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is also established by their own nature. Among these, delusion is also the root of the other roots. For attachment and aversion are indeed the results of delusion. And the wholesome nature of non-greed and so on is established together with the latent tendency of ignorance. But these greed and so on are the specific roots of those accompanied by greed and so on. For views, conceit, and so on, are the results of attachment and so on. And faith and so on are the results of non-attachment and so on. Since roots are the principal phenomena in their co-arisen states, therefore, the indeterminacy of resultant and functional consciousness with roots is also appropriate to be stated in terms of roots. [86] Thus far, what has been said is to be clarified: "Others, however, establish the wholesome nature of wholesome things, etc. They say, "A cause is a state." If so, another cause would have to be sought to establish the wholesome and other states of the causes themselves. If the wholesome and other states of these are dependent on the remaining associated causes, then the unwholesome state of a cause associated with a deluded mind would not be dependent. Then its unwholesome state might be inherent. If so, the wholesome and other states of the remaining causes would also be inherent. Then, like them, the associated states would not be dependent on causes, if the wholesome and other states were dependent on causes. Then the indeterminate state of the causeless would not exist. Thus, it is rejected by saying, "Enough of over-straining!" Just as among the form and formless states that are the objects of attained jhānas, the jhāna factors pervade only the formless states for the purpose of contemplation, not the form states. But those are mentioned among the jhāna-produced states because they arise from jhāna states. Similarly, causes pervade the wholesome and other states only in formless states, not in form states. But those are mentioned among the cause-produced states because they arise from causes. Thus, the objection that those form states attain wholesome and other states should not be raised. [87] And what needs to be clarified: "The wholesome and other states, however, are dependent on wise and unwise attention of the wholesome and unwholesome," this statement also needs to be examined. For example, when sunlight comes, there is an opportunity for day-active creatures like swans. When the dark of night comes, there is an opportunity for night-active creatures like owls. And those light and darkness do not determine their special colors and so on. But their origins alone determine that. There, light should be seen as wise attention. The other as darkness. Those beings as wholesome and unwholesome. The special colors and so on as wholesome and other states. The origins as causes. As for the indeterminate, all states that are neither wholesome nor unwholesome fall into the category of what is called indeterminate. There, in the collection of causes, for the ease of comprehending the cause-associated, the causeless, which should be excluded here, are first presented. Therefore, it says, "the remaining..." No. Not even with a cause. Even the name of "causeless" for them is established distinctly by the power of causes, so their inclusion here is not contradictory. Therefore, it is said, "causeless, like the sap of wood," and so on. The six kinds of causes, by their nature, become nine kinds by the division of wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate, as stated, "greed, hatred," and so on. 132. The collection of consciousness and mental factors that perform the fourteen functions, by the division of those functions, is the collection of functions. [88] In the Vibhāvanī, however, it is said, "The collection of functions is the collection by way of dividing the functions such as rebirth-linking, and by way of defining those that possess those functions." That is not good. By which one action, one rebirth-existence is produced. When that is exhausted, either by its essence or by having met with an obstacle, that existence ceases. There is an opportunity for one action. Therefore, for one who has died from the existence produced by that, without remaining for even a moment in between, the production again of another existence, etc., by way of rebirth-linking through one action that has found its opportunity, is the function of rebirth-linking. Likewise, the continuous flow of the rebirth-existence thus produced, as long as that action is not exhausted, is the function of life-continuum, by being a contributing factor to its uninterrupted continuation. For when it thus continues, the continuity of life and the continuity of heat continue, and these three phenomena protect this body from breaking apart. As it is said – When life, heat, and consciousness abandon this body; Then it lies cast away, like a useless log. Adverting is the turning of the mind-stream, or it adverts, it turns, or it turns here by this, thus adverting. The meaning is that it emerges from the life-continuum process and proceeds towards another object. Or it adverts, it makes an impression on another object, thus adverting. Seeing, etc., are clear. Determining means distinguishing and setting aside, like "this is blue," or "this is yellow," or "this is beautiful," or "this is ugly," setting aside without mixing, it is said to be regulating. Impulsion, or swiftness, or speed, or self One is destroyed. The function of javana is the occurrence of each mind, swift as a lightning strike. [89] What is said in the Vibhāvanī, “The function of javana is the occurrence as if running many times or one time, in the sense of accomplishing various functions in the object,” this is not good. For there is no cessation of a running mind after a single occurrence. Even the javanas of the path and fruition, from the mind of adverting and preparation onwards, are indeed included in the continuous stream of running minds that occur with a single impetus. They do not run with a javana that is separately established. [90] And there, “The occurrence as if running”—by this, it is shown that there is no separate javana, which is swift movement, for momentary phenomena that arise and cease separately. But it is called javana because it is like a swiftly moving person due to occurring many times. This too is not good. For it was said earlier, “The function of javana is the occurrence of each mind, swift as a lightning strike.” The bhavanga mind, even though it occurs for a long duration, is without speed, like a dry leaf carried in a river current. But the javana mind, even though each is single, occurs with speed, like a thunderbolt released by Indra. “That is its object”—thus, tadārammaṇa. It is said that whatever is grasped by javana, that alone is its object. For it is said that it is called tadārammaṇa because the object grasped by javana is grasped. Or, the object of that javana is its object—thus, tadārammaṇa. Here, however, the state of tadārammaṇa is intended. Utterance, release, flowing down, and falling away are from the state of arising. Now, those functions do not occur without regulation. To show that they occur only by fixed positions, the distinction of positions is stated. “Position” is where that mind, having its respective function, stands and occurs. It is an opportunity. It is said to be the respective interval. For time is also the sphere of occurrence for those that have time. is called a state. The state of rebirth is the rebirth-state. The time of rebirth is said to be the moment of rebirth. And so for the rest. [91] But in the Vibhāvanī, it is said: "Having said that 'the state of rebirth is the rebirth-state,' there is indeed no state that is separate from rebirth. But for ease of understanding, just as in 'the body of a stone-child' and so on, a distinction is imagined even when there is no real separation." This should not be accepted. For time, though not existing in its own nature, is a conceptual phenomenon, a distinct object for the mind. Thus, in the commentary, the place of fruition for these eight great resultant consciousnesses should be known. For these ripen in four states: in rebirth, in life-continuum, in death, and in registering. And expanding on this, it is said that they ripen as rebirth at the time of grasping rebirth, and as life-continuum for an immeasurable period of life, and as death at the time of death, so time is what is spoken of. Otherwise, the states, like the functions, would have to be said to be fourteen kinds. The detailed classification of states will be known above, in accordance with the methods of consciousness-process in the two process-collections. Since a weak two-rooted wholesome consciousness, even if accompanied by joy, cannot give rise to a rebirth accompanied by joy due to its extreme weakness, it is said that the investigating consciousness accompanied by joy does not go to the rebirth-state, but only those accompanied by equanimity do. Thus, in the Paṭṭhāna, in the section on consciousness accompanied by joy, in the dependent-relation chapter, in the root-condition section, it is extracted by the rebirth-state. The mind-door adverting consciousness, even if it occurs two or three times with a small or indistinct object, is said to be devoid of the impulsion-force because of its weakness, having received its condition from the resultant continuum, hence it is said "excluding the two advertings." [92] But in the Vibhāvanī, it is said: "Because of experiencing the flavor of the object." That is not a reason. For the experiencing of the flavor of the object is not the accomplishment of the impulsion-function. Indeed, impulsion is a cause for gain. And it is the fruit of the accomplishment of the impulsion function. But since the fruit-consciousness, even without the nature of repetition, due to the great power of the path-volition