English
just as with mind, the division of even one mental factor by way of plane, class, association, and so on, should be explained. To show this, the last verse is stated. "Thus, having known the sixteen kinds of association and the thirty-three kinds of collection of mental factors unseparated from mind, in the manner described, one should explain their division, as appropriate, together with mind"—this is the connection. Contact, for instance, being associated with eighty-nine or one hundred and twenty-one minds, is of eighty-nine or one hundred and twenty-one kinds. In this way, having extracted each of the fifty-two mental factors separately, one should explain their division by way of plane, class, association, and so on, as appropriate—this is the meaning. Thus ends the Paramatthadīpanā, the exposition of the collection of mental factors, in the fourth commentary of the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha named Paramatthadīpanī. Paramatthadīpanī on the Collection of Miscellaneous Items 129. Having thus shown the exposition of minds and mental factors separately, now, showing the exposition of both again, it says, "Associated as appropriate," and so on. "The fifty-three minds and mental factors, which are associated as appropriate by their nature, are the phenomena that I have expounded separately. Now, the collection of both of them, as appropriate, is determined"—this is the connection. Therein, "one's own state" is "nature." It is said to be the inherent characteristic of phenomena. Thus, even though it is eighty-ninefold due to distinctions of plane, class, association, and so on, by its unique characteristic of knowing its own object, it is just one. Contact, too, even though eighty-ninefold due to distinctions of plane, class, association, and so on, by the characteristic of touching, is just one. Similarly, feeling, perception, and so on. Thus, in reality, there are just fifty-three. The collection that proceeds from feeling, cause, function, door, object, and basis is the connection. There, "from feeling, cause" means from the distinction of feeling, from the distinction of cause. Similarly, "from function, door, object, basis" applies here too. "By way of mind-origination" means "it is led by way of mind alone" —that is the connection. By the word "alone," it excludes mental factors. Thus far, the meaning of the six miscellaneous collections has been shown here by the Elder: "The collection of mind and mental factors by distinction of feeling is the Feeling Collection." "The collection of mind and mental factors by distinction of cause is the Cause Collection," and so on. [83] However, in the Vibhāvaniya, taking mental factors also by the word "mind-origination," and seeing nothing else to exclude, it says, "not anywhere without it." That is not appropriate. For here, no collection is led by mental factors, such as "so many mental factors are accompanied by pleasure," "so many by pain," and so on. Rather, it is led by mind alone, such as "the pleasant-accompanied wholesome resultant body-consciousness is just one." However, having established mind, mental factors are also established. Therefore, it should be understood that "by way of mind-origination" was said. 130. "Therein" means among those six collections. The collection of mind and mental factors associated with it by distinction of feeling is the Feeling Collection. [84] However, in the Vibhāvaniya, it is said: "The collection by way of distinction of pleasant and other feelings and mind-originations accompanied by them is the Feeling Collection." There, by the word "and" (ca), it shows that "Feeling Collection" is an ekosesa (ellipsis) designation in the sense of "Feeling Collection and Feeling-accompanied Mind-origination Collection." That is not good. For here, the distinction of feeling is for the purpose of comprehending the supporting dhamma of this collection. was said. Not for the purpose of showing a separate collection of feelings. So why was it said that there are three kinds of feelings? Were not two, three, five, six, eighteen, thirty-six, and one hundred and eight feelings mentioned in the Saṃyutta? True. But by the characteristic of experiencing, feeling is only of three kinds. For whatever anyone experiences, whatever object, they experience it pleasantly, or unpleasantly, or neutrally. There is no other kind than that. Other distinctions were stated in various ways. There, two were stated based on bodily and mental. As it was said: "And what, bhikkhus, are the two feelings? Bodily and mental." Or based on pleasure and pain, including equanimity in pleasure. As it was said: "Two feelings were stated by the Blessed One: pleasant feeling and painful feeling. As for this feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant, venerable sir, is it stated by the Blessed One as being in tranquil, excellent pleasure?" In the Vibhāvanī, however, it was said that two were stated by including blameless equanimity in pleasure and blameworthy equanimity in pain. Even if this is not found in the Pāli, it is still appropriate. Five based on the distinction of faculties. Six based on the distinction of contacts. Eighteen based on the distinction of upavicāras. Six based on household life, six based on renunciation; thus, thirty-six based on each of the twelve kinds of joy, sorrow, and equanimity. And those same feelings, one hundred and eight, were stated based on the three times. And what was said in some suttas, "Whatever is felt, all that is suffering," that was said in terms of the suffering of formations. But below, in the explanation of consciousness, since consciousnesses were explained based on the distinction of faculties, here too, to include consciousnesses based on the distinction of faculties, it was again said that "pleasure, etc., is of five kinds." And here, those states in which pleasure and pain are called faculties by way of dominance, since they are of two kinds, bodily and mental, they are also called the faculty of pleasure, the faculty of joy, the faculty of pain, and the faculty of sorrow. But the dominant position of equanimity Mental states are only mental, thus it is said to be the faculty of equanimity in one way. Moreover, these are twofold by way of classification, due to the existence of those based on the eye and other sense-faculties. Feeling, however, is said to be one in one way, due to its single essence. In the Vibhāvanī, however, it is said: “Pleasure and pain are said to be twofold, due to the distinction of bodily and mental happiness and unhappiness.” Therein, pleasure and pain are by nature characterized by experiencing agreeable and disagreeable tangibles. The others are characterized by experiencing agreeable, disagreeable, or neutral states, either by nature or by conceptualization. The remaining ones: the thirty-two Kāma-sphere consciousnesses and the twenty-three fifth-jhāna consciousnesses, which are other than the aforementioned pleasure and pain, together with mental joy and sorrow— all fifty-five consciousnesses. In one sense: in one consciousness. The other is the feeling of equanimity. 131. The collection of roots is the collection of roots, which is the collection of consciousnesses and mental factors associated with them, due to the distinction of roots. [85] In the Vibhāvanī, however, it is said: “The collection of roots is the collection by way of the division of roots such as greed, and by way of the associated phenomena.” That is not good. The reason has already been stated. The connection is that roots are of six kinds. Therein, the function of a root is to establish firmly the associated phenomena in the object. Just as the roots of a tree, growing deep within the earth themselves, take in earth-sap and water-sap and convey them to the very top of the tree. When wind or great floods come, they hold the tree firmly, and thus the tree becomes grown, sprouted, vast, and long-lasting. In the same way, these phenomena, being themselves firmly established in the objects, cause the associated phenomena to be grown, sprouted, vast, and long-lasting therein. Rootless consciousnesses, however, should be understood as not being firmly established in the object, like rootless moss on the surface of water. Others, however, say that the function of a root is to establish the wholesome and other states of phenomena. If this were so, for those which have no co-nascent roots, their unwholesome state and indeterminate state would not be accomplished. And the forms that are due to cause and condition. They say that their wholesome nature would arise, and they reject that view. But just as in the world, darkness is not to be brought about by any specific condition. Where there is no light, there it exists by its own nature. Even so, the darkness of delusion, which is the act of being deluded about phenomena, can also be unwholesome by its own nature. Thus, there is craving. When it is conjoined with the act of being deluded, reaching the state of attachment, it is called unwholesome greed. But when it is conjoined with faith, reaching the state of desire for Dhamma, it is called wholesome desire. Similarly, there is impatience. When it is conjoined with the act of being deluded, reaching the state of aversion, it is called unwholesome hatred. But when it is conjoined with faith, reaching the state of opposing evil phenomena and evil objects, in the manner of "not enduring arisen sensual thoughts," it is called wholesome non-greed. But the act of being deluded is not called unwholesome when conjoined with this, nor wholesome when conjoined with that. Like the taste of a wild mango, which needs no other combination to be sour, it is of an absolutely unwholesome nature. And the phenomenon that is neither wholesome nor unwholesome, that is called indeterminate. This alone is the reason for the indeterminacy of phenomena. Therefore, the indeterminacy of rootless consciousness, form, and Nibbāna