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That some idea of the kind underlies the fact which I imagine it may justify, seems probable from this ; it is only in the case of mankind, whose reason suggests to them burial, and whose nobler sympatliies should render mutual destruction hate- ful, that people in general abhor the practice of preying on one another ; whereas, with those carnivorous beasts to whom it is natural, few think of blaming it. " Not but that I must ftdly admit, if my conception of life was the same as that of Vidydchdrya, it would seem to me horrible for even animals to prey upon each other. H all life were, as you imagine, the very substance of the Divine Being, I could not even think patiently of all that we see around us. But if two conceptions are incompatible, I must give up the 198 MORAL EVIL POSITIVE. least likely of the two ; and certainly, as far as probability of reasoning goes, I see nothing to support the A'ch^rya's theory of life. It seems bom out of a confusion between the spiritual passing of thought into action, and the materialistic transfor- mation of the Maker's mind into the thing He makes. Or, even if that be not so, our daily experience of life being given for a while and then resumed in such ways as it is, seems to justify us in considering it as properly a gift rather than an emanation, and distinct, as Madhwa conceived it to be, from the ineflFable being of the life-giving God. " Now suppose for a moment, that evil, either considered positively, or as I have represented it to be, the mere negation of good, were far greater than it is in reality, still you would admit that sinful creatures could not feel justified in murmuring at it with the confidence of perfect beings. For if our need of forgiveness is a reason, as you Hindtis appear to admit, for our forgiving injuries from men, much more it may suggest to us patience imder any evils which our Maker might impose. I say this would be a fair view of the case, even on the theory that human sinfulness were only an accidental accompaniment of pain, and not at all a cause of it. Whereas, we have next to observe, that all the possibilities of the idea of good being im- perfectly realised, which I have enumerated above as forming the appearances of evil, must be infinitely multiplied, when the scheme of the world is seen to contain not only things but persons; that is, not only objects and physical contingencies, but thinkers and doers of right or wrong, such as technically are termed moral agents. For if all these are to act, in any real sense of action, they must enjoy some degree of freedom, or apparent choice. With the freedom then of every living man, there is imported into our practical problem a new element, and that one of some degree of uncertainty ; for whoever makes a choice must be supposed capable of choosing otherwise, though the motives on one side or the other may preponderate. Any man then choosing wrong, may be expected, on the supposi- EVIL IN FREE AGENTS. 199 tion of the world having a moral Governor, to bring on himself pain, or some other kind of evil ; and perhaps here is the first footstep we have foimd of anything which can properly be termed positive evil, and this is of such a kind, as not to be any argu- ment against a good and wise God, but rather to follow from His being such. But again, whoever chooses evil for himself, is likely to persuade others to follow him ; for every one desires companionship; and thus the freedom of every moral agent, which originally admitted of being somewhat biassed by motives, may receive a decided impulse for evil instead of for good, by having its motives tampered with, or that knowledge of truth, which is the strongest of all motives to the reasonable will, debased. Suppose then, we took all these things, and wrought them into a sum in a kind of moral arithmetic. If we took all those necessary conditions, and all the drawbacks, chances, and contingencies, which might impede the realisation of any idea, even in dealing with malleable matter, and multiplied them tenfold by a like idea of uncertainty as applied to the motives and choices of free agents, and again multiplied whatever possi- bility of error, crime, and pain might thus arise, by all the corrupting contacts with each other of men who do wrong, we should have rather a formidable amount of either evil, or ten- dency to evil, which yet might form no part of the design legible in the constitution of the world, and therefore no impeachment of the wisdom of a Creator, still less a reason why we worms of an hour should shut our eyes to His existence. " To sum up briefly this part, allow something for the pro- bability of our judgments being mistaken ; allow very much for what I will venture to call by a word of my own, circumatanr ticUion, which I conceive to be what many old speculators have intended when they spoke of the jierversity of matter; and again, allow still more for the possible self-perversion of all free agents, and subsequently for their mutual corruption; then I think the result of our speculation will approximate somewhat 200 EVIL REMEDIAL. to the Christian doctrine of original sin, or at any rate justify us in ascribing wisdom to our Creator, notwithstanding certain marks of crookedness in the creature. One remark only, which was half implied, I wish to draw out a little, and I have done. Just as fear may be an instrument not only in curbing, but in educating the world, thus many other pains, may be not only punishments of our moral disobedience, (which would be a sufficient accoimt of them,) but they may be even benevolent remedies for the same mischief, considered as a disease. You £Emcy the * indiscrete ' or primary element straining itself into all possible forms. I, for my part, fancy the Mind of man straining itself under the influence of many sufierings which appear grievous to it, into far higher conceptions either of con- trivance and ingenuity, or else of manly fortitude and patient meekness. Many men have become greater through suffering, and I believe also, some far happier, than if they had not so learnt either to do, or dare, or endure. Do not then let us be frightened by things, which after all, perhaps, are to real evil that which you suppose the spectacle of nature may be made by the soul, or what the A'ch&rya would call Mdyd, a mere passage of shadows, below which may lie a substance of blessedness upheld by wisdom. To me evil, considered as a positive element in the constitution of the world, appears to become more and more shadowy the more we examine it. That only is true evil, which comes of voluntary doers starting aside from duty, and so failing in that part of the plan which devolved upon them as fellow-workers with God. Perhaps even this may not be with- out remedy; for certainly in remorse and in forgiveness, even among men, we find instruments to both sides of moral health. But whether my account of evil be correct, or whether any one has anything better to advance, the utmost inference which can be drawn from its appearance is, that our view of the world's design, as a merciful one, may require to be less hopeful, and not, as you seem to argue, that there has been no design at all. EVIL REMEDIAL. 201 Nothing, in short, whicli can be argued on this subject, ought to obscure the proofs of a Supreme and Wise Creator; I humbly trust, for myself, that nothing need shake our confidence in a righteous Governor and a merciful Father." NOTE ON CHAPTER V. The Yoga Aphorisms explain the Theistio section of the Sankhya, which is probably an accretion upon the older and more n^ative Gfystem. For Yigaya, see Turner's Mahdwansa, pp. 52, 53. For Sankhya sources of Buddhism, Lassen, B. ii. p. 830, R 1, and pp. 66 — 80, B. 2. For the legends and maxims, R Bumouf ; and as regards Ceylon, the Missionary Hardy. For Chinese comparisons, A. Rdmusat's Melanges. The Virgin-birth was ascribed to Sdkya as early as St Jerome's time : but the age of the Bauddha legends gene- rally is an unsettled, and a highly interesting question. Will not some scholar in India investigate it ? 202 AKQUMENT FROM DESIGN. CHAPTER VI. Fa/rOuT Criticismt of ffinda Systems, particularly of the Veddntine — Design — Moral Oovemment — Need of ffoprftUness — ParUhewn and Idolatry — Two Aspects of one £vil. "A little philoflophj inclineth man*8 mind to Atheism ; but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to Religion.