English
that the future and present are, respectively, "is" and "has become." The method of explanation that proceeds with "That which by you..." is the former method, for there the state of "having become, is" is challenged starting with "If your future, having become..." "Another method" and so on is the second method. For there, the designation of each of the future and so on as "having become, is" is challenged, starting with "of the future... (etc.)... is indeed called 'having become, is'." The explanation of the purification of terms is finished. Explanation of the discourse on knowledge of the past, etc. 290. "How is it said?" means "Why is it said?" "By that" indeed, by this second question, "knowledge of the past..." "knowledge" is what is grasped, and that knowledge, being present, is called "past" because its object is past phenomena. Therefore, it is said in the commentary, "Again, when asked, 'knowledge whose object is past, which is present'," and so on. The explanation of the discourse on past knowledge, etc., is concluded. Explanation of the discourse on Arahants, etc. 291. "Arahant, one whose defilements are destroyed," and so on— the contradiction with the Sutta is evident, so, showing just this, it says, "the contradiction in reasoning... ...should be seen." Here, "not diverse" means "not different." "And so on" means that by the word "and so on," the absence of completed action, the state of not having laid down the burden, and such like, should be understood as included. The explanation of the discourse on Arahants, etc., is concluded. Explanation of the discourse on word purification 295. The meaning denoted by the word "past" is also denoted by the word "is" (atthi), so, considering both to have the same referent, it is said, "because the words 'past' and 'is' have one meaning." No, it is because what is denoted by "past" is itself denoted by "is." Therefore, it says, "and because the meaning of 'is' is not past." What is established by this? It says, "The past is not past, and the not past is past." This is what is meant: If, according to your view, the past exists, and the existing is not past, then the past would be not past. Similarly, if the existing is not past, and the not past is past, then the past would be past. Just as in "the past exists," it is not to be taken as a rule that only the past exists, because the existence of the non-past is also desired. Therefore, it says, "The past may exist, it may be not past." For in whatever way the existence of the past is desired by the opponent, in that same way, the existence of the non-past, the future, and the present is desired. But in what way is it desired? In the way of the conditioned. Therefore, it is said, "Thus the past is not past, and the not past is past." Therefore, the rule "the past exists" should be taken here. For the past is limited to existence, but existence is not limited to the past. However, in "Nibbāna does not exist," the rule that only Nibbāna exists is possible, so that should be taken. Even if Nibbāna is supreme, From the existence of the head, the determination of the latter word is obtained, because there is no other. Even so, because nothing else is found in the unconditioned aspect, thus, when the meaning of the determination of the former word, that only Nibbāna exists, is taken, the objection "Nibbāna might exist, Nibbāna might not exist" is out of place. However, regarding the past and so on, the determination of the former word is not accepted by the opponent, so there is no over-extension here. And its non-acceptance is understood from the Pāli itself. Thus, in this case, this fault of frustrating one's own wish applies to the opponent who asserts the existence of the past and so on, but not to one's own side who asserts the existence of Nibbāna. "Paṭipādanā" should be understood as "patiṭṭhāpanā" (establishment). Here it is said, "The past exists," and so on. Is the existence of the past and future intended to be in the ultimate sense, or not in the ultimate sense? And in this regard, if it is in the ultimate sense, due to their existence at all times, the conditioned things would become eternal, and that is not proper, due to contradiction with the scriptures and contradiction with reason. If it is not in the ultimate sense, the objection "All exists" and so on would be meaningless. No, it is not meaningless. For that opponent, since the aggregates of the past and future are spoken of as "whatever form is past or future," and so on, if there were no past, how could the fruit of wholesome and unwholesome kamma arise in the future? And how could the knowledge of past lives and so on in the past, and the knowledge of future events and so on in the future, operate? Therefore, this statement is made with reference to what he asserts, namely, that the past and future exist in the ultimate sense. And this must be absolutely accepted. Those who say "All exists," the past, the future, and the present, they are the All-Existentialists. And these All-Existentialists are of four kinds. Among them, some are "bhāvaññattikā" (those who assert the manifestation of being). They say: "Just as when a gold vessel is broken and made into something else, it is only the shape that changes, not the color and so on; and just as milk, when it transforms into curds, gives up its taste, potency, and result, but not its color; similarly, phenomena also..." When moving from the future to the present, they abandon only their future state, not their own nature. Similarly, they say, when moving from the present to the past. Some are those who declare distinct characteristics. They say, "A phenomenon existing in the three times, when past, is endowed with the characteristic of the past, and not with other characteristics. Similarly, when future or present. Just as a man is attached to one woman, and not to others." Others are those who declare distinct states. They say, "A phenomenon existing in the three times, having reached this or that state, is designated as different, as another, due to a difference in state, not in nature. Just as one die, placed in one position, is called one, in a hundred positions, a hundred, in a thousand positions, a thousand; this is similar." Still others are those who declare distinct references. They say, "A phenomenon existing in the three times, is spoken of with a nature different from itself, depending on this or that. Just as one woman is called mother and also daughter." Thus, these are the four theories of the Sarvāstivādins. Among these, the first, being a theory of transformation, should be grouped with the followers of Kapila. For the second, there arises a confusion of times, as everything is endowed with all characteristics. For the fourth, there is also confusion. At the moment of a single phenomenon's occurrence, all three times converge. For the preceding and succeeding moments are past and future, the middle one is present. But for the third, the one who declares distinct states, there is no confusion, because time is determined by the function of the phenomenon. For a phenomenon is present at the moment of its function, before that it is future, and after that it is past. In this regard, if the past also exists due to its nature of being, and the future also exists, why is it called past or future? Was it not said, "because time is determined by the function of the phenomenon"? If so, what is the function of a present eye? The production of fruit when all conditions are completely assembled. If this is the case, the future eye must also have that, due to its existence, and there would be a confusion of characteristics. And this should be said here: a phenomenon existing with that very nature What is its task? What obstructs the performance of the task? Because sometimes it does, sometimes it does not, due to the presence or absence of conditions, or due to the absence of the task itself? That is not so, as its constant existence is desired. And for that very reason, there is no determination of time. If a phenomenon exists with that very nature, why is it sometimes called past, sometimes called future? There would be no determination of time. For a phenomenon that is not born, is future. One that is born but not ceased, is present. One that has ceased, is past. This is what should be said here. If, just as the present exists, so too do the past and future exist, then how can its not being born or its having ceased come about for that which thus exists? How can it be accomplished for a phenomenon that exists with that very nature, that it is "not born" or "has ceased"? What was not there before it, due to the absence of which it is called "not born"? And what is not there afterwards, due to the absence of which it is called "has ceased"? Therefore, in no way does the three-fold time become established, if they do not accept that it comes into being without having been, and perishes after having been. As for what was said, "there is no danger of eternalism due to possessing the characteristics of the conditioned," this is merely a matter of words, as arising and ceasing are impossible. If that phenomenon always exists, and yet is not called eternal, from where does this verbal consistency come? Its nature always exists, yet the phenomenon is not called eternal; The phenomenon is not other than its nature, Oh, what skill in phenomena! And as for what was said, "because the past and future aggregates are stated in phrases like 'whatever form is past or future,' they do exist," we say: The past is what has been before, the future is what will be when conditions are present. The state of being a form aggregate, etc., is stated for both of these, because they do not transgress the nature of being subject to change, etc. Past phenomena and future phenomena are so called because they do not transgress the nature of phenomena, not because they have an existing nature.