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190, Since visible perception of phenomena is an illusion, a theosophist’s desire of enjoyment is therefore not firm, for he knows it to be impermanent, and it is consequently unlike that of ignorant persons, who are firm in their desire. 1g. Two distinct doctrines prevail in the Shastras, for instance, “ Desire is characteristic of the ignorant,’* and “ Pas- sions and desires are found even in a theosophist,” but they are not meant to imply any contradiction. For, desire is the play-ground of the internal organ, and 4s the cavern of a tree * As from the sight of smoke in a mountain the nateral in= ference is the presence of fire in it, so is the presence of fond attachment a sign of indication of the ignorant. 5B4 PANCHADAS!. ‘ebintalning fire kills it, by destroying its sap, and its greenness fe gone; so do the sacred writings interdict passions and desires in the wise, for they are detrimental to emancipation. Hence it is said, when their purport is gathered, and cognition of the Secondless Reality firmly established, a person ts no longer affected by his desires, because they are simply the attributes of the internal organ, But then, aa @ theosophist’s dosires are not firm, consequently their want is established, hence admission and interdiction of @ theosophist's desire in the sacred writings, as they refer to firmness or firm attach> tment (which he has not) and its want, does not signify any opposite condition, but simply want of fond attachment. 192. As the unreality of phenomena is firmly established in the wise, so is his knowledge of self, being unconditioned * If from some cause or other, there be fire in the cavern of atree, its sap is destroyed: so is tranquility of mind destroyed by desire produced from ignorance of the Supreme Self and his distinction with the individual spirit or Atma, therefore it is said to be his sign. A theosophist's desire is not firm, that is to say, from a relation of its proximate cause, the internal organ, and a similar relation with the material cause, its friendly object, an exclusive want of desire is called ‘unfirm desire.’ An ignorant person has also his relation with the internal organ but no want of desire; we feel no desire in sound sleep, but there is no relation of the internal organ toc; impressions only continue then, In the ignorant, notwithstanding a relation of the internal organ, a desire is absent when trying for the accomplishment of an object, but there is no recollection of objects conformable er friendly and adjacent or near. A similar relation with the internal organ and conformable objects are found to be present along with a theoso- phist’s desire when he is not in the discriminating mood, but that is not constant or exclusively so. In the Gita (Chap. 10., ¥. 59,) is mentioned, ‘Desires cease in an individual after the cogni- tion of Brahma.” Hence unfirm desires of s theosophist are favliless. PANCHADASI. : 18S: and anreiated, he has no more desire for any object; therefore it is anid: “What more is be to desire and continue attached to the body?” It is not to be supposed, want of objects Produce cessation of desire; on the other hand, from an absence of agent of instrament of enjoyment, desire is des troyed: and that does not signify the death or destruction of the agent, but only his instrumentality of enjoyment. 193. “A husband and wife are not desired for their grati- fication, but for enjoyment of Self.” Sruéi. In other words, affection for wife or son does not proceed from any other motive but self-interest ; a person has his own desires to serve, therefore the above passage from the Sruft, like similar others, ‘re intended to show desire for wife and children, husband, and other objects proceed not for making them enjoy happi- ness, but for the happiness of one’s own self. But it may be objected, as self is not an instrument or agent, it is futile, to do away with the idea of his enjoyment; though this ts a fact, yet prior to gnosis has atisen, he Is apt to be taken for an instrument, and individual experience likewise establishes it. This is again corroborated by the above Srufi text. 194. Who is the agent? Whether the Uniform Intell gence or its reflected shadow is so, or the two together com- bined? Now as regards the first, it is clearly untenable, be- cause Uniform Intelligence is unassociated and unrelated : 195. Because enjoyment is a modification of conceit in happiness and its reverse; and as the Uniform Intelligence fa subject to no modification {it is unchangeable) therefore if it were to be an instrument of enjoyment, its uniformity will be destroyed and it will then be subject to change, and change cannot abide in uniformity—the two are opposed to one another. To be more explicit:—Enjoyment of bappi- ness and misery assumes this shape “I am happy,” “Iam miserable,” etc., for which it is called a changed condition of conceit, in the form of happiness or its reverse. Now intelli. gence that is uniform, and knows no change, cannot be com i BANCHADAS!, ected with that concelt, inasmuch as change does not reside fin the same place with uniformity, for they are naturally opposed. 196. Neither can reflex intelligence be regarded as an instrument. Because though dependent on Intellect which ia always undergoing change, and for that, it is possible to attribute changeability to it, yet as a reflected shadow, it cane not abide independently of the Uniform Intelligence ; but ag this one is no instrument, its shadow, the reflex intelligetce can neither be so, Then again, as there can be no mistake of snake without a rope being present,—here rope is the abiding substance on which the snake is attributed through illusion— 80 without Uniform Intelligence being present, there can be no reflex, and this one cannot be mistaken for that other, 197. Thus then, if neither the Uniform Intelligence nor its reflected shadow be an instrument, the two together are practically regarded so, though in point of truth they are not, “This one is unassociated.” “The cognitional sheath isa subject of the vital airs, etc.” From these texts, self is estab- lished a3 one unconditioned, and Intellect is a manner of witness. Therefore, one may object to the view taken, and apprehend truly also, about the two Intelligences together, aa instrument, and nota mere matter of popular belief. The Sruti never intended to establish the truth of such instru. mentality or agency, therefore to say, the nature of such agent is true, is improper. In the same manner, has the Srufi done away with the agency beginning with self and ending in the Uniform Intelligence. [As will appear in the sequel.) 198. King Janak enquired of Yajnavalkya who is sel.? The sage pointed out one after the other, beginning with the ‘cognitional sheath’* and ending in the unassociated, for help- * There are five sheaths each of whichis regarded as Self, ¥Vajnavalka refuted them by demonstrating arguments and proofs, one by one, thus helping to insti! in the mud of his pupil a correct knowledge of self ultimately, by the passage quoted “This one etc.’ PANCHADAS. “ ce yf -ing hits 10 comprehend, finally resting on the text, “This one Is unagsociated ;” and that unasseciated Uniform Intelligence in Self. (Brikadarenyek Upanishad} 199. There are other Srusi texts inthe Attareya Upa- wtshad and elsewhere to the same purpose. ‘ Who is Self that is to be worshipped?” Beginning with the associate of the internal organ, and ending in the Uniform Intelligence, this one has been declared to be self, after thorough analy: in the Upanishad above named. Therefore, if the method used there be followed closely, it would appear, the Uniform Intelligence and its reflected shadow—the two—are not agents: and in point of truth, the former is unassociated, hence neither an instrument nor an agent. 200, If the attribution of an enjoyer to self be false, how find why does an individual experience it to be a fact? From want of ‘discrimination of self, the truth of the Uniform Tateiligence is attributed to the two, and from illuston ac- tually regarded as an enjoyer with hardly a desire for aban- doning enjoyment, knowing such enjoyment to be teal—a mistake. zor. For his self-enjoyment, an enjoyer desires to have & Wife and vice vers2; even iu the Sruéi we find a confirmation of this popular belief. 202, All enjoyable things are dependent on him, there- fore to shew any attachment for them is vain; on the other hand, it is advisable, there should be no desire for them but oaly for self, who is the principal enjoyer, true and free. 203. On this subject the evidence of the: Purana is 08 follows :-— “ The attachment which ignorant persons have for material obdjects, which are not eternal, Lord, do out of thine grace I beseech thee; impart me a similar firm attachment for thee, 80 that I.may never forget thee from my heart.” 204. In this manner,.by discrimination, alter att fond desires for non-eternal objects have -bten: abandoned, obe ts PANCHADASI. Shdelibly to fiz bis love on the trae nature of the real enjoyer “and thus know him, 205. As from forgetfulness of self, the ignorant fix their sttachment firmly on objects of senses, garland, sandal, wife, clothing, and gold, so is a theosophist to fix and concentrate ft om the real natare of the enjoyer (self); and he forgets -him not. 206. As one desirous of victory over his rivals, is always engaged in the study of Dramatic works, Logic, etc. 20 does " person desirous of release study discrimination of Self. 307. Asa man of faith Is engaged in devotional exercise and sacrificial works, enjoined in the Shasfras, with a desire of acquiring the blissful abode of heaven, so does the emanci- pated show bis faith in self. 208.