English
"Pleasant is the result of these" - by this compound, the pleasant-resultant nature of the wholesome is stated. And that is not their co-existence by being endowed with it. Thus it is understood as capable of producing that, and so it is said: "It shows the nature of opposing pleasant results." This is appropriate, for even if there is no ultimate distinction, a distinction by way of the aforementioned expression and what is expressed arises conventionally in that object which is the referent. So it is appropriate here to speak of a distinction by way of characteristic and what is characterized. Indeed, a distinction is spoken of even in an undifferentiated object merely by a difference in the meaning of the word, just as "the body of the stone statue." Even without a word expressing being, a description with being as primary occurs, so it is said: "By the word 'blameless,' blamelessness is taken." And here the word analysis should be understood thus: "Not blameworthy" is "blameless," a nature not to be censured due to being the opposite of blameworthy. "Its result is pleasant" thus "pleasant result," the capacity to oppose pleasant results. And that which is blameless and has a pleasant result is "blameless pleasant result"; those whose characteristic this is are "those with the characteristic of blameless pleasant result." Or, as before, "blameless"; "opposing" is "result"; "the result of pleasure" is "pleasant result"; "blameless and pleasant result," by way of unity, is "blameless pleasant result." Those whose characteristic this is are "those with the characteristic of blameless pleasant result." What is the reason here for taking two words? Is not the desired meaning achieved with just one word? Even if "blameless is free from blame," in this case, to exclude the indeterminate, the term "pleasant result" would have to be taken; but when "pleasant result" is taken, the term "blameless" would not have to be taken. Considering the objection: "If 'blameless' means 'opposite of blameworthy,' then 'pleasant result' is also needed," he says, "There, by the word 'blameless,' etc." Thereby, by illuminating the specific points of the nature of pleasant results in action, self-purity, pure results, the exclusion of unwholesome and indeterminate natures, the taste, the manifestation, and the proximate cause, he shows that the inclusion of two words has such a broad purpose. Just as the word "sukha" (pleasure) is a synonym for what is desired, as in "Nibbāna is the highest pleasure" (Dhammapada... in "happiness is detachment in the world" (Ud. 11), and "their appeasement is happiness" (Dī. Ni. 2.221, 272), the meaning of the appeasement of the suffering of formations is also found. But since it is not a result, it cannot be said here that it is a happy result, thus he says, "formations... (etc.)... there is not." This is what is meant: even though wholesome actions of the three realms, due to their nature of being dependent on the cycle of existence, are of the nature of occurring, and thus all wholesome actions can produce the happiness of the appeasement of the suffering of formations, yet because the aforementioned happiness is not a result, the wholesomeness of actions does not become a happy result by this term. Since the word "result" is established in formless phenomena that have reached the state of being results, he says with doubt, "if indeed." That which occurs with fault is "sāvajjā" (faulty), meaning it is worthy of blame. Thus, it shows their blameworthy nature. There are other things that are blameworthy due to their nature of suffering, namely unwholesome results. Seeing the fault of their becoming unwholesome by the mere word "sāvajjā," he says "dukkhavipāka" (painful result) to avoid that. Or the word "avajja" (fault) is established in things like greed, which are entirely unwholesome. Thus, the distinction of unwholesome actions from wholesome and indeterminate actions, in terms of their being accompanied by such faults, is shown by the word "sāvajjā" alone. However, the characteristic of having a result, which is common to wholesome and unwholesome actions, is distinct from indeterminate actions. Therefore, to show the distinction in that characteristic, the characteristic of "dukkhavipāka" (painful result) is stated. From this point onwards, by placing the terms "dukkhavipāka" (painful result) and "sāvajjā" (faulty) in place of "sukhavipāka" (happy result) and "anavajja" (faultless) wholesome terms, the meaning should be understood in the aforementioned manner. And the explanation is that by the word "sāvajjā" (faulty), it shows the suffering of the occurrence of unwholesome actions, and by the word "dukkhavipāka" (painful result), it shows the suffering of the result. For the former is a characteristic term by virtue of its nature of occurrence, and the latter is by its ability to produce a result at a later time. Similarly, by the former, it shows the impure nature of unwholesome actions, and by the latter, their impure result. In the former, Nor does it turn away from the unwholesome from the nature of the wholesome, because the latter, by indicating the nature of the undeclared as having results, is the latter. By the former, by seeing it as having fault, by the meaning of function, by its essence, it shows the essence of not generating harm. By the latter, by the meaning of attainment, the essence of an undesirable result. By the former, by the meaning of the mode of manifestation, by its immediate manifestation, the immediate manifestation of defilement. By the latter, by the meaning of fruit, the immediate manifestation of the result of suffering. By the former, it reveals unwise attention as the proximate cause of unwholesome states. For from that, they arise as faulty. By the latter, it clarifies the state of unwholesome states as the proximate cause of others. For they are the cause of the result of suffering. Here, the word "suffering" should be understood as a synonym for "undesirable." For unwholesome states have undesirable results of four aggregates, not just results of painful feeling. If the word "result" is a synonym for "fruit," then the result of suffering should also be combined with the undesirable form as a consequential result. The characteristic of the undeclared is said to be "without result" in the sense of denying the nature of having results. To show its meaning, it says "of a nature not deserving results." "Of such kinds" includes supernormal knowledge and so on. Six meanings are stated in the triads by six terms, and in the dyads by four terms, respectively. The non-existence of a group of six is to be understood as having been questioned, since the non-existence of a group of four is shown by the method mentioned. "A distinction of meanings arises." Why is this said? Is not that meaning, when spoken of by the three terms for phenomena, the same, in the sense of supporting its nature and so on? No, because there is a distinction by differences such as origin. For origin and so on are the differentiators. "By the meaning of the word 'month'" means by being denoted by the word "month." "Of distinct meanings to be expressed by them" means distinct meanings to be expressed by those words for time and so on. This is what is said: "Just as there is no distinction among the meanings of time and so on, which are denoted by words for time and so on and have distinct natures, by being denoted by the word 'month,' so too, there is no distinction among those three and two meanings, even though they are distinct by differences such as origin, by the word 'phenomenon.'" because of the meaning of the word 'ma', there is no difference. Vini...pe...mānāti, it states the reason for difference even when the form of the word 'dhamma' is not different. Indeed, because it is expressible by a meaning of a different class, there is a difference in that very meaning. Sādhetunti means to make known. "Let there be no connection, what harm is it to us?" Fearing that someone might say this, he says, "pubbā...pe... they are called." So cāti, the meaning, which is the state of being held by the condition of holding its nature, cannot be expressed, it is said, because it is expressed with reference to the non-existence of what has been stated. For those expressed with reference do not obtain what is to be referred to without a reference. Even though there is a commonality of meaning such as holding its nature, because it is specifically intended here for that which is distinguished as the class of wholesome, etc., oneness is not allowed, it is said, or by way of a play on words. Atha vāti, by this and so on, not accepting the non-existence of the three 'dhamma' words, he avoids the fault of the non-existence of distinct meanings. Because it is a revealing cause, reasoning is here called a cause, so he says, "A cause is a justification." Punaruttīti, by this and so on, is it not the case that since it is said, "even for wholesome, etc., oneness arises," the arising of oneness should also be stated? It is true, it should be stated, but that is included in the arising of non-existence, by the commonality of the objection of the non-existence of distinctness. Because the state of being qualified and the qualified depends on difference and non-difference, it is certainly not present in what is absolutely non-different, so it shows absolute non-difference by the non-existence of the qualified and the qualifying, but not the non-existence of the qualified and the qualifying only in what is absolutely non-different. Or else, it proceeds to explain the meaning of words that are not revealed in what is absolutely non-different. Why? Because of the non-existence of the qualified and the qualifying. Thus, the connection should be made. He is able to overcome an enemy, so he is Sakka; he rules, so he is Inda; he gives in former times, so he is Purindada. Thus, by specific inclusion