English
The Advaita-brahma-siddhi is an excellent summary of all the most important Vedanta doc- trines, written in an easy style and explaining the chief features of the Vedantic doctrines in the different schools of Advaita teachers. Narahari’s Bodha-sara may be mentioned as one of the important products of the late eighteenth century!. The sort of relationship of teachers and students in particular circles that has been pointed out holds good of the earlier authors also, though it is difficult to trace them as well as can be done in the later years, since many of the earlier books are now missing and the footprints of older traditions are becoming more and more faint. Thus it may be pointed out that Vidyaranya was a con- temporary of Amalananda in the fourteenth century, as both of them * A number of other important Vedanta works, written mostly during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, may also be mentioned. Thus Lokanatha, son of Sarvajfianarayana and grandson of Nrsimhaérama, wrote a metrical work in three chapters refuting the views of the dualists, called Advaita-mukta- sara with a commentary on it called Kanti; Brahmananda Sarasvati wrote the Advaita-siddhanta-vidyotana; Gopalananda Sarasvati, pupil of Yogananda, wrote the Akhandatma-prakasika; WHarihara Paramahamsa, pupil of Sivarama, pupil of Visvesvaragrama, wrote the Anubhava-vildsa, and early in the nineteenth century Samin, a pupil of Brahmananda, wrote a big work in twelve chapters, called Brahmananda-vilasa. In this connection it may not be out of place to mention the names of some important works of Vedanta dialectics in refutation of other systems of philosophical views more or less on the lines of those dialec- tical writings which have been noticed in the present volume. Thus Ananda- pti-na (A.D. 1600), who commented on Sriharsa’s Khandana-khanda-khadya, wrote the Nyaya-candrika in four chapters, refuting the views of the Nyaya, Mimamsa and Vaisesika; Anandanubhava, pupil of Narayana Jyotisha, who lived probably in the same century, wrote a similar work, called Padartha-tattva-nirnaya ; Jianaghana, who probably lived in the thirteenth century, wrote an elaborate dialectical work in thirty-three chapters (prakarana), called Tattva-suddhi; Srinivasa Yajvan, who probably lived in the sixteenth century, wrote the Vadd- vali in twenty-six chapters in refutation of Visistadvaita and Dvaita views; Bhavanisankara also wrote a similar dialectical work, called Siddhdnta-dipika. As examples of semi-popular Vedanta works of a syncretistic type, such works as the Tativa-bodha of Vasudevendra, the Guna-traya-viveka of Svayamprakasa Yogindra, the Jagan-mithyatva-dipikd of Ramendra Yogin, the Ananda-dipa of Sivananda Yati (which hada commentary called Ananda-dipa-tikar by Ramaniatha), the Svatma-yoga-pradipa by Yogisvara (which had a commentary by Amarananda) and the Veddnta-hrdaya (on the lines of the Yoga-vasistha and Gauda- pada) by Varada Pandita may be mentioned. This latter work was probably later than Praka$sananda’s Vedanta-siddhanta-muktavali, which followed the same line of thought. 58 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. were pupils of Sankarananda and Anubhavananda respectively ; these in turn were both pupils of Anandatman. Sankarananda was the author of the Gitd-tatparya-bodhini and of a number of commentaries on the various Upanisads, and also of a summary of the Upanisads, called Upanisad-ratna. Amalananda, however, had as teacher not only Anubhavananda, but also Sukhaprakasa Muni, who again was a disciple of Citsukha, himself a disciple of Gaudeégvara Acarya (called also Jhanottama). Vedanta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist Doctrine of Soullessness. One of the most important points of Sankara’s criticism of Buddhism is directed against its denial of a permanent soul which could unite the different psychological constituents or could behave as the enjoyer of experiences and the controller of all thoughts and actions. The Buddhists argue that for the production of sense-cognition, as the awareness of a colour or sound, what is required in addition to the sense-data of colours, etc. is the corresponding sense- faculties, while the existence of a soul cannot be deemed indispens- able for the purpose!. Vasubandhu argues that what is experienced is the sense-data and the psychological elements in groups called skandhas. What one calls self (atman) cannot be anything more than a mere apparent cognitional existence (prajfapti-sat) of what in reality is but a conglomeration of psychological elements. Had the apparent self been something as different from the psycho- logical elements as colours are from sounds, it would then be regarded as an individual (pudgala) ; but, if its difference from these psychological elements be of the same nature as the difference of the constituents of milk from the appearance of milk, then the self could be admitted only to have a cognitional existence (prajnapti- sat)?. The self has, in fact, only a cognitional appearance of separateness from the psychological elements; just as, though 1 The arguments here followed are those of Vasubandhu, as found in his Abhidharma-koga, and are based on Prof. Stcherbatsky’s translation of the ap- pendix to ch. viii of that work, called the Pudgala-viniscaya, and Yasomitra’s commentary in manuscript from Nepal, borrowed from Vigvabhirati, Santini- ketan, Bengal. 2 yadi yatha ripadih sabdader bhavantaram abhipreyate pudgala iti abhyu- pagato bhavati bhinna-laksanam hi riipam sabddad ityaddi ksiradivat samudayasé cet prajnaptitah. Abhidharma-kosa-vyakhya, Visvabhiarati MS. p. 337. x1] Soul in Vedanta and Buddhism 59 milk appears to have a separate existence from the proper com- bination of its constituent elements, yet it is in reality nothing more than a definite kind of combination of its constituent elements, so the self is nothing more than a certain conglomeration of the-psychological elements (skandha), though it may appear to have a separate and independent existence. The Vatsiputriyas, however, think that the individual is something different from the skandhas or psychological entities, as its nature is different from the nature of them. The Vatsiputriyas-deny the existence of a permanent soul, but believe in momentary individuals (pudgala) as a category separate and distinct from the skandhas. Just as fire is something different from the fuel that conditioned it, so the name “individual” (pudgala) is given to something conditioned by the skandhas at a given moment in a personal life!. Vasuban- dhu, however, argues against the acceptance of such an individual and says that there is no meaning in accepting such an individual. Rain and sun have no effects on miere vacuous space, they are of use only to the skin; if the individual is, like the skin, a deter- miner of the value of experiences, then it must be accepted as external; if it is like vacuous space, then no purpose is fulfilled by accepting it?. The Vatsiputriyas, however, thought that, just as the fuel conditioned the fire, so the personal elements conditioned the individual. By this conditioning the Vatsiputriyas meant that the personal elements were some sort of a coexisting support?. What is meant by saying that the pudgala is conditioned by the personal elements is that, when the skandhas or psychological elements are present, the pudgala is also present there*. But Vasubandhu urges that a mere conditioning of this kind is not sufficient to establish the cognitional existence of an individual ; for even colour is conditioned by the visual sense, light and attention in such a way that, these being present, there is the perception of light; but can anybody on that ground consider the 1 Stcherbatsky’s translation of the Pudgala-vintscaya, Bulletin de Académie des Sciences de Russie, p. 830. The exact textof Vasubandhu, as translated from Tibetan in a note, runs thus: grhita-pratyutpannabhyantara-skandham upadaya pudgala-prajnaptih. Ibid.p.953. 2 Vatstputriyandm tirthika-drstih prasajyate nisprayganatvam ca varsata-pabhyam kim vyomnas carmany-asti tayoh phalam carmopamas cet sa nityah khatulyas ced asatphalah. MS. of Yasgomitra’s commentary, p. 338. 3 asraya-bhiitah saha-bhiitas ca. Ibid. 4 riipasyapi prajnaptir vaktavya caksur-adisu satsu tasyopalambhat, tani cak- sur-ddiny upadaya riipam prajnapyate. Ibid. 60 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. existence of colour to be a cognitional one? And would cognitional entities deserve to be enumerated as separate categories? Again it may be asked, if such an individual exists, how is it experienced? For, if it be experienced by any of the senses, it must be a sense- datum: for the senses can grasp only their appropriate sense-data, and the individual is no sense-datum. Therefore, just as milk is nothing but the collected sense-data of colour, taste, etc., so also the so-called individual is nothing more than the conglomerated psychological elements!. The Vatsiputriyas argue that, since the psychological elements, the sense-data, etc., are the causes of our experience of the individual, the individual cannot be regarded as being identical with these causal elements which are responsible for their experience; if it were so, then even light, eye, attention, etc., which are causes of the experience of the sense-data, would have to be regarded as being identical in nature with the indi- vidual?. But itis not so maintained ; the sense-datum of sounds and colours is always regarded as being different from the individual, and one always distinguishes an individual from a sense-datum and says “this is sound,” “‘this is colour” and “‘this is individual?.” But the individual is not felt to be as distinct from the psychological elements as colour is from sound.