English
Just as it is renowned, it is false. As stated in the Samadhiraja Sutra: "Eyes, ears, and nose are not valid; tongue, body, and mind are not valid. If these faculties were valid, what would the noble path do for anyone?" So it is said. Fourth, if all dharmas are without inherent existence, how could the Thuba (the Able One, i.e., the Buddha) have declared things to be of the nature of momentary impermanence? This is intentional, with the intention based on mere appearances. In order to gradually lead the world that clings to things as real, the Protector showed that things are impermanent. As it says: "The Victorious One said 'I' and 'mine' is due to intention. Aggregates, elements, and sources are likewise spoken of due to intention." In reality, those things are not truly momentary, because they are harmed by reasoning that refutes momentariness. If momentariness is not apparent to the world, then it is also contradictory in conventional truth. If you say so, although it is not apparent to ordinary people, it is apparent to the world of yogis, that is, to those who see only the selflessness of persons. Therefore, there is no fault in it being conventional. If so, then seeing the momentary is said to be seeing reality, which is contradictory. If you say so, in relation to the world's view of permanence, etc., the yogi's not seeing the momentary is regarded as seeing it, because the momentary is only the ultimate truth of designation. Otherwise, if it is merely that an ordinary person, in relation to a yogi, is seeing it, then the yogi's certain realization that a woman is impure, while the world regards her as pure, would become an obstacle, Gela explains in this sense. Fifth, there are four points: not obtaining merit, not connecting rebirth, no virtue or vice, and abandoning meaningless actions. First, if all dharmas are not true, then the Buddha is also false, so offering to him will not produce merit. If you say so, just as you think that offering to a real Buddha will produce real merit, offering to an illusory Buddha will also obtain illusory merit, so there is no fault. Second, if sentient beings are like illusions, how are they born after death? The cause of birth is the assembly of conditions, as long as the conditions
Chinese
只要有聚合，幻象也会随之产生，虽然不是真实的，但看起来相似，仅仅因为时间长久，怎么能说众生比幻象更真实呢？幻象也有长短之分。第三，如果众生杀死众生，幻象杀死幻象，供养等等善恶是否相同呢？幻象之人被幻象杀死，以及供养等等，因为作者没有心，所以没有善恶。如果像幻象一样的有心的众生这样做，作者有慈爱憎恨等心，所以产生福德和罪恶。产生有心和无心的区别，是因为幻象的因，如咒语等，没有产生心的能力，所以幻象的心不会产生，而众生的因有。虚假的事物，果报不同，取决于因的不同。像这样，从各种各样不同的因缘产生的幻象，也会变得各种各样不同。一个因能产生所有的果，在任何地方都不存在。第四，如果从胜义谛上来说，一切众生本来就从自性上已经从寂灭中解脱，但这些众生在世俗谛中仍然在轮回，如果是这样，道理相同，从显现的角度来看，佛也会轮回，那么修菩提行有什么用呢？如果因缘没有中断，幻象也不会停止，同样，众生轮回的因缘没有中断，所以会轮回。而佛陀轮回的因缘已经中断，所以在世俗谛中也不会出现轮回的自性。又，意思是说胜义谛更不用说了吗？或者说，佛陀示现于世间，是由于愿力的力量，而不是因为没有断除轮回的因，没有过失。这是善天所说。胜生说，如果因缘没有中断，不仅是轮回，幻象也不会停止。如果轮回的因缘中断，那么在世俗谛中也不可能轮回。并且，因为串习真如，无明等十二缘起次第止息，所以成佛。
English
As long as there is aggregation, illusion will also arise. Although it is not real, it looks similar. Just because it lasts for a long time, how can one say that sentient beings are more real than illusion? Illusions also have different lengths. Third, if sentient beings kill sentient beings, illusions kill illusions, and offerings, etc., are the merits and demerits the same? When an illusory person is killed by illusion, and offerings, etc., there is no merit or demerit because the actor has no mind. If a sentient being with a mind like an illusion does this, the actor has a mind of love, hatred, etc., so merit and sin arise. The difference between having a mind and not having a mind arises because the cause of illusion, such as mantras, etc., does not have the ability to generate a mind, so the mind of illusion does not arise, but the cause of sentient beings does. False things, different results, depend on different causes. Like this, the illusion that arises from various different causes will also become various and different. One cause cannot produce all the results; it does not exist anywhere. Fourth, if from the ultimate point of view, all sentient beings are inherently liberated from suffering by their very nature, but these beings are still in samsara in the conventional truth. If this is the case, the reasoning is the same. From the perspective of appearance, the Buddha will also be in samsara, so what is the use of practicing the conduct of enlightenment? If the causes are not interrupted, the illusion will not stop. Similarly, the causes of sentient beings' samsara are not interrupted, so they will be in samsara. But for the Buddha, the causes of samsara have been interrupted, so the nature of samsara will not appear even in the conventional truth. Also, does it mean that there is no need to mention the ultimate truth? Or, the Buddha's appearance in the world is due to the power of aspiration, and there is no fault because the cause of being born in samsara has not been abandoned. This is what Gelha said. Sherjung said, if the causes are not interrupted, not only samsara, but also illusion will not stop. If the causes of samsara are interrupted, then samsara is impossible even in the conventional truth. And, because of familiarizing oneself with suchness, ignorance and other twelve links of dependent origination gradually cease, so one becomes a Buddha.
Chinese
解释为不改变范围的意思。显现是，佛陀幻化也是，如果有众生的福德因缘就会显现，如果没有，即使在世俗中也不会显现。第二，依靠胜义谛的辩论反驳分为两种：如果没有错乱的意识，就没有执着；如果错乱的基础不成立，就没有轮回的过失需要避免。第一种分为两种，第一种是辩论者说：如果不存在错乱的意识，那么显现如幻象一般，会以什么作为目标呢？第二种，对此的回答有三种：辩论相同，反驳辩论的回答，以及将重点应用于当前情况。第一种是：如果对于唯识宗的你来说，所取部分如幻象一般，本身不是真实的，那么那时所取部分会以什么作为目标呢？这两者是相同的。第二种分为两种：认为显现是心，以及否定事物既不是意义也不是心。第一种分为两种，第一种是建立宗义：如果所取部分本身不是真实的，但其他意识实际上是真实的，因为显现的方式是心，所以可以作为目标。第二种，对此的反驳有三种：陈述自证对胜义谛的妨碍，没有成立的理由，以及避免对反驳的妨碍。第一种分为直接的和避免错乱两种。第一种是：如果心本身与所取部分幻象是同一实体，那么那时就没有能见和所见，谁会看到什么呢？世间的怙主也曾于《楞伽经》中说：『如刀不自割，如指不自触，不能割不能触，如是心不观心。』同样，《宝顶经》中也说：『如同刀刃不能切割刀刃本身，如同指尖不能触碰指尖本身一样，心本身也不能看到心本身。』因此，如同刀刃不能自己切割自己一样，心也不能看到心。第二种分为两种：例子不成立，以及意义不相同。第一种分为两种，第一种是反驳灯的例子：如同灯自己能够完全照亮自己的事物一样，
English
It is explained as meaning 'not changing the scope.' Manifestation is also explained as: even a Buddha's illusion will arise if there is merit from sentient beings, but if there is none, it will not even arise conventionally. Second, refuting arguments based on ultimate truth has two parts: if there is no mistaken consciousness, there is no grasping; and refuting the fault that if the basis of error is not established, there is no samsara. The first has two parts, the first being the opponent's argument: The Mind-Only proponent says, 'If there is no mistaken consciousness, then what will the appearance, which is like an illusion, take as its object?' The second part has three answers to that: the argument is the same, refuting the answer to the argument, and applying it to the case at hand. The first is: 'If, for you Mind-Only proponents, the apprehended aspect, which is like an illusion, is not true, then what will the apprehended aspect take as its object at that time? These two are the same.' The second has two parts: asserting that appearance is mind, and refuting entities that are neither meaning nor mind. The first has two parts, the first being establishing the system: 'If the apprehended aspect is not true in itself, but other consciousnesses are actually true, since the mode of appearance is mind, it can be an object.' The second part has three refutations to that: stating the harm to self-awareness in ultimate truth, the absence of proof, and avoiding harm to the refutation. The first has two parts: direct and avoiding error. The first is: 'If the mind itself is the same entity as the apprehended aspect illusion, then there is no seer and seen, so who sees what? The protector of the world also said in the Lankavatara Sutra: 'As a sword does not cut itself, as a finger does not touch itself, it cannot cut or touch, so the mind does not see the mind.' Similarly, the Jewel Peak Sutra also says: 'Just as the edge of a sword cannot cut the edge of the sword itself, and just as the tip of a finger cannot touch the tip of the finger itself, so the mind itself cannot see the mind itself.' Therefore, just as the edge of a sword does not cut itself, so the mind does not see the mind.' The second has two parts: the example is not established, and the meaning is not the same. The first has two parts, the first being refuting the example of a lamp: 'Just as a lamp clearly illuminates its own object,
Chinese
如果说心也能像那样自己认识自己，那是不行的，因为灯不是自己照亮自己。因为，凡是能被照亮的，必然先前是不亮的。但灯刚产生时，黑暗就被驱散了，没有不亮的情况。如《根本慧论》所说：“灯在何处，此处无黑暗。灯能照亮什么？能驱散黑暗的就是照亮。”就像这样。第二，驳斥蓝色的例子：例如蓝色，也像水晶一样依赖于其他的蓝色，又像毗琉璃一样不依赖于其他的蓝色。白色的水晶变成蓝色，是依赖于其他的蓝色；像毗琉璃一样的蓝色，变成蓝色并不依赖于其他的蓝色。同样，有些瓶子等事物，需要依赖于其他的显现者和认知者；而像灯和苦乐等，则不需要依赖。如果这样说，那是不对的。因为，毗琉璃的蓝色，从产生时就是蓝色，不是原本不是蓝色，后来自己把自己变成蓝色的。所以，不能用它来比喻自己照亮自己和自己认识自己。有些藏地的学者是这样解释的。而《般若生》中说：蓝色本身变成蓝色，也不是不依赖于其他的，因为它是依赖于因的。如果从自己的因中产生出来的不是蓝色，那它变成蓝色就不需要依赖于其他的条件，必须是自己把自己变成蓝色，但这是不可能的。因为自己对自己起作用是相违的。第二种说法是：如果在世俗中，因为知道灯自己能照亮自己，所以才这样说。那么，在胜义中，心自己能认识自己，又是谁知道后才这样说的呢？因此，比喻和意义并不相符。第二种（破他宗）分二：第一，没有现量的成立：如果胜义中，自证和他证都没有成立，所以没有其他能认识的智慧看到，那么说它的差别是明显或不明显也没有意义。例如就像寡妇的女儿的姿态美不美一样。第二，没有比量的成立：如果不存在自证，自己怎么能回忆起心识呢？不能回忆起来。
English
If it is said that the mind itself knows itself in the same way, that is not the case, because a lamp does not illuminate itself. Because, whatever is to be illuminated is necessarily not illuminated beforehand. But as soon as the lamp arises, darkness is dispelled, and there is no non-illumination. As it says in the Root Wisdom: "Where there is a lamp, there is no darkness. What does a lamp illuminate? That which dispels darkness is the illuminator." Like that. Second, refuting the example of blue: For example, blue, like crystal, depends on other blue, and like lapis lazuli, blue itself does not depend on other blue. White crystal turning blue depends on other blue; like lapis lazuli, blue itself does not depend on other blue to turn blue. Similarly, some things like pots depend on other illuminators and cognizers, while things like lamps and pleasure and pain do not depend on them. If you say that, it is not right. Because the blue of lapis lazuli is blue from the moment it arises, it is not that it was not blue and then made itself blue. Therefore, it cannot be used as an example of self-illumination and self-cognition. Some Tibetan scholars explain it this way. And the Sherjung says: Blue itself turning blue is not independent of others, because it depends on the cause. If what arises from its own cause is not blue, then its turning blue does not depend on other conditions, and it must make itself blue, but that is impossible. Because it is contradictory for oneself to act on oneself. The second saying is: If in conventional terms, it is said that a lamp illuminates itself because it is known. Then, in ultimate terms, who knows that the mind itself knows itself and says that? Therefore, the example and the meaning do not correspond. The second (refutation of others' views) has two parts: First, there is no establishment by direct perception: If in the ultimate sense, neither self-cognition nor other-cognition is established, so no other knowing wisdom sees it, then it is meaningless to say that its difference is clear or unclear. For example, like the beauty or ugliness of a widow's daughter's posture. Second, there is no establishment by inference: If there is no self-cognition, how can one remember consciousness? It cannot be remembered.