English
So again in our methods of discriminating truth from falsehood, we do not shrink from the distinctions of Gr<S- tama. We have no objection to say, there are six paddrthaSj that is, categories, or descriptive heads, under which all things may be reduced; for all things may be described as coming either under substance, or quality, or action, or participation, or individuality, or association. But moreover all substances have some kind of inherent qualities, as things are either heavy or light, sweet or bitter. What we especially agree in, then, with the Sankhya philosophers, is this belief, that all substances act according to their qualities, and not against them; and this quality, being also a tendency, is the reason of their so acting ; so that really the effect of every action or result is already con- tained in its cause ; for otherwise it could not be superadded by any external maker. You would not yourself say, that a spin- ster makes woollen yam out of sand, but out of a fleece ; nor coidd a sculptor carve his statue except out of a block, which CAUSATION. 17 already contained its capability. So the wise Sad^nanda here could tell US out of the treatises of his school, that oil is in the seed of sesamum before it is extracted; and milk, not water, must be taken to make curds. Just as any one seeing an earthen jar, would infer that a lump of clay had previously existed, or from a golden coronet would infer the virgin gold, or even on seeing a rigidly abstemious novice, imagine his parents or teachers to be of a sacerdotal tribe ; so, in all cases, if we look forward, we find materials must be selected which have in them a quality or aptitude for the purpose, and if we look backward, we must infer the cause to have contained already the effect ; for the nature of cause and effect is the same. " You now therefore probably begin to understand, how certain aggregations of atoms, being once constituted, have a quality or a tendency in themselves, the heavy ones to fall lower, and tlie lighter ones to mount upward ; and seeds, being once developed from earth, and moistened by water, and animated by air, and warmed by fire, tend to germinate, and the germs to branch out, and the branches to bear flowers, and the flowers to become fruit Yet, in all such processes, no intelligent man will say that the germ and flower are conscious in themselves of their own destination, if even of their being ; nor, again, do we per- ceive any interference from any external hand with their going on. Whether, indeed, you look at the immediate cause, which is the seed, or at the concurrent occasions which are the earth and so on, you in neither case detect a plan of forethought, such as you wish me to ascribe to your Creator. Again, if, upon the the same principle, you examined the human frame, you would find the same elements of earth, water, fire, and air, contributing each something to its parts, and each in turn acting upon their aggregate, so that sensation (v^dan^), and longing (trishnd), produce effort (updddna), and effort produces merit or demerit, (dbarma and adharma), and either of these has a consequence of reward or punishment ; while along with them all runs intelli- gence^ through which we observe what exists, and are alone M. P. 2 18 CAUSATION. assmed of its existence. While men follow trae intelligence of things, as they really are or rather are changed, thej tend up* ward like air and light ; but if they follow passion, which comes of ignorance, thej both bring misery through sin upon them- selveSy and beget in turn a race of children destined to go through the same cycle of delusion. You see then, how no external interference with the course of the world is necessary in order to give things what you observed was a certain appear- ance of order. For all things act according to their qualities, while they possess them ; but the substance being changed, the quality changes, and life changes into death, or death into life, or either of them leads on to Ninxmay or else to renewed trans- migration." Blan. '' Perhaps I hardly understand the natore of your argmnent; though many difficulties occur to me; partly, for instance, in the shape of a doubt about what you call causesy whether they are not more properly saurcesj and whether our tracing of a particular source gives us any real clue to a general or original cause ; and partly also about those qualities which you speak of, whether they are not merely attributed by your imagination, and so are figures of speech; or, again, if those qualities are real existences, how they became inherent, or who fixed the law of succession, whether progress or revolution, by which they guide, or, at least, the things to which you attribute them are guided ; while concurrently with this last doubt, or as a part of it, comes in my old difficulty about a beginning ; and that I can scarcely ask you to explain, because to you it appears a difficulty which need not even be raised." Saug. " Certainly I must abide by what has been said about not ascribing to the whole ocean of existence a beginning; for, if there ever had been a time when the entire whole was a blank, neither then (as Sadinanda will demonstrate to you) could anything but a blank have begun to be. Moreover, such a supposition would make even the Supreme Intelligence^ Adi Buddka^ himself unnecessary. For, if there was no world, why CO-EXISTENT INTELUGENCE. 19 should we anj longer suppose any Deity to be ? So that, although I have heard some Europeans call us Bauddhas atheists, whioh it seems is an uglj appellation with jou, in mj judgment, the true atheists are those who saj the vast order of things and events ever began to be, or had a time when it was not, instead of rather, as is the reality, always being, and always becoming." Blan. '^ Pray pardon me, if I have seemed for a moment, by mistake, to imitate those unwise persons who put all their arguments in the shape of reproaches. Such was not even for an instant my intention ; yet let me acknowledge that I don't quite understand how the benefit of this last argument belongs to you ; for you imply that the existence of the world is the reason firom which we infer a Deity, which is a just inference with us who make the Deity the Creator ; but since you deny Him apparently any share, or at least any active and operative share, in creation or control, I feel a difficulty in seeing the sort of connexion which you imply between the eternity of the world and of the Supreme Intelligence." Saug. " Well, we have never denied that the whole sub- ject is, from its vastness, one of difficulty ; but you allow, I sup- pose, that man in general has intelligence." Blan. " Certainly." Saug. '^ And you infer the real existence of what you call a mind from seeing a human body in frill life." Blan. " Exactly so." Saug. ** But yet you allow that some of the operations of the body, dependent on health or disease, go on pretty much mechanically, or with little aid from the mere volition of the mind." Blan. <* Partly I allow that." Saug. " Well, then, partly you will comprehend how, in allowing the world to exist, I also admit the existence of the Highest Intelligence ; but to say, that this Supreme Being is cumbered about the ordinary processes of the world, would be like saying that the wisest or holiest of men has no better 2—2 20 SUPERINTENDENCE OF DEITY. employment than making his hair or his nails grow, all which sort of things proceed naturally, neither needing his aid, nor perhaps being much benefited by it. Our full conviction there- fore that this universal frame has what, if you please, you may call a soul, or a Deity, or any other name, but which we have learnt to call the Supreme Intelligence ; and, again, our belief in nimierous other beings, some nearer and some farther from the highest and most serenely blessed, are neither absurd, nor yet imply any necessity of troubling what is highest with the care of what is lowest." Blan.