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And that calamity assumes pretty often this shape, “Let my enjoyments never come to an end, but Jet them gradually increase, and there be no impediment tathem. I consider myself blessed in having so many things to enjoy.” * Frailty arising from desire or anger inclades ten vices coming udder calamity, as :—hunting, gambling, day-sleeping, calumny, whoring, dancing, singing, playing, idle-roaming, drinking. Fate comprehends eight :—depravity, violence, injury, envy, malice, abuse and assault, PANCHADAS!. 179 ‘Mintakes like these, occurring in the ignorant, are a fruitfut source of calamity, misfortune and frailty. 168, Its means of destruction are now being declared. To ponder in mind and unceasingly to confirm the belief that fructescent cannot by any power be prevented, and what is ta happen, cannot be anyhow avoided, and what is not to be, can never come to pass, causes the destruction of the poison of constant thoughts as to when shall my troubles cease, and better days dawn. 169. From an absence of particular distinction; between the wise and ignorant, so far as present enjoyments brought about from the fructescent are concerned, how can calamity be said to befall the ignorant and not affect the wise? What is the cause of this difference? Enjoyments though equal, yet an ignorant person is subject to the illusion of reality of all objects of enjoyment to which the wise is not, therefore calamity affects the former and not the latter, who is devoid of ignorance, and determination, for the acquisition of material well-being—tiches, property and the rest. 170, A theosophist knows the unreality and imperma- nence of all objects of enjoyment, for they are material and liable to destruction, he therefore minimises his desire, and begets no inclination for an extensive sphere of enjoyment, nor is he bent after its pursuit; under such circumstances how can evil befall him? 171. But it may be alleged, how can a false object pro- duce perception of happiness which follows during its enjoy- ment? Therefore it is said, his desire of enjoyment can never be reduced. To this contention the reply is: How can a theosophist have any regard for the objective world which is material and impermanent, as unreal as objects seen in a dream or in a performance of magic? 173—173. With the experience of dreaming and waking in his own person, and constant study of the unreality of the universe, though it appears asa living reality while awake, 24 1to PANCHADASI. he bes ceased to be convinced of its reality, and takes ft al! for 9 dream, consequently he heeds it not, and pays very litdle regard. 174. This indescribable universe, made of matter, ia but an illusion, like objects seen in 2 magical performance; from afirm conviction of the unreality of phenomena, in this way, he keeps off all illusions as to their reality, and as a result, whatever enjoyments he may have from his fructeacent works, produce no calamity to him. 175. For, the knowledge of unreality of phenomena isa helping cause for Self-knowledge : while fructescent works are only a source of enjoyment or suffering for an individual. 176, Thus from a natural difference in the effects they produce, self-knowledge and fructescent works are not opposed to each other; for, we finda person deriving pleasure and amusement from the sight of a magical performance, though he knows the things produced are all unreal. Thus for as difference of subjects, fructescent works do not stand in the way of Self-knowledge. 177. When an ignorant person enjoys the fruits of ac- tions already commenced to bear fruit, with a firm convice tion of the reality of the world in spite of its impermanence, auch knowledge is destructive of Self-knowledge. And his conviction of reality cannot make it real when it is naturally unreal. 178, As dream-objects though naturally unreal, are en- joyed, so are unreal objects of the waking condition to be regarded ag capable of being enjoyed. 179. If knowledge of Supreme Self could destroy all em joyable objects it would then cause destruction of fructescent works and be regarded in that light: virtually it doea no euch thing, it simply establishes their impermanence and unreality, .and does not cause their destruction, therefore Self-knowledge is no antagonist or destroyer of the fructescent.- P ANCHADASI. gt 3Bo. As without the destruction of a thing produced in Magic show, its very sight causes mirth to a spectator though he knows it to be unreal; so without the destruction of alt objects of enjoyment, self-knowledge offers no impediment to theie enjoyment, with a simple knowledge of their unreality from the force of fructescent works, 181. If it be said, repeated mention is made in the Srutt, of aman of discrimination reaching that stage when Le re- gards everything non-different from self; in such a state who is then to see, hear, or smell, and what is he to'speak ? 182. Therefore, when there is no possibility for gnosis to arise without destruction of phenomena, how can a knower ‘of the Secondiess Brahma, non-distinct from self, be eaid to ‘enjoy objectively ? 183. Listen to the reply that is being given. The above Srufi text bas no reference to the period when @ person is engaged in the acquirement of knowledge, for it is distinctly mentioned in the Shartraka Sutras (Chapt. 1v., Sutra 16,) ‘as an illustration of profound slumber and emancipation; of them, the dependence of either one, as subject of that condi- tion when be regards everything to be self, is maintained in the Srufz. 184. If that is not admitted, Yajnavalkya will cease to be @ professor, because when he sees the external world, his knowledge of non-duality is virtually at an end, and when he gees it not, no words can flow. [In other words, if no regard ‘be paid to the explanation just given about profound slumber ‘or emancipation, there would be no professor of self-kaowe Yedge, for in the waking condition he is practically related to the external world, his knowledge of its illusion is then at an ‘end; and when he sees it not, from want of adequate words to help the perception of his pupils, his words would cease to netil into their minds knowledge of non-duality, so that the traditional doctrine of the efficacy of knowledge will be nullified.) 382. PANCHADASI 185. If you regard that variety of ‘profound unconscious meditation’ when there is no distinction kept up between knower, knowledge, and the subject to be known, for this want of perception, as visible knowledge® of self, why is not profound slumber to be equally regarded? 186. If you contend, there is want of knowledge of self in profound slumber, and hence it is not admitted as know- ledge, that is to say, the external world then ceases to exist relatively to the individual, and for want of a subject to cover or take possession of self, profound slumber cannot be looked upon as knowledge, it virtually amounts to an exclusion of phe- * There are two varieties of knowledge, the invisible and visible. ‘ Brahma is” is an instance of the first, I am Brahma,’ of the second kind: the ‘invisible’ destroys the non-beiag of Brahma, visibility destroys ignorance with its trammels. “The non-being of Brahma, due to ‘envelopment,’ is des troyed by the knowledge of the ‘invisible kind,’ which clearly defines Its existence by the expression “There is Brahma.” For the two are antagonistic to each other, and cannot co-exist; herice the admission of the existence of Brahma, must do away with Its non-existence or non-being ; and as such a perception is dim and vague, (nothing definite) it is called invisible. “I am Brahma” is a definite perception, hence it is called ‘visible know- ledge [or knowledge marked by visibility}; and it causes the destruction of ignorance with itstrammels. For this knowledge is antagonistic of that ignorance which says “I know not Brahma,” and of that other kind, which declares There is no Brahma.” “Tt cannot be cognized”—varieties of concealment or envelope ment as have just been remarked ;—~and to the declaration “I am not a Brahma,” but an agent of virtue and vice, and an instru- ment for enjoying weal or suffering woe, i.e., the same as Jiva, which is a mistake ; and these are the trammels or nets of ignorance which cannot exist with the real, definite, and visible perception ef Brahma, which is expressed by ‘1 am Brahma,’--Daorz’s Vicharsagar, p. 17. PANCHADASI. ey momena end perception of “I am I as knowledge. And snch is fit to be considered so, for I have a similar purport too. 187. If you say, knowledge of non-duality and total for- getfulnesa of phenomena, the two combined, constitute Self- knowledge ; all insentient objects, a jar, a cloth, etc., would in that case form half subjects of knowledge, for though virtually they cannot claim any knowledge of non-duality, yet it is quite natural to credit them with the forgetfulness of the external world, 188, Thus then, as in the case of jar and other insen- tient objects, there is total frightfulness of the external world [they have no cognition to take hold of it] so you can never have a similar forgetfulness of phenomena in profound medi- tation, for there are thousand and one cause for distracting your mind, as for instance, buzzing of musquitoes, etc. 189, If you abandon the position you seek to maintan of knowledge of non-duality and forgetfulness of phenomena, the two together, constituting Self-knowledge and admit know- ledge of self to be supreme, may you live long, for that amounts to an admission of what I have been contending for: and as I hold earnestness of the mind necessary to that supreme knowledge of self, may you be successful in it.