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One may seek to attain this state either by philosophic wisdom or by devotion to God, and it is the latter path which is easier. God, by His grace, helps the devotee to purge his mind of all impurities, and so by His grace a man can dissociate his mind from all motives of greed and selfishness and be in communion with Him; he can thus perform his duties, as fixed for him by his caste or his custom, without looking forward to any reward or gain. The Gita ideal of conduct differs from the sacrificial ideal of 1 Gitd, xvii. 44-48. 504 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita [cH. conduct in this, that sacrifices are not to be performed for any ulterior end of heavenly bliss or any other mundane benefits, but merely from a sense of duty, because sacrifices are enjoined in the scriptures to be performed by Brahmins; and they must therefore be performed from a pure sense of duty. The Gita ideal of ethics differs from that preached in the systems of philosophy like the Vedanta or the Yoga of Patafijali in this, that, while the aim of these systems was to transcend the sphere of actions and duties, to rise to a stage in which one could give up all one’s activities, mental or physical, the ideal of the Gita was decidedly an ideal of work. The Gita, as has already been pointed out, does not advocate a course of extremism in anything. However elevated a man may be, he must perform his normal caste-duties and duties of customary morality!. The Gita is absolutely devoid of the note of pessimism which is associated with early Buddhism. The sila, samadhi and pafiia of Buddhism have, no doubt, in the Gita their counterparts in the training of a man to disinclination for joys and attachments, to concentration on God and the firm and steady fixation of will and intelligence; but the significance of these in the Gita is entirely different from that which they have in Buddhism. The Gita does not expound a course of approved conduct and prohibitions, since, so far as these are concerned, one’s actions are to be guided by the code of caste-duties or duties of customary morality. What is required of a man is that he should cleanse his mind from the impurities of attachment, desires and cravings. The samadhi of the Gita is not a mere concentration of the mind on some object, but communion with God, and the wisdom, or prajna, of the Gita is no realization of any philosophic truth, but a fixed and unperturbed state of the mind, where the will and intellect remain unshaken in one’s course of duty, clear of all consequences and free from all attachments, and in a state of equanimity which cannot be shaken or disturbed by pleasures or sorrows. It may naturally be asked in this connection, what is the general standpoint of Hindu Ethics? The Hindu social system is based on a system of fourfold division of castes. The Gita says that God Himself created the fourfold division of castes into Brahmins, Ksattriyas, Vaigyas and Siidras, a division based on characteristic 1 Sankara, of course, is in entire disagreement with this interpretation of the Gita, as will be discussed in a later section. x1v]_ The Ethics of the Gita and the Buddhist Ethics 505 qualities and specific duties. Over and above this caste division and its corresponding privileges, duties and responsibilities, there is also a division of the stages of life into that of Brahma-carin— student, grha-stha—householder, vana-prastha—tretired in a forest, and bhiksu—mendicant, and each of these had its own prescribed duties. The duties of Hindu ethical life consisted primarily of the prescribed caste-duties and the specific duties of the different stages of life, and this is known as varnasrama-dharma. Over and above this there were also certain duties which were common to all, called the sadharana-dharmas. Thus Manu mentions steadiness (dhairya), forgiveness (ksama), self-control (dama), non-stealing (cauryabhava), purity (Sauca), sense-control (indriya-nigraha), wisdom (dhi), learning (vidya), truthfulness (satya) and control of anger (akrodha) as examples of sadharana-dharma. Pragastapada mentions faith in religious duties (dharma-sraddha), non-injury (ahimsa), doing good to living beings (bhita-hitatva), truthfulness (satya-vacana), non-stealing (asteya), sex-continence (brahma- carya), sincerity of mind (anupadha), control of anger (krodha- varjana), cleanliness and ablutions (abhisecana), taking of pure food (Suct-dravya-sevana), devotion to Vedic gods (visista-devata-bhakti), and watchfulness in avoiding transgressions (apramada). The caste-duties must be distinguished frorn these common duties. Thus sacrifices, study and gifts are common to all the three higher castes, Brahmins, Ksattriyas and Vaisyas. The specific duties of a Brahmin are acceptance of gifts, teaching, sacrifices and so forth; the specific duties of a Ksattriya are protection of the people, punishing the wicked, not to retreat from battles and other specific tasks; the duties of a Vaisya are buying, selling, agri- culture, breeding and rearing of cattle, and the specific duties of a Vaigya. The duties of a Siidra are to serve the three higher castes}. Regarding the relation between varna-dharma and sadharana- dharma, a modern writer says that “‘the sadharana-dharmas con- stitute the foundation of the varnasrama-dharmas, the limits within which the latter are to be observed and obeyed. For 1 The Gita, however, counts self-control (sama), control over the mind (dama), purity (sauca), forgiving nature (ksdanti), sincerity (arjava), knowledge (jriana), wisdom (vijfidna) and faith (astikya) as the natural qualities of Brahmins. The duties of Ksattriyas are heroism (Saurya), smartness (tejas), power of en- durance (dhrti), skill (daksya), not to fly in battle (yuddhe capy apalayana), making of gifts (dana) and power of controlling others (%svara-bhava). ‘The “natural duties of Vaisyas are agriculture, rearing of cows and trade. Gitd, XVIII. 42-44. 506 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita [cH. example, the Brahmin in performing religious sacrifice must not appropriate another’s property, non-appropriation being one of the common and universal duties. In this way he serves his own community as well as subserves (though in a negative way) the common good of the community—and so, in an indirect way, serves the common good of humanity. Thus the individual of a specific community who observes the duties of his class does not serve his own community merely, but also and in the same process all other communities according to their deserts and needs, and in this way the whole of humanity itself. This, it will be seen, is also the view of Plato, whose virtue of justice is the common good which is to be realized by each class through its specific duties; but this is to be distinguished from the common good which constitutes the object of the sadharana-dharmas of the Hindu classification. The end in these common and universal duties is not the common well-being, which is being correctly realized in specific communities, but the common good as the precondition and foundation of the latter; it is not the good which is common- in-the-individual, but common-as-the-prius-of-the-individual. Hence the sadharana duties are obligatory equally for all indi- viduals, irrespective of their social position or individual capacity?.” The statement that the common good (sadharana-dharma) could be regarded as the precondition of the specific caste-duties implies that, if the latter came into conflict with the former, then the former should prevail. This is, however, inexact; for there is hardly any instance where, in case of a conflict, the sadharana-dharma, or the common duties, had a greater force. Thus, for example, non-injury to living beings was acommon duty ; but sacrifices implied the killing of animals, and it was the clear duty of the Brahmins to perform sacrifices. War implied the taking of an immense number of human lives; but it was the duty of a Ksattriya not to turn away from a battle-field, and in pursuance of his obligatory duty as a Ksattriya he had to fight. Turning to traditional accounts, we find in the Ramayana that Sambika was a Sidra saint (muni) who was per- forming ascetic penances in a forest. This was a transgression of caste-duties; for a Sidra could not perform tapas, which only the higher caste people were allowed to undertake, and hence the performance of tapas by the Siidra saint Sambiika was regarded * Ethics of the Hindus, by S. K. Maitra under Dr Seal’s close personal supervision and guidance, pp. 3-4. x1v]_ The Ethics of the Gita and the Buddhist Ethics 507 as adharma (vice); and, as a result of this adharma, there was a calamity in the kingdom of Rama in the form of the death of an infant son of a Brahmin. King Rama went out in his chariot and beheaded Sambiika for transgressing his caste-duties. Instances could be multiplied to show that, when there was a conflict between the caste-duties and the common duties, it was the former that had the greater force. The common duties had their force only when they were not in conflict with the caste-duties. The Gita is itself an example of how the caste-duties had preference over common duties. In spite of the fact that Arjuna was extremely unwilling to take the lives of his near and dear kinsmen in the battle of Kuruksetra Krsna tried his best to dissuade him from his disinclination to fight and pointed out to him that it was his clear duty, as a Ksattriya, to fight. It seems therefore very proper to hold that the common duties had only a general applica- tion, and that the specific caste-duties superseded them, whenever the two were in conflict.