Chinese
色即是空，空即是色。如是说故，显空双运之法界，离四边八边三十二边之系缚，不可言说思议，超越心识之各别自证智，乃究竟之般若波罗蜜多，是无异名之胜义谛。以心识执取此为此，以言语称彼为彼，凡成为心与语之行境之法，若加以观察，则了无自性，如幻象般空寂，绝不可能堪忍观察。因此，薄伽梵于经中云：天子，若胜义谛成为身语意之行境，则不入胜义之数，而唯成世俗谛。天子，然胜义谛是超越一切名言，非真实生，非真实灭，离言说，离能说，离所知，离能知。如是，凡超越一切种殊胜之遍知智之境者，即是胜义谛。如是。此处说，法性非所知，法性超越一切戏论，因此，彼非心识所能缘取。何者未成境与有境，亦未成任何相状，真实而言，云何能说是所知耶？如云：如是众生口中说，见虚空，虚空如何能见耶？当善加观察此义。如是，见法亦如来所说，见之譬喻，以他者不能诠释。如是。如是，于名言中，依于圣者之等持为有境，以法界为境，故可说为所知。如是云：何时无生即是彼，心识亦离于生灭，尔时由彼依于彼，如是证悟彼性也。如心识成为何种相，彼即是境，如是了知彼，如是依于名言而合理。如是说。又，真
English
Form is not other than emptiness; emptiness is not other than form. As it is said, the Dharmadhatu, which is the union of appearance and emptiness, is free from the four extremes, eight extremes, and thirty-two extremes of clinging. It is inexpressible and inconceivable, and the self-cognizant wisdom that transcends the mind is the ultimate perfection of wisdom, the ultimate truth that is not different in name. To apprehend and conceptualize with the mind, saying, "This is this," and to express with speech, saying, "This is this," any dharma that becomes the object of mind and speech, when examined, is devoid of inherent existence and empty like a mirage. It is never possible to withstand scrutiny. Therefore, the Bhagavan said in the sutra: "Son of the gods, if the ultimate truth were to become the object of body, speech, and mind, it would not be counted as the ultimate truth, but would only become the conventional truth. Son of the gods, however, the ultimate truth is beyond all expressions, unborn, unceasing, free from what is to be said, free from the speaker, free from what is to be known, and free from the knower. Thus, as long as it transcends the realm of the omniscient wisdom that possesses all supreme aspects, it is the ultimate truth." Here, it is said that the nature of reality is not an object of knowledge, and because the nature of reality is beyond all elaboration, it cannot be apprehended by the mind. Since it has not become an object or a subject, and no characteristic has been established, how can it be said to be an object of knowledge? As it is said: "Beings say, 'I see the sky.' How can the sky be seen? Examine this meaning well. Likewise, the Tathagata has taught the seeing of dharma. No other example can explain seeing." Nevertheless, conventionally, it can be said to be an object of knowledge because it relies on the noble meditative equipoise as the subject and the Dharmadhatu as the object. As it is said: "When the unborn is that itself, and the mind is also free from arising, then it is like realizing that nature by relying on that. Just as the mind becomes whatever aspect it is, that is the object. Knowing that completely, it is reasonable to rely on convention in that way." So it is said. Furthermore, true
Chinese
由于二者的区分基础是所知，因此承认胜义所知也是一种决断。此处非所知是完全排除，因此不矛盾，应当依赖于意义。第三，对于这样的两种真理，进行思考者的立场或群体，被视为两种世间。哪两种呢？具备寂止和胜观功德的瑜伽士世间，以及不具备的普通世间。其中，普通世间又分为未被宗派改变心意者和已被改变心意者两种。第一种，从无始以来就自认为“我”存在，将“我的身体”视为一个整体，认为心是常恒等等。第二种，被宗派改变心意的外道，虽然分类繁多，但可归纳为常断二见。因此，认为自在等是常恒的，是常见；认为没有前后世的因果等，是断见。对于这些人的观点，依次由佛教的瑜伽士世间，以身体由多个部分组成，并非一个整体，以及心在不同时刻是无常的等道理进行驳斥。并且，以阐述遮止常断二见的道理等进行驳斥。瑜伽士世间也有四种宗派，第一种是承认外境存在，不承认自明的声闻分别说部，他们认为所知由五蕴和三时组成，是实有，并且根识在同一时间认识外境。在认识是否能认识境和自明等方面存在许多观点差异，对于二谛的安立方式，《俱舍论》中说：“何为可毁及，慧析余复异，彼于分别时，如瓶水非有，胜义有异此。”意思是说，色等物质和眼识等意识，对于任何可以依次用棍棒等摧毁，以及用智慧分析成其他部分，从而可以摧毁和破坏的粗大之物，是世俗谛；而对于不可摧毁和破坏的，色法的最小单位无分微尘，以及意识的最小单位无分刹那，这二者认为是胜义谛。这一点与经部也是共同的。第二种是外境和自明二者
English
Since the basis of distinction between the two is knowable, acknowledging ultimate knowable is also a determination. Here, non-knowable is complete exclusion, so there is no contradiction, and one should rely on the meaning. Third, for such two truths, the position or group of those who contemplate them is seen as two types of worlds. What are the two? The yogi world that possesses the qualities of tranquility and insight, and the ordinary world that does not possess them. Among them, the ordinary world is further divided into those whose minds have not been changed by tenets and those whose minds have been changed. The first is those who, from beginningless time, assume that "I" exists, considering "my body" as a single whole and believing that the mind is permanent, and so on. The second, the non-Buddhists whose minds have been changed by tenets, although there are many classifications, can be summarized into the two views of permanence and annihilation. Therefore, those who believe that the self, etc., are permanent hold the view of permanence; those who believe that there is no cause and effect, etc., from previous and future lives hold the view of annihilation. For the views of these people, the Buddhist yogi world refutes them in sequence with the reasoning that the body is composed of many parts and is not a single whole, and that the mind is impermanent at different times, and so on. Furthermore, they are refuted by explaining the reasoning that prevents the two extremes of permanence and annihilation. Among the yogi worlds, there are also four tenet systems. The first is the Hearers' Vaibhashika, who assert external objects and do not assert self-awareness. They believe that knowable is composed of the five aggregates and the three times, and is substantially existent, and that sense consciousness cognizes objects and time simultaneously. There are many differences in views regarding whether consciousness can cognize objects and self-awareness, and regarding the way of establishing the two truths, the Abhidharmakosha says: "What can be destroyed and analyzed by wisdom into other different parts, that exists conventionally like a pot of water, the ultimate exists differently." This means that form and other material objects, and eye consciousness and other consciousnesses, whatever can be destroyed in sequence with sticks, etc., and analyzed by wisdom into other parts, thereby being able to be destroyed and broken, are conventionally existent; while the smallest indivisible particles of form that cannot be destroyed or broken, and the smallest indivisible moment of consciousness, are considered to be ultimately existent. This is also common with the Sutra School. The second is both external objects and self-awareness.
English
The Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas assert that appearances are objects of consciousness, hidden phenomena and non-associated phenomena are imputed, and Nirvana is non-existent, merely nominal designations. They also claim that consciousness can cognize itself and its objects, among other distinctions. Within the two truths, conventional truth itself is also a designation. As stated in the Pramanavarttika: "Whatever has the power to perform a function, that is ultimately existent here. The rest is conventionally existent; those are considered to be characteristics of self and generality." Thus, whether matter or consciousness, the self-characteristics that perform a function are ultimately true, while general characteristics that cannot perform a function are conventionally true. Self-characteristics are synonymous with reality, impermanence, functionality, and ultimate truth, while general characteristics are synonymous with non-reality, permanence, non-functionality, and conventional truth. With such differing terminology, some schools with similar meanings harm the Vaibhashikas, and the Mind-Only school also harms both who assert that indivisible particles are ultimately true. Thirdly, the Mind-Only school, which does not accept external objects and considers self-awareness to be ultimately true, refutes the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas who assert that the indivisible particles apprehended as external objects are ultimately true. Vasubandhu states: "If six are joined together at once, the subtle particle should become six-parted. If those six are in one place, the aggregate should also be like a subtle particle." If a single particle is joined by six particles above, below, and on the four sides, does the central particle have parts or not? If it has parts, then the indivisible particle would also become six-parted. If it does not have parts, then no matter how many particles gather, they would become a single indivisible unit, and aggregates like mountains would also become subtle particles, and it would be impossible to form coarse objects, thus appearances would cease. This is a refutation. Furthermore, regarding the assertion that the internal grasping consciousness is momentary, indivisible, and ultimately true, for example, in the consciousness of something like Oṃ (藏文：ༀ་，梵文天城体：ओ，梵文罗马拟音：oṃ，汉语字面意思：嗡), Āḥ (藏文：ཨཱཿ，梵文天城体：आः，梵文罗马拟音：āḥ，汉语字面意思：阿), Hūṃ (藏文：ཧཱུྃ་，梵文天城体：हुं，梵文罗马拟音：hūṃ，汉语字面意思：吽), are the moments of consciousness cognizing Oṃ and Āḥ connected or not? If they are not connected, then there is no consciousness in between, thus consciousness would cease, and the preceding and following consciousnesses would become unrelated. If they are connected, do the connected and unconnected parts exist or not? If they exist, then the earlier part of the consciousness cognizing Oṃ is unconnected to Āḥ, and the later part is connected, and the earlier part of the consciousness cognizing Āḥ is connected to Oṃ, and the later part is unconnected, thus it would become four parts, etc., and indivisibility would not be established. If there are no connected and unconnected parts, then it becomes one.
Chinese
并且由于没有前后刹那的部分，因此会受到承认识是常法等的过失的损害。因此，凡是显现为对境的一切，都只是显现为自己的心性，除此之外别无他物，就像梦中的马牛等显现一样，一切显现都认为是心。这种认为空离能取所取的觉性，仅仅是自知自明的观点，对于这种宗派来说，安立二谛的方式是：将一切所知归纳为遍计所执、依他起、圆成实三种，因此，显现为能取所取遥远的遍计所执是世俗谛；如果将二空的识，也就是依他起，在显现方式上强调其主导地位，则是世俗谛；如果在存在方式上强调其主导地位，则是有法胜义谛；而圆成实则仅仅是胜义谛。这种观点将遮止认为自证是真实成立的，正如将要阐述的中观理证的妨害一样。中观派不承认外境和自证二者是胜义谛，因为他们认为一切所知之法都是远离戏论的自性，是二谛双运的平等性，因此比其他宗派更为殊胜。其中，凭借辨别二谛的智慧能力，又分为中观自续派和中观应成派两种。安立二谛的方式是：如果从观察存在方式胜义谛的角度出发，那么显现方式是世俗谛，存在方式是胜义谛；如果从观察显现方式世俗谛的角度出发，那么存在和显现不一致的对境和有境二者都是世俗谛，存在和显现一致的对境和有境二者都是胜义谛，存在这两种方式。总而言之，宗派的智慧过失，小乘有部和经部的智慧过失主要是，对于世俗谛存在自以为是的分别念，以及对于胜义谛存在无分，这二者都认为是胜义谛；唯识宗认为自证自明是胜义谛；中观自续派则执着于二谛各自的方面。因此，对于瑜伽行者来说，也是凭借证悟存在方式的智慧的差别，上面的宗派会损害并压倒下面的宗派所证悟的宗义，因为证悟存在方式的智慧越来越殊胜，所以谁具有量，谁就能驳倒下面的宗派，而不是其他的宗派。如是。