English
Thus what appear as but different aware- nesses, as book-cognition, table-cognition, are not in reality different awarenesses, but one unchangeable consciousness suc- cessively associated with ever-changing objects which falsely appear to be integrated with it and give rise to the appearance that quali- tatively different kinds of consciousness are flashing forth from moment to moment. Consciousness cannot be regarded as momen- tary. For, had it been so, it would have appeared different at every different moment. If it is urged that, though different conscious- nesses are arising at each different moment, yet on account of extreme similarity this is not noticed; then it may be replied that, if there is difference between the two consciousnesses of two successive moments, then such difference must be grasped either by a different consciousness or by the same consciousness. In the first alternative the third awareness, which grasps the first two awarenesses and their difference, must either be identical with them, and in that case the difference between the three awarenesses would vanish; or it may be different from them, and in that case, if another awareness be required to comprehend their difference and that requires another and so on, there would be a vicious infinite. If the difference be itself said to be identical with the nature of the consciousness (samvit-svariipa-bhiito bhedah), and if there is nothing to apprehend this difference, then the non- appearance of the difference implies the non-appearance of the consciousness itself ; for by hypothesis the difference has been held to be identical with the consciousness itself. The non-appearance of difference, implying the non-appearance of consciousness, would mean utter blindness. The difference between the awareness of one moment and another cannot thus either be logically proved, or realized in experience, which always testifies to the unity of awareness through all moments of its appearance. It may be held that the appearance of unity is erroneous, and that, as such, it x1] Recognition in Vedanta and Buddhism 65 presumes that the awarenesses are similar; for without such a similarity there could not have been the erroneous appearance of unity. But, unless the difference of the awarenesses and their similarity be previously proved, there is nothing which can even suggest that the appearance of unity is erroneous!. It cannot be urged that, if the existence of difference and similarity between the awarenesses of two different moments can be proved to be false, then only can the appearance of unity be proved to be true; for the appearance of unity is primary and directly proved by experience. Its evidence can be challenged only if the existence of difference between the awarenesses and their similarity be otherwise proved. The unity of awareness is a recognition of the identity of the awarenesses (pratyabhina), which is self-evident. It has also been pointed out that the Buddhists give a different analysis ef the fact of recognition. They hold that perception reveals the existence of things at the moment of perception, whereas recognition involves the supposition of their existence through a period of past time, and this cannot be apprehended by perception, which is limited to the present moment only. If it is suggested that recognition is due to present perception as asso- ciated with the impressions (samskara) of previous experience, then such a recognition of identity would not prove the identity of the self as ‘‘ I am he””—for in the self-luminous self there cannot be any impressions. The mere consciousness as the flash cannot prove any identity; for that is limited to the present moment and cannot refer to past experience and unite it with the experience of the present moment. The Buddhists on their side deny the existence of recognition as the perception of identity, and think that it is in reality not one but two concepts—“‘I”’ and “‘that”’— and not a separate experience of the identity of the self as per- sisting through time. To this the Vedantic reply is that, though there cannot be any impressions in the self as pure consciousness, yet the self as associated with the mind (antahkarana) can well have impressions (samskara), and so recognition is possible?. But it may be objected that the complex of the self and mind would then be playing the double réle of knower and the known; for it is the mind containing the impressions and the self that together | Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, p. 76. * kevale cidatmani janya-jnana-tat-samskarayor asambhave ’py antahkarana- visiste tat-sambhavad ukta-pratyabhijnda kim na syat. Ibid. p. 76. DII 5 66 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cu. play the part of the recognizer, and it is exactly those impressions together with the self that form the content of recognition also— and hence in this view the agent and the object have to be regarded as one. But in reply to this Vidyaranya Muni urges that all systems of philosophy infer the existence of soul as different from the body ; and, as such an inference is made by the self, the self is thus both the agent and the object of such inferences. Vidyaranya says that it may further be urged that the recognizer is constituted of the self in association with the mind, whereas the recognized entity is constituted of the self as qualified by past and present time’. Thus the recognition of self-identity does not strictly involve the fact of the oneness of the agent and its object. If it is urged that, since recognition of identity of self involves two concepts, it also involves two moments, then the assertion that all knowledge is momentary also involves two concepts, for momentariness cannot be regarded as being identical with knowledge. The complexity of a concept does not mean that it is not one but two different concepts occurring at two different moments. If such a maxim is accepted, then the theory that all knowledge is momentary cannot be admitted as one concept, but two concepts occurring at two moments; and hence momentariness cannot be ascribed to know- ledge, as is done by the Buddhists. Nor can it be supposed, in accordance with the Prabhakara view, that the existence of the permanent ‘‘this self”? is admitted merely on the strength of the recognizing notion of “‘self-identity”; for the self which abides through the past and exists in the present cannot be said to depend on a momentary concept of recognition of self-identity. The notion of self-identity is only a momentary notion, which lasts only at the present time; and hence the real and abiding self cannot owe its reality or existence merely to a psychological notion of the moment. Again, if it is argued that memory, such as “I had an awareness of a book,” shows that the self was existing at the past time when the book was perceived, it may be replied that such memory and previous experience may prove the past existence of the self, but it cannot prove that the self that was existing in the past is identical with the self that is now experiencing. The mere existence of self at two moments of time does not prove that the self had persisted through the intervening times. Two notions of . 1 antahkarana-visistatayaivatmanah pratyabhijfatrtvam pirvapara-kala-vi- sistataya ca pratyabhijneyatvam. Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, p.77. xr] Recognition in Vedanta and Buddhism 67 two different times cannot serve to explain the idea of recognition, which presupposes the notion of persistence. If it were held that the two notions produce the notion of self-persistence through the notion of recognition, then that would mean that the Buddhist admits that one can recognize himself as ‘‘I am he.” It cannot be said that, since the self itself cannot be perceived, there is no possibility of the perception of the identity of the self through recognition ; for, when one remembers “I had an experience,” that very remembrance proves that the self was perceived. Though at the time when one remembers it the self at the time of such memory is felt as the perceiver and not as the object of that self-perception, yet at the time of the previous experience which is now being remembered the self must have been itself the object of the per- ception. If it is argued that it is only the past awareness that is the object of memory and this awareness, when remembered, ex- presses the self as its cognizer, then to this it may be replied that since at the time of remembering there is no longer the past awareness, the cognizer on whom this awareness had to rest itself is also absent. It is only when an awareness reveals itself that it also reveals the cognizer on whom it rests; but, if an awareness is — remembered, then the awareness which is remembered is only made an object of present awareness which is self-revealed. But the past awareness which is supposed to be remembered is past and lost and, as such, it neither requires a cognizer on which it has to rest nor actually reveals such a cognizer. It is only the self-revealed cognition that also immediately reveals the cognizer with its own revelation. But, when a cognition is mediated through memory, its cognizer is not manifested with its remembrance? So the self which experienced an awareness in the past can be referred to only through the mediation of memory. So, when the Prabhakaras hold that the existence of the self is realized through such a complex notion as ‘‘I am he,” it has to be admitted that it is only through the process of recognition (pratyabhyfa) that the persistence of the self is established.