English
When a man can purge his mind of attachments and antipathies and can take to sense-objects after purifying his senses and keeping them in full control, he attains contentment (prasada). When such contentment is attained, all sorrows vanish and his mind becomes fixed (buddhih paryavati- sthate)?. Thus sense-control, on the one hand, makes the mind unruffled, fixed, at peace with itself and filled with contentment, and on the other hand, by making the mind steady and fixed, it makes communion with God possible. Sense-control is the indis- pensable precondition of communion with God; when once this has been attained, it is possible to link oneself with God by con- tinued efforts*. Thus sense-control, by producing steadiness of the will and thought, results in contentment and peace on the one hand, and on the other makes the mind fit for entering into communion with God. One thing that strikes us in reading the Gita is that the object of sense-control in the Gita is not the attainment of a state of emancipated oneness or the absolute cessation of all mental pro- cesses, but the more intelligible and common-sense ideal of the attainment of steadiness of mind, contentment and the power of entering into touch with God. This view of the object of self- control is therefore entirely different from that praised in the philosophic systems of Patafijali and others. The Gita wants us to control our senses and mind and to approach sense-objects with such a controlled mind and senses, because it is by this means alone that we can perform our duties with a peaceful and contented mind and turn to God with a clean and unruffled heart®. The main emphasis of this sense-control is not on the mere external control of volitional activities and the control of motor propensities i Gitaeite sO. 2 Tbtd S36.587. 8 _ Abid. II. 65; see also 11. 58, 64, 68, 70, 71. 4 Ibid. v1. 36. raga-dvesa-vimuktais tu visayan tndriyais caran atma-vasyair vidheyadtma prasadam adhigacchati. Ibid. 11. 64. xiv] The Ethics of the Gita and the Buddhist Ethics 493 in accordance with the direction of passions and appetites, but on the inner control of the mind behind these active senses. When a person controls only his physical activities, and yet continues to brood over the attractions of sense, he is in reality false in his conduct (mithyacara). Real self-control does not mean only the cessation of the external operations of the senses, but also the control of the mind. Not only should a man cease from committing actions out of greed and desire for sense-gratification, but his mind should be absolutely clean, absolutely clear of all impurities of sense-desires. Mere suspension of physical action without a corresponding control of mind and cessation from harbouring passions and desires is a vicious course. The Ethics of the Gita and the Buddhist Ethics. The subject of sense-control naturally reminds one of Bud- dhism. In the Vedic religion performance of sacrifices was considered as the primary duty. Virtue and vice consisted in obedience or disobedience to Vedic injunctions. It has been pointed out that these injunctions implied a sort of categorical imperative and communicated a sense of vidhi as law, a command which must be obeyed. But this law was no inner law of the spirit within, but a mere external law, which ought not to be confused with morality in the modern sense of the term. Its sphere was almost wholly ritualistic, and, though it occasionally included such commands as ‘“‘One should not injure anyone” (ma himsyat), yet in certain sacrifices which were aimed at injuring one’s enemies operations which would lead to such results would have the imperative of a Vedic command, though the injury to human beings would be attended with its necessary punishment. Again, though in later Samkhya commentaries and compendiums it is said that all kinds of injuries to living beings bring their punish- ment, yet it is doubtful if the Vedic injunction ‘‘’Thou shouldst not injure”’ really applied to all living beings, as there would be but few sacrifices where animals were not killed. The Upanisads, however, start an absolut.ly new line by the substitution of meditations and self-knowledge for sacrificial actions. In the 1 Cf. Dhamma-pada, 1.2. All phenomena have mind as their precursor, are dependent upon mind and are made up of mind. If a man speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness accompanies him, just as a shadow follows a man incessantly. 494 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita [cH. primary stage of Upanisadic thoughts a conviction was growing that instead of the sacrificial performances one could go through a set form of meditations, identifying in thought certain objects with certain other objects (e.g. the dawn as the horse of horse- sacrifice) or even with symbolic syllables, OM and the like. In the more developed stage of Upanisadic culture a new conviction arose in the search after the highest and the ultimate truth, and the knowledge of Brahman as the highest essence in man and nature is put forward as the greatest wisdom and the final realiza- tion of truth and reality, than which nothing higher could be conceived. There are but few moral precepts in the Upanisads, and the whole subject of moral conflict and moral efforts is almost silently dropped or passes unemphasized. In the Tatttirtya Upanisad, 1. 11, the teacher is supposed to give a course of moral instruction to his pupil after teaching him the Vedas—Tell the truth, be virtuous, do not give up the study of the Vedas; after presenting the teacher with the stipulated honorarium (at the con- clusion of his studies) the pupil should (marry and) continue the line of his family. He should not deviate from truth or from virtue (dharma) or from good. He should not cease doing good to others, from study and teaching. He should be respectful to his parents and teachers and perform such actions as are unimpeachable. He should follow only good conduct and not bad. He should make gifts with faith (sraddha), not with indifference, with dignity, from a sense of shame, through fear and through knowledge. If there should be any doubt regarding his course of duty or conduct, then he should proceed to act in the way in which the wisest Brahmins behaved. But few Upanisads give such moral precepts, and there is very little in the Upanisads in the way of describing a course of moral behaviour or of emphasizing the fact that man can attain his best only by trying to become great through moral efforts. The Upanisads occupy themselves almost wholly with mystic meditations and with the philosophic wisdom of self- knowledge. Yet the ideas of self-control, peace and cessation of desires, endurance and concentration are referred to in Brhad- Granyaka, Iv. 4. 23, aS a necessary condition for the realization of the self within us!. In Katha, vi. 11, the control of the senses (indriya-dharana) is referred to as yoga, and in Mundaka, 1. 2. 2, 1 santo danta uparatas titiksuh samahito bhiitvatmany eva atmanam pasyati. Brh, 1. 4. 23. xIv]_ The Ethics of the Gita and the Buddhist Ethics 495 it is said that he who consciously desires the objects of desire is again and again born through desires; but even in this world all desires vanish for him who is self-realized in himself and is self- satisfied!. The idea that the path of wisdom is different from the path of desires was also known, and it was felt that he who sought wisdom (vidyabhipsita) was not drawn by many desires?. The point to be discussed in this connection is whether the central idea of the Gita, namely, sense-control and more particularly the control of desires and attachments, is derived from the Upanisads or from Buddhism. It has been pointed out that the Upanisads do not emphasize the subject of moral conflict and moral endeavours so much as the nature of truth and reality as Brahman, the ultimate essence of man and the manifold ap- pearance of the world. Yet the idea of the necessity of sense- control and the control of desires, the settling of the mind in peace and contentment, is the necessary precondition for fitness for Vedic knowledge. Thus Sankara, the celebrated commentator on the Upanisads, in commenting on Brahma-siitra, 1. 1. 1, says that a man is fit for an enquiry after Brahman only when he knows how to distinguish what is permanent from what is transitory (nityanitya-vastu-viveka), and when he has no attachment to the enjoyment of the fruits of his actions either as mundane pleasures or as heavenly joys (thamutra-phala-bhoga-viraga). 'The necessary qualifications which entitle a man to make such an enquiry are disinclination of the mind for worldly joys (Sama), possession of proper control and command over the mind, by which it may be turned to philosophy (dama), power of endurance (visaya-titiksa), cessation of all kinds of duties (uparati), and faith in the philo- sophical conception of truth and reality (tattva-sraddha). It may be supposed, therefore, that the Upanisads presuppose a high degree of moral development in the way of self-control and dis- inclination to worldly and heavenly joys. Detachment from sense- affections is one of the most dominant ideas of the Gita, and the idea of Mundaka, 111. 2. 2, referred to above, is re-echoed in the Gita, 11. 70, where it is said that, just as the waters are absorbed in the calm sea (though poured in continually by the rivers), so the person in whom all desires are absorbed attains peace, and 1 kaman yah kdmayate manyamanah sa kamabhir jayate tatra tatra paryapta- kamasya krtatmanas tu ihaiva sarve praviliyanti kamah. Mundaka, it. 2. 2. 2 Katha, 1. 4. 496 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita [cH. not the man who indulges in desires.