English
nor is it the second jhāna due to the presence of sustained application. Thus, showing that this is not a jhāna, it is said: "It is not a jhāna due to the absence of being any of the first jhāna, etc." The explanation of the discourse on the intermediate jhāna is finished. 9. Explanation of the Discourse on "One Sees Form with the Eye" By "having seen form with the eye," indicating a disinclination to accept recognition by eye-consciousness, it is said: "Indeed, it refers to recognition by mind-consciousness." Therefore, it is said: "But recognition by mind-consciousness," etc. "Therefore" means that recognition by mind-consciousness is intended. "If this is so" means: if one recognizes form by form, then mind-consciousness, which recognizes form, becomes a recognition of form, not a seeing of form. Thus it is said: "But how is recognition by mind-consciousness a seeing of form?" The explanation of the discourse on "One Sees Form with the Eye" is finished. The explanation of the eighteenth chapter is finished. 19. The Nineteenth Chapter 1. Explanation of the Discourse on Abandoning Defilements "But those" refers to those noble ones... Defilements are abandoned by the path, those. Indeed, here, defilements to be abandoned by the path, if there is no development of the path, are liable to arise, and might be called "not yet arisen" because they have not come for three moments. But since they will not arise, they are not spoken of in that way, it should be understood. Therefore it is said: "Nor will they be." The explanation of the discourse on the abandoning of defilements is finished. 2. Explanation of the discourse on emptiness. 832. By which, in the sense of not being subject to control, what is conceived by others does not exist for these (things) as their own domain, natural phenomena are called "not-self." This not-selfness, therefore, is said to be "the characteristic of not being subject to control is not-self." But since this, in essence, is indeed unsubstantiality, therefore, to show it in one aspect, it is said: "in essence, it is just old age and death." If it were so, there would be a confusion of characteristics. But this should be understood as a statement of their intention. For it is precisely by the characteristic of not being subject to control of formless phenomena that the characteristic of not-self is included in the aggregate of formations. The explanation of the discourse on emptiness is finished. 3. Explanation of the discourse on the fruits of recluseship. 835-836. "Pattidhamma" (attainment-quality) refers to the endowment mentioned below. The explanation of the discourse on the fruits of recluseship is finished. 5. Explanation of the discourse on Suchness. 841-843. By "the intrinsic nature of forms, etc.," this meaning is rejected: that forms, etc., are themselves the intrinsic nature. Because the opponent desires that (suchness) not be included in forms, etc. Therefore it is said: "Indeed, he speaks of 'being' as suchness, not 'connection with being'." There, "being" means merely a phenomenon, the meaning of "nature," as in "jātidhamma" (nature of birth) and so on. For the nature of forms, etc., such as affliction, and also the unconditioned, is the opponent's doctrine. Therefore it is said: "not 'connection with being'." For that by which a being, a natural phenomenon, is connected, and indeed becomes one, that characteristic of affliction, etc., is "connection with being." But that is not different from forms, etc., it is conditioned by them, but by the meaning of "not otherwise," it is called "tatha" (such). The explanation of the discourse on Suchness is finished. 6. Explanation of the discourse on wholesome. 844-846. The connection is that it is wholesome merely by its blameless nature. Therefore... because it is faultless, free from all faults, and by the very nature of being faultless, it is wholesome, therefore Nibbāna is wholesome. The explanation of the wholesome is finished. 7. Explanation of Absolute Fixity 847. What is stated in the commentaries as: “Once plunged, one remains plunged, there is no rising again from that existence,” that is an opinion of the teachers, not the method of the commentaries, thus intending to show this, it says: “in that birth… and so on… thinking.” Here, “in that birth” means the birth in which a person is endowed with hindrances such as kamma-hindrances. The state of being a stake in saṃsāra should be understood like that of Vassabhañña and others, or like Makkhali and others. And this should be understood as the result of wrong views such as the ahetuka view, not because there is any such thing as absolute fixity for anyone. For just as there is no fixity for one who is liberated, except for the cutting off of existence by the path, so too there is no fixity in saṃsāra for one who is not liberated. But when such a wrong view is strong, there is a very long continuation of saṃsāra over an immeasurable number of aeons, and rebirth in the lower realms, which is called a stake in saṃsāra. As for what some say: “There are indeed those who wander in saṃsāra absolutely, because the multitude of beings is infinite,” that too might be said with reference to the multitude of beings who are rich in demerit. For there is no saṃsāra-fixity that obstructs the liberation of beings, like the wrong-view-fixity that obstructs the attainment of right-view-fixity for matricides and others in that very existence. But as long as the basis for the path and its fruits is not found, saṃsāra is unlimited. And when it is found, then it is indeed limited. Just as there is fixed right view, so too there must be fixed wrong view, reaching its peak by taking an absolute stance on its own subject. If there is absolute fixity for a person endowed with it, how could an unabsolute stance arise regarding that object of adherence, or how could a different, opposing adherence arise? Indeed, the charge was made in the Pāli that there would be no absolute certainty, due to the arising of doubt and the arising of other certainties. For just as doubt does not arise for those destined for rightness, nor do states destined for rightness or wrongness arise for those destined for wrongness or rightness, respectively, at any time. But it is only another certainty that is not contradictory. Thus, to show that it is contradictory, just as an immediate interval does not stop a similar kind of interval after wrong view, so in the Pāli, only views like eternalism and annihilationism are brought up, like doubt. Thus, here, the nature of the arising of doubt and the arising of other certainties, as preventing the arising of other certainties, should be understood. And that absolute certainty will cease, and this is contradictory, it might be said, "It should be taken after careful consideration." The explanation of the discourse on absolute certainty is finished. 8. Explanation of the Discourse on Faculties 853-856. Just as supramundane faith and so on are the faculties of faith and so on, so too are the mundane ones. Why? Because there too, the meaning of "lordship" exists, due to the characteristic of determination and so on. For it is merely the act of believing in objects of belief and so on. Showing this meaning, it is said: "Of the supramundane... (etc.) ... should be seen." The explanation of the discourse on faculties is finished. The explanation of the nineteenth chapter is finished. 20. The Twentieth Chapter 2. Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge 863-865. Although the full understanding of suffering exists in the earlier part, that which is effective is only momentary, at the path-moment. Thus, emphasizing the exalted full understanding of suffering, it is said: "Suffering... (etc.) ... reveals only path-knowledge." But that emphasis should not be seen as the cessation of other knowledge, but rather as the cessation of the function of other knowledge as it was attained. Therefore, it is said: "Not the very nature of knowledge," and so on. The explanation of the discourse on knowledge is finished. 3. Explanation of the Discourse on Hell-Guardians 866-868. They guard those in hell in hell, they protect them by not allowing them to escape from there, thus they are hell-guardians. Or, by being hell-guardians, they are sufficiently capable of binding those in hell with the suffering of hell, thus they are hell-guardians. But what about these hell-guardians... Are the hell-guards hell-beings, or are they not hell-beings? What is the point here? If they are hell-beings, born of karma leading to hell, they would themselves experience hell-suffering. In that case, they would be unable to torment other hell-beings. And there would be no distinction, "These are hell-beings, these are hell-guards." And if those who torment others are equal in form, strength, and measure, the others would feel no fear or terror. If they are not hell-beings, how do they come to be there? It is said: The hell-guards are not hell-beings, born of karma not leading to a hell-state. Indeed, they are born of different karma than that leading to rebirth in hell, being of the rakṣasa species. Thus it is said: "Wrathful, with cruel deeds, And delighting in evil; They rejoice in the suffering, Born as Yama-rakṣasas." Therefore, what some say, "Because they do not experience the suffering of torment, otherwise they would torment each other," and so on, this is like plucking hairs from the sky, because hell-guards are not hell-beings. But what if someone were to say: Even if the hell-guards are not hell-beings, how is it that they do not experience suffering while moving about on the iron, blazing, flaming, glowing hell-ground? By the power of karma. Just as those with psychic power, masters of mental control, like Mahāmoggallāna and others, out of compassion for hell-beings, go to the hell-ground by psychic power and are not afflicted by the suffering of burning there,