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A Dialogue of the Knowledge of the Supreme Lord - Bell Deighton - Complete Book

English

Sup- posing, then, such an assurance as we have spoken of should exist among the best men, what would it be, but a crowning answer, and a satisfactory supplement, such as both our dramatic instincts and our trust in divine providence suggest as probable, to all those deep longings of the affections, that crying out of the heart against annihilation, and that inextinguishable fore- boding of the rational conscience, which we have already found to pervade mankind. Or, if such an assurance were destined anywhere to exist, who would be so likely as men of deep piety to obtain the privilege of concluding these natural prophecies, and throwing the notes of joy amidst the imcertain sounds which divine influences seem ever calling forth from the strings of humanity? That such confidence may exist only among the few, appears to me, irom the nature of the case, no clear argu- ment against the probability of its being well-grounded. " It suffices me, however, to mention these things only as reasons for seeking more earnestly what religion is true and acceptable to God. For that all human beings, if true humanity is to survive in them, have need to fear, love, and obey, some ILLUSTRATIONS. 163 divine object of worship, and that this object must be a being who has a right to their worship, and therefore can command it, are points which have been clearly established/' NOTE ON CHAPTER IV. With the above Chapter, and with portions of the next, may be compared the first part of Butler s Analogy ; the Natural Theology of Talej, especially its concluding chapter ; Dr Whewell's BridgeuxUer Treatise^ and the extracts from it, published as Indicationa of the Creor tor; the first book of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity ; and the works of Samuel Clarke, including his correspondence with Butler. For readers of Greek, and even for thoughtful persons who have access only to tranalations, the Republic of Plato remains sbill a work worthy of being studied, as a very wonderful blending of the appeal to intellect and to conscience, though with some fimtastic disfigurements. Cud- worth, with Mosheim for his commentator, as a vast repository of ancient fiedth and speculation, I would rather recommend to the few, than expect to be read by the many. More succinct arguments may be found at the commencement of Pearson, and of Bui-net, and in Thompson's Bampton Lectures; where, however, the argument from design in creation is not quite forcibly enough dwelt u{K)n. Nor are the better among the English Deists, and others who have approxi- mated to them in reasoning, such as Tucker and Culverwell, without some useful suggestions. But their general defect is, that they set positive history too much on one side ; and, in attempting a sort of demonstration, not warmed by the affections, they make faith a dry problem, instead of a living spirit. Much better, therefore, are some of the life-experiences and confessions of great men, such as those of Sir W. Raleigh in his History of tJie Worlds Burnet, at the end of the History of his oum Timey — instances, in short, where feeling, thought, and experience, seem to converge in a confession from Man's life to his Author, Preserver, and Governor. 154 SA'NKHYAST INDIFFERENCE. CHAPTER V. Criticism of Hindii Systems, particularly the Bauddha and the Sdnkhya. " Dens non est sotemitas vel infinitas, sed stemus et iniiDitus ; non est duratio vel spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper^ et adest ubique; et existendo sefmper et ubique, durationem et spatium, stemitatem et iiifinitatem constituit." — Sir I. Newton. " Tanto a te longius, quanto dissimilius ; neque enim locis. Tu, Domine Deus omnipotens, Id Principio quod est de Te, in SapientiA tuft^ qusB nata est de substan- tia tu&, fecisti all quid et de nihilo. Fecisti enim ccelum et terrain non de Te ; nam esset sequale unigonito tuo, ac per hoc et tibi ; et nullo modo justum esset ut sequale tibi esset, quod de Te non esset. — St Augustine. After Blancombe had finished, there was silence for some time, as if the company were thinking over his speech. Then, on some one's asking him, " Which religion, since we have need of one, is the best?" ** There," he answered, " is the question which we have to inquire about; for it is clear that none can be best, which is not also the truest possible." " Or, rather," here asked Saddnanda, "is not the question an unnecessary one?" " What? do you, who think knowledge the liberation of the soul," answered Blancombe, "conceive it unnecessary to inquire what ought to be known? If truth is a thing so in- different, how is the soul to be liberated?" "Why, perhaps," rejoined Saddnanda, "the knowledge which sets firee the soul is not so dependent as you imagine upon what is generally termed religion. For there are many devout Hindus, who arc far from having attained true knowledge, because they start by wrong methods ; so in other religions, which in themselves are mistaken, or at least only fit for the countries in which they are professed, I do not say that liberating knowledge may not be attained." "But surely," said Blancombe, "it is a part of religion to have a right belief; and we have seen already, that the intellect refuses to believe anything which it supposes to fall short of truth. Either then you must take truth into your religion, or else you must strike the intellect out of it; and the first plan appears to most men the best; for unless we know the vedantist's apathy. 155 truth, our piety may even offend that highest Being whom we profess to worship; nor can men in general be persuaded to feel devoutly, unless they have also reason to be in some measure intellectually satisfied." " Well," said Saddnanda, " I feel no objection to the inquiry which you propose." " But I must confess," here interposed Vidy^ch^a, " that to me, too, the question now arising appears not perhaps indif- ferent in itself, but, as regards the different natives of countries £Eur remote from each other, not very necessary. We are abund- antly convinced, as it is our duty to believe, that we possess in our sacred books a revelation divinely given to the people of India. If you think otherwise, we are willing to concede that perhaps your religion may be better suited to your country. We are often obliged to tolerate the sight of practices, which, if you will excuse my saying so, appear to us profane and bar- barous, in the conduct of foreigners. Yet to you such practices appear right; and we endeavour not to blame you. Perhaps the mode in which the Supreme Spirit has instructed you is different from that which he has employed towards ourselves. And as I have already acknowledged that there is a great diversity of names and attributes among the deities which our tolerant creed permits to be worshipped by different men, yet under all these disguises the twice-born man who is well- instructed worships one eternal Spirit, so perhaps under your different names it may have been permitted you to express something of the one spiritual truth. So far, at least, as you fulfil the duties enjoined by your own religion, I am w^illing to hope you may have, not absolutely the best, but yet a sufiicient form of piety; and such, you may be aware, is the sentiment which our wisest* teachers entertain towards you." " Why, however, do you require of us, that we should be faithful in certain duties?" asked Blancombe. "That I need hardly teach you," replied the other; " for it is clear that there are virtues of justice and mercy, which all mankind agree to respect; unless, therefore, * Elphinstone, B. Yi. Sehander LdcU. 156 ARGUMENTS FOB INQUIRY. you practise these, you are condemned by your own rules." "You would not then permit us to inflict wanton cruelty?" asked Blancombe. " Certainly not," answered the other. " Nor to practise treachery, nor theft, nor adultery?" ** Certainly not." " Nor again, to pray with an outward show of devotion, but with an absence of sincerity and purity of heart?" " Cer- tainly not." " And you would forbid all these things," con- tinued Blancombe, "upon an idea that they were highly dis- pleasing to the Deity?" " Precisely so," answered Vidy4ch&rya. " Do not you then observe that our conceptions of the Deity are at least So far alike; and the reason of our agreeing so far is probably that, notwithstanding other differences, we have yet in this respect the truth ? What then should hinder this agree- ment from being extended farther?