English
so too should this be understood. Is that because the realm of psychic power is inconceivable? This too is similar, because the result of karma is inconceivable. Indeed, they are born of such karma that they torment hell-beings without being afflicted by hell-suffering. And it is not that there is no external object because of this, as the doorkeepers are individually divided into pleasant and unpleasant natures. Thus, what is pleasant for one doorkeeper is unpleasant for another, and what is unpleasant for one is pleasant for another. And so, What some say: "There is no harming others by the power of kamma" — that is refuted. As for what they say: "How can those who are not hell-beings come to be there?" — because they are relatives of hell-beings. For kamma, which produces an existence suitable for the realm of hell-beings, causes it to arise in the very place of hell, being thus fashioned and shaped. And these are more powerful, more robust, and more terrifying, more cruel in their application than hell-beings. It is for this reason that the arising of crows, dogs, etc., is also described there. Nor should it be said: "How can those of one destiny harm those of another?" — since it is seen elsewhere too. As for what some say: "The hell-guards, hell-dogs, etc., are non-beings" — that is merely their opinion, as it is not seen elsewhere. For there is no such phenomenal process that is non-existent, not employed by existing beings, and yet seen to accomplish a purpose. There is no special reason for the non-existence of the men with staffs, etc., who prevent drink for the hungry ghosts. Even harm in dreams is not a proof of its ability to accomplish a purpose, as the purpose is achieved merely by seeing, etc. Thus, in a dream, there is no accomplishment of purpose by consuming food, etc., and an illusory form is here exempted, due to the inconceivable nature of the sphere of psychic power. If it is said: "Here too, due to the inconceivable nature of kamma-vipāka?" — that is not so, because it is unproven. That the kamma-vipāka of hell-beings are the hell-guards is unproven; but their being beings is proven by the method stated. Indeed, it can be said that the phenomenal process called "hell-guards," which are reckoned as beings, are intentional and harmful to others, because of the existence of their purpose, like the lineage of ogres who consume vital essence. And here, intentionality cannot be denied, since there is torment by intention in various ways; therefore, there is no non-exclusivity with the crushing mountains, etc. As for those who say: "They are merely special kinds of beings, with special forms and shapes, of terrifying appearance, the hell-guards..." they attain a common designation,” that is not established. Straightforwardly, in the Pāli, the statement “there are hell-keepers in hell” is established. Moreover, just as in the noble discipline the substantial existence of hell-keepers is not established, so too for one who holds them to be mere designations, their substantial existence is not established. For him, there are no truly existing things. If he speaks taking ultimate reality, then why does he reject feelings and the like? Let this investigation of views cease, for those with unstable reasoning, whose delusion and perversion are not abandoned. Thus, it must be concluded here that hell-keepers do exist. And when they do exist, the argument that there is a regulation of place, like in hell, even without an external object, is not established, so it should be understood. The explanation of the discourse on hell-keepers is finished. 4. Explanation of the Discourse on Animals Regarding “of that,” it refers to the devaputta named Erāvaṇa. Regarding “of the elephant-nāga,” it is said with reference to the transformation into an elephant form during the time of his play there. The same method applies to “of the divine vehicle.” For it is not appropriate for an existence that is the basis of suffering, arising from unwholesome kamma, to be possible in heaven, a place that is exclusively a cause of happiness. Therefore, it is said, “not of an animal.” The explanation of the discourse on animals is finished. 6. Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge Regarding “the twelve-object knowledge is supramundane,” here, intending to show that the supramundaneness of the twelve-object knowledge is established, having stated the first alternative, he then says “that, or…etc…meaning” to show that the twelve-object nature of supramundane knowledge is established. In “to be fully understood,” the word “iti” has the meaning of “etc.” or it indicates a type. By that, it includes “to be abandoned,” and so on. The same method applies to “fully understood.” By “to be fully understood, fully understood,” and so on, the necessity of being brought about and the state of being brought about by the act of fully understanding, and so on, are shown, not the state of being brought about. To show that by which it occurs, “but the knowledge of the truths,” and so on, is said. Therein, “knowledge of the truths” means that which comprehends the nature of the truths, such as suffering. knowledge, which is referred to when it is said, "this is suffering," and so on. Even at the moment of the path: by the word "even," it should be understood as also before and after that. The meaning is that it occurs by way of accomplishing the functions of full understanding and so on, due to non-delusion and due to the object. The explanation of the discourse on knowledge is finished. The explanation of the twentieth chapter is finished. The fourth fifty is completed. 21. The Twenty-First Chapter 1. Explanation of the Discourse on the Teaching 878. Collection: the collection of words that arose by way of questions, such as "the teaching has been made new," and so on. Of a part: of its components. "In all three questions": thus stated in the sense of a locus. The explanation of the discourse on the teaching is finished. 4. Explanation of the Discourse on Psychic Power 883-884. By way of intention: by way of the intention to resolve in such and such a way. The explanation of the discourse on psychic power is finished. 7. Explanation of the Discourse on Dhamma 887-888. The nature of form is the form-state: he says, "there is no such thing as a form-state that is different from form." But that which is different from something, is not its nature, so he says, "and form is not different from the form-state," meaning, it is not form itself. By this, he establishes that meaning by exclusion. Therefore: since there is no form-state different from form, and no form different from the form-state, therefore form is form itself, it is the nature of form itself. By the word "itself," he shows what is excluded: "not the nature of feeling and so on." By intention: by the intention of the non-difference of form and the form-state. Otherwise: if they were different, it would have to be said that form is determined by the form-state as a rule—this is the connection. It is already shown, because it is implied in the meaning. For one does not make a difference in terms in an undivided object. Difference: of the natures of form, and of form and the form-state. The non-difference established by the possessive case, like "the body of the stone-child," and this difference is merely a conceptualization, not ultimately real, so he says, "it proceeds as if having taken." It is indeed different from feeling and so on: it is indeed different from feeling and so on. That nature: that nature of form. For the purpose of indicating difference: the nature of form, not of feeling and so on—thus a distinction. for its understanding. And that statement is the statement: "Form is not fixed by its nature as form." By the manner stated, meaning: "by the manner stated, beginning with 'because there is no other form apart from its nature as form'." If it is faulty, then why does he admit it? - this is the connection. The reason stated is the reasoning stated thus: "form is form itself, not the nature of feeling, etc." "Challenged by another" refers to the challenge of the opponent, beginning with: "it should not be said that form is fixed by its nature as form." Having shown that very reason means having shown that very reasoning as stated, beginning with: "here indeed." "He removes the challenge" means he removes the challenge stated as: "then why does he admit it?" To show the meaning with reference to which "otherwise than this" was stated, "form, etc." was stated. The commentary on the discourse on Dhamma is finished. The commentary on the twenty-first chapter is finished. 22. The Twenty-Second Chapter 2. Commentary on the Discourse on Wholesome Consciousness 894-895. "At the moment of the preceding impulsion" means at the moment of the preceding impulsion-turn, immediately past, from the consciousness of final Nibbāna. The commentary on the discourse on wholesome consciousness is finished. 3. Commentary on the Discourse on Imperturbability 896. He calls the death-consciousness "life-continuum consciousness" because it is similar to the life-continuum consciousness, due to its root-nature, object, associated phenomena, and object of phenomena, etc. The commentary on the discourse on imperturbability is finished. 5-7. Commentary on the Discourse on Tissopī 898-900. He thinks that the attainment of arahantship also occurs in the womb itself. For seven-year-old novices like Sopāka and others attained arahantship. The opponent's intention is that there is also a seven-year-old fetus. A dream of going through the sky is an "sky-dream," like one going through the sky. Thinking that it is produced by supernormal powers, he shows it by making an example, saying: "like supernormal powers such as going through the sky."