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Answer as for ' feeling,' § 436, omitting the phrase ' which is born of contact with the appropriate element of visual cognition.' ^ There will be but one of these, viz., attention (Asl. 262). 125 [438] What on that occasion is self-collectedness ? The persistence of thought^ which there is on that occasion — this is the self-collectedness that there then is. [439] What on that occasion is the faculty of ideation ? Answer as for * thought,' § 436. [440] What on that occasion is the faculty of dis- interestedness ? Answer as in § 437. [441] What on that occasion is the faculty of vitality ? Answer as in § 19. Or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion — these are the states that are indeterminate. [Summary.] [441a] Now, on that occasion the skandhas are four, the spheres are two, the elements are two, the nutriments are three, the faculties are three,^ contact counts as a single factor, etc. {Continue as in § 58], ^ In the text omit . . . pe . . . after thiti, as in § 424, and for the same reason (Asl. 262). ^ Jhana and the Path, says the Cy. (262), are not in- cluded in the summary ; and why ? Jhana at its extremity has conception (vitakko), and the Path at its extremity has cause (hetu). Hence, it is not consistent to include Jhana in a thought that has no conceptual activity, or the Path, when the thought is not causally effective. This remark throws a little light on to the problem of indeterminate states. In vitakko the mind is working towards an end good or bad ; in the Path the first factor (right views) is synonymous with * absence of dulness,' which is the cause or root of good (§ 1054). Neither vitakko nor am oho is, therefore, a possible constituent in a cognition which is inefficacious to produce good or bad karma. 126 the faculty of ideation counts as a single factor, the element of visual cognition counts as a single factor, the sphere of [mental] states counts as a single factor, etc. [Continue as in § 58.] ! [442] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn- theses ? Contact, thinking, self-coUectedness, the faculty of vitality, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion, exclusive of the skandhas of feeling, perception and intellect — these are the skandha of syn- theses. (ii.-v.) [443] Which are the states that are indeter- minate ? When, as the result of good karma having been wrought, having been stored up in connexion with the sensuous universe, auditory cognition, olfactory cognition, or gustatory cognition has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness, and having as its object a sound, a smell, or a taste respectively ... or cognition of body 127 has arisen, accompanied by ease, and having as its object something tangible,^ then there is contact, thinking, feeling,^ thought, perception, ease, self-collectedness ; the faculties of ideation, ease, vitality. Now, these, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion — these are states that are indeterminate. [444] Question and answer on * contact ' as above, passim, [445] What on that occasion is feeling ? The bodily pleasure, the bodily ease, which on that occasion is born of the appropriate element of the cog- nition of body; the pleasurable, easeful sensation which ^ Or ' a touch ' (v. p. 2, n. 2). The view that the cogni- tion of something tangible has a positive hedonic concomit- ant— pleasant or, if the karma be bad (§ 556), unpleasant — as compared with the neutral feeling attending other kinds of sense-cognition (under the given circumstances), is of psychological interest. And the comment it evokes is not less so. Touch, or body- sensibility, is, the Cy. explains (263), the one sense through which the four elements with- out and within the individual come into direct contact. Other cognition is secondary, inasmuch as the other senses are derived (up a da). They are as balls of cotton-wool on four anvils, deadening the impact of the hammer. In touch the wool is beaten through, and the reaction is stronger. Cf. this with the theory of sense below, §§ 596-632. Neverthe- less, the ease or the distress is so faintly marked, that the cognition remains ' indeterminate.' The constituent states, contact, etc., refer only to the last-named species of cognition. In the case of the other four * disinterestedness ' would have to be substituted for ' ease.' 2 Vedana has dropped out of the printed text. 128 is born of contact with the body ; the pleasurable, easeful feeling which is born of contact with the body — this is the feeling that there then is. [446] What on that occasion is perception ? The perception, the perceiving, the state of having perceived, which on that occasion is born of contact with appropriate element of the cognition of body — this is the perception that there then is. [447] What on that occasion is thinking ? The thinking, the cogitating, the reflection, which on that occasion is born of contact with the appropriate element of the cognition of body — this is the thinking that there then is. [448] What on that occasion is thought ? The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind, heart, that which is clear ; ideation as the sphere of mind, the faculty of ideation, intellect, the skandha of intellect, the appropriate element of the cognition of body — this is the thought that there then is. [449] What on that occasion is ease ? The bodily pleasure, the bodily ease which on that occa- sion is the pleasant, easeful sensation born of contact with the body ; the pleasant, easeful feeling born of contact with the body — this is the ease that there then is. [450-453] What on that occasion is self-collectedness^ . . . the faculty of ideation 2 . . . of ease . . . of vitality? Answers as in §§ 438, 448, 449 and 441 respectively. Or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion — these are states that are in- determinate. ^ In § 450 omit ... pe ... in the text after thiti. 2 In § 451 supply kaya- before vinnanadhatu. The state manindriyam is, it is true, one of representative cognition only, but it is occupied, under the given circum- stances, with a kaya-viniianam. The 'door of mano' has as its object any or all of the objects of the five senses. 129 [Summary.] [453a] Now, on that occasion the skandhas are four, etc. [Continue as in § 441a, substituting ' the element of the cognition of body' Jm- * the element of visual cognition.'] ^ ^ * * * * [454] What on that occasion is the skandha of syn- theses ? Answer as in § 442. ^ * ■^ * * * [{b) Good (karma) taking effect in ideation (kusalavi- paka manodhatu).] [455] Which are the states that are indeterminate ? When, as the result of good karma having been wrought, having been stored up in connexion with the sensuous universe, an element of ideation^ has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness, and having as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, something tangible, or what not, then there is contact, thought, feeling, conception, ^ Once more the Cy. points out (263) the significance of the affix -dhatu (element), as meaning the absence of entity (nissatta), the * emptiness' or phenomenal char- acter of the ideational faculty. Cf. above, p. 33, n. The characteristics of mano are here set out. See Introduc- tion (Theory of Intellection). The theory of a sensorium commune here alluded to is practically identical with that adopted by Aristotle in the * De Sensu.' ' The basis (or site, vatthu) of this kind of thought is a constant, namely, the heart ; the objects of the " doors " (or of the idea-door) are not constants. Whereas they come in one after another, this is the locus (thanam), which has the function of receiving them into unity ' (ekasampaticchana- kiccam). The process of cognition is completed by manoviniia- nadhatu (see below). 9 130 perception, discursive thought, thinking, disinterestedness, self-collectedness ; the faculties of ideation, disinterestedness, vitality. These, or whatever other ^ incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion — these are states that are indeterminate. [456] Question and ansiver on * contact ' as above, passim, [457] What on that occasion is feeling ?