English
should not be analyzed and questioned, nor should it be answered definitively, because there is no distinction. It merely stands in the category of what should be set aside. With this intention, it says: 'by an unanswerable answer'. Just as all debates are counter-debates, and a statement of fact is an unanswerable answer that should be disregarded, so too should this be understood. Therefore it says: 'by what should be disregarded'. Alternatively, 'unanswerable answer' means an answer that should not be given. For example, to one who asserts impermanence, the answer 'sound is impermanent because it arises dependently' should not be given, as it is a case of proving what is already proven. The same should be seen here. Proving what is already proven is like burning what is already burnt, and would be meaningless. However, in the commentary, since the opponent establishes that a phenomenon which exists by a certain nature does not exist by that very nature, without considering distinctions of time, etc., it is said: 'because it is established improperly'. Here, the opponent who asserts 'it is thus, it is not thus', has acknowledged the existence of form, etc., by their own and other natures, and has also acknowledged this in terms of distinctions of time and place. Therefore it says: 'by way of past, future, and present, or future and present do not exist by way of past, etc.' If this is the case, the view of the Nigaṇṭhas and Acelakas would be elucidated. For they acknowledge partial existence in all categories of things, saying 'it might exist, it might not exist, it might exist and not exist', and so on. If the non-existence of a thing is intended by its own nature, or by way of place, time, or continuum, that is proving what is already proven. because it is desired by those of one's own doctrine. For, whatever is the intrinsic nature of a phenomenon, it is not found otherwise than that. If it were found otherwise, it would be something else entirely. And here, the general characteristic should not be pointed out, as the specific characteristic is intended, and its non-existence is impossible. Just as there is no dispute about non-existence due to other-being, so too in different places and times, due to the impermanence of formations. For formations do not migrate to another place or another time, because they are momentary. By this very reasoning, non-existence in another way should be understood as rejected. Just as existence and non-existence, without a distinction of time, do not find a footing in one phenomenon, being mutually contradictory, so too is permanence always. But what they say: "Just as gold, existing in the form of a bracelet, assumes the state of an earring, so it is both permanent and impermanent. For it is permanent by not abandoning its gold-nature, and impermanent by abandoning its bracelet-nature. Thus are all phenomena." To them, this should be said: "Is the bracelet-nature of the bracelet, or of the gold?" If of the bracelet, it would be independent of gold, like another state. If of the gold, it would be found there always, like the gold-nature. And it is not possible to say that both are one state, because gold is not destroyed even when the bracelet is destroyed. If it is held that there is no fault here because gold, bracelets, etc., are modes and the moded. Just as when the mode of a bracelet ceases and the mode of an earring arises, the moded remains the same, so too when the human mode ceases and the divine mode arises, the moded life-substance remains, thus it is both permanent and impermanent, and so are all substances. This is like answering about a breadfruit when asked about a mango. When he himself says that something is both permanent and impermanent, he admits permanence in one aspect and impermanence in another. If the non-difference of modes and the moded is desired, then in that case, the mode would also be permanent, due to non-difference from the moded, like the nature of the moded. Or the moded would be impermanent, due to non-difference from the mode, like the nature of the mode. Then for them, difference is non-difference, and thus, the two faults mentioned are not overcome. Moreover, what is this "mode" called? If it is form, let it be gold, how can it be in a living substance, due to its formlessness? If even that is desired to have form, then, in that case, multiplicity would arise even in a single continuum of beings, and its own nature would be seen in things having form, like boils, etc. Now, if it is a special mode of occurrence, even so, multiplicity and momentariness would arise, therefore, the very nature of the mode must first be established. But regarding what is said, "gold exists in the form of bracelets, etc.," among the distinct forms, smells, tastes, and tangibles perceived due to their combination, is gold one (of these), or a collection of them, or some other phenomenon distinct from them? Among these, no single form, etc., is gold, because the function of gold is not achieved by it. Nor is it some other phenomenon distinct from them, because such a thing does not exist. Now, if it is a collection, that, however, is merely a designation, so neither permanence nor impermanence is possible for it. And just as with gold, so too with a bracelet, it is merely a designation. This example, for the opponent, proves that even a living substance is merely a designation. So how can it have permanence or impermanence? Enough of this excessive elaboration. The commentary on the Hevatthikathā is concluded. The commentary on the Mahāvagga is concluded. 2. The Second Chapter 1. Commentary on Parūpahāra 307. "Those whose defilements are suppressed" cannot be "those whose defilements are not suppressed" due to their conceit. The meaning is that as long as there is conceit, they fall asleep with full awareness. Regarding "the conceited," it is said that this is spoken by way of past occurrence, meaning "those who were formerly conceited are intended." 308. What is said to be the cause of doubt, that "handa hi" illuminates the other (point), with this meaning, it is said, "it is appropriate in the sense of cause." But the certainty of doubt, that "handa hi" illuminates the other (point), is said "in the sense of speech." The commentary on Parūpahāra is concluded. 5. Commentary on the Discourse on Distinctions of Speech 326. Soti paṭ ...is mistaken. Therefore, because the meaning of the discourse, "the dustless, stainless Dhamma-eye arose: 'Whatever is of the nature to arise, all that is of the nature to cease'," is taken otherwise, and insight arises at the moment of the path, seeing suffering as a result of observing rise and fall, therefore they say, "he speaks a word that is just suffering." 328. "Desired" means accepted by the opponent. "Imposed" means it is fitting when established in that meaning by logical determination. But it is not fitting for "desired" that one hears that sound after the moment of vocalization, because ear-consciousness has a present object—this is the intention. However, since one hears the sound one has uttered oneself, it should be understood that ear-consciousness is mentioned in the commentary as "that by which one hears that sound." 332. "At the moment of the supramundane path" means at the moment of the first path of one who is in the first jhāna. "The intention in quoting the Abhibhū Sutta should be stated"—by this, it shows the irrelevance of that quotation. Therefore, it says, "thus it is inconclusive." The explanation of the discussion on the division of speech is finished. 7. Explanation of the Discussion on the Stability of Consciousness 335. "Thus" means in the manner stated, "one consciousness remains for a lifetime." "Elsewhere" means in a realm other than the formless realm. By this, it is intended that the second commentary, which states, "only one consciousness remains in the formless realm, it remains for a lifetime," should also be seen, in order to clarify that the statement of long duration in the first commentary is for another purpose. "In the former" refers to the earlier one from the question, "it remains for a lifetime." For there, to the question, "does it remain for a hundred years?" an affirmation was made, "yes." But in the latter, to "one consciousness of humans remains for a lifetime," a denial was made, "it should not be said so." The non-contradiction should be clarified, because the affirmation was made there itself, not later—this is the intention. And by "a hundred years, etc.," the word "etc." does not only include "two hundred years" and so on, but also "one c it stands for a day" and so on, should be understood. "The question 'it arises moment by moment' is stated as if asked by one's own side" - this should be considered. "It arises moment by moment" is the question of the other side. "It is stated that the assertion of one's own side is based on the meaning of the Sutta beginning with 'subject to arising and passing away'." The explanation of the discourse on the stability of consciousness is concluded. 9. Explanation of the discourse on gradual comprehension 339. "Or he asserts that all four knowledges are just one path of stream-entry" - referring to this, he says "or" and so on. Of the four knowledges: of the four knowledges such as the knowledge of suffering. Due to being one path: due to being one path such as stream-entry. For even though those knowledges occur in succession, they are one path because they accomplish the task of that particular path - this is the intention. Therefore, he says "of one path... and so on... he asserts." 344. In seeing: in seeing the path. 345.