常且不遍布，因此我没有认识而是无心识，但因为与认识相合，所以执着快乐等是我的，我是存在的。对此，无心识也不是我，因为是无心识的缘故，如同瓶、毡等一样，如果认为我是作者和苦乐的所依，那么无心识者无论何时都不可能是苦乐的所依。或者，我自身虽然不是心的体性，但因为与心相同而具有，因此凭借它的加持而能认识对境吗？如果是这样，那么认为我不认识对境或者承诺没有认识就会崩溃，因为它变成了认识对境的自性。这样一来，也会变成无常。如果我是没有变化的常恒，那么心识对我做了什么认识对境的行为呢？什么也没有做，因为我是不变的，不能做从先前的自性变成其他变化的作为，如同用颜色不能把天空染成蓝色等一样。这样一来，没有认识的无心识，与所有作为分离的虚空，这仅仅是自认为这是我而已。唉，看看有智慧者的智慧吧！第三，驳斥对无我意义的争论，其中有：驳斥无我则业果不合理的争论，驳斥无我则慈悲不合理的争论，以及显示不遮止假立的我。第一是：主张有我的人说，如果按照你的意愿，我不是存在的，那么从因上所做的善恶业所产生的果