English
" " To be quite candid," proceeded Wolff, "we must observe, that whatever has been said of the fixed character of natural processes, and of the regular order in which all things proceed, or revolve, might be made to tell strongly on the side of any thorough materialist. If the control of any Deity is, as the Bauddha tells us, unne- cessary, why should we imagine such a Being even to exist ? Again, if things act according to their properties now, why should not they always have done so ? Or why do we talk of begiomng and ending? where, perhaps, there may be no room, certainly I see no necessity, for either." " But how do you account for the world^s being?" some one here asked. " I might just as well inquire of you," replied Wolff, " how would you account for its not being, supposing there was no world. For there are only two contingencies open to supposition. Either the world was to exist, or not. The chances may have been equl either way, and I am no more bound to account for the 108 DIFFICULTIES. one, than 70U are for the other. There are many things difficult to explain ; but we must not therefore have recourse to an unten- able explanation. For example, upon the principles of most of the persons here present, the existence of a Deity is a mystery, which they cannot explain ; but they do not therefore deny it. What if in the same manner I fully admit the existence of matter in general to be difficult of explanation ; yet as a neces- saiy preliminary to my own body I may consider it as necessary as others consider a supreme Spirit, and I may assume the one as my starting-point, just as priests in general may assume the other. Not that again I see any radical objection to admit of the Spirit of life as pervading matter ; though, since life is not everywhere, it seems to be rather a product of particular forms and conditions of matter. But if we only assume existence in any sense, things must exist in some way ; and that the way of their actually existing in our world is not the most intrinsically spontaneous, or the most likely product of the doctrine of chances, you would find it, perhaps, more difficult to make good than you may expect." " Not that I am ignorant," proceeded Wolff, " of all that has been said by pious people on the subject of design ; for they conceive themselves to find in the world certain traces of con- trivance, which they argue must imply necessarily a designing or creative mind. Upon the whole of this topic, however, I am entirely agreed with the wisdom of the S4nkhya philosophers. They justly observe, that if a minute design had either arranged the several parts of our system, or if a special Providence con- trolled them severally in their motions, the result attained in each case would be far more perfect. For whether you suppose that goodness, or happiness, or anything else, is willed by the Creator, you do not find it produced so as to correspond with the will which you imagine. Nor do I speak here of what you would say results from the wickedness of man, but of things which would be parts of what you consider the original scheme. The seeds of life, for example, are scattered upon barren and DIFFICULTIES. 109 inhoBpitable shores, where they langnish or perish ; desures are implanted in man, which in manj cases he can never hope to gratify, but without the gratification of which he cannot be happ7 ; and if, by some perverse logic, you resolve this neces- sary disappointment into the fitult or sin of mankind, you still observe the rest of the animal creation, without any such sin, are liable to similar sufferings ; nay, they seem even appointed to prey upon each other ; and thus mutual rivalries and lusts and slaughters, such as one of the speakers to-day has termed canni- balisms, come in aid of that stock of pain which was already engendered by the unequal operations of nature — storm and ship- wreck, earthquake and pestilence, tropical fevers and Arctic freezings, with all the accidents of fire and water — ^which confirm what our friends here believe of Nature being blind, rather than any theory of her manifesting a creative design. " But, indeed, the pious people to whom I have alluded do not seem to reflect, that what they call proofs of design should rather be termed conditions of existence. Either water is to flow, or it is to stand still ; if it is upon a declivity, I want no design to account for its flowing down, rather than up, or for its cleaving itself a channel, which in time will be a torrent, and which men will call the handiwork of Grod. Thus, if a plant is to live, it must struggle forth into the light; and all the organisation, which botanists explain, of stem and bark and leaves and calyx .d bloBsom. with L moisture feeing it from below, and the air fix)m above, are only circumstances, or conditions, within which alone earth and air and water could be refined into a tulip or a rose. The case, as regards the higher forms of life, is essen- tially the same. There is no chemist who cannot explain to you the proportions in which various earths are mixed, or ought to be mixed, together in our bodies ; and there is no part of our intellectual functions which may not be sufficiently explained by reference to the organs of which we are made, and the order in which they are disposed. Not that I deny the organising breath of life, as it is the last refinement of nature, so to be most subtle 110 OBSCURITY ALLEGED. in its operations, and most difficult to apprehend. There is no reason, however, for making it different in man from what it is in the elephant, or for supposing it to be any other than a pro- duct of sensuous matter. But so much of the systems of some one or other of our three friends might here be quoted in his fevour by any materialising Chkrv^ca, that it is needless for me to dwell longer on that point. " Perhaps, indeed, with reference to any supposed author of the conditions of life already spoken of, it might be safer to observe a guarded neutrality, not very unlike that of the Saugata Mtini, than either to adopt the direct negation of Sad^Lnanda, or the positive dogma of Vidydch&rya. All that need be said on this branch of the subject is, we have no evidence of a supreme and designing Iswara so cogent as to justify us in making it an article of necessary belief, instead of rather leaving the whole question, as being a very intricate one, to the researches of specu- lative men. But the weak point in each one of the systems which has been expounded, is evidently that at which they begin to insist on a fiiture state, as a thing either of certainty, or of imminent concern. As to those arguments indeed of an histo- rical kind, which may be drawn from a supposed revelation, perhaps I am not quite competent to deal with them. But on this head it may be sufficient to balance the Saugata and Vidy&- ch&rya against each other. When they have fiilly agreed, which of their opposite revelations has the greater claim on my accept- ance, it may be time for me to consider it. But upon what ground the philosopher Sadananda should agree with them in such a general principle as that of a future state, fairly passes my comprehension. The same life which dwells in man is also the vital principle of beasts, and since we do not find it careful to reanimate in their case the forms which it has once tenanted, and which have perished from its grasp, why should we imagine it to act differently in the case of man? " We can have done nothing, as two at least of the speakers already agree, to merit a renewal of that life which it is sufficient PHYSICAL INFLUENCES. Ill for US to have once enjoyed. The foundation for a hope of its reyival seems either to be a certain knowledge which we are supposed to attain as an immortalising principle, or else the identity of our souls with the supreme Being. K then that knowledge be a dream, and that fancy of identity a delusion, what becomes of the inference which has been drawn from them ? In fact, if our perception be the product of Pracriti, as Sad^anda informs us, or, as perhaps we should say, of organisation, there is no manner of reason, as Dr Blancombe justly suggested, for importing the supposition of a soul. For why humanity, or its life, should be like a stage-play, I cannot pretend to understand. " Upon the whole, the simplest mode of belief appears also the more rational ; or so at least the Ghkrvkca, might argue.