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B030304Dhammasaṅgaṇī anuṭīkā(abhidharma samuccaya supplementary commentary)

English

he states the former proponent's side according to the literal meaning, and knowing the advertence of what has arrived and what has not arrived is his own determined side. The former proponents would not agree, meaning they would not agree, standing on the intention that the word "present" in the Abhidhamma matrix does not refer to a continuous duration or a present moment in the sense of a word. And even though there is a difference in nature here, due to the absence of a difference in form, the advertence, preliminary, and supernormal knowledge minds have different objects in the sense of oneness. There is no such fault, the momentary present as the object of mind-penetrating knowledge has been shown by way of explaining the intention of the former commentators. But in the Commentary, it is explained that "when there is a difference in nature, there is no absence of the fault of having various objects, thus the present as object is explained as existing in a single mind by way of a continuous duration." In both views, what is appropriate should be considered and taken. "Therefore," it is said, because in the past triad and the arisen triad, a passage indicating the mind-penetrating knowledge having present phenomena as its object is not seen, for that very reason. "In the two knowledges" means the knowledge of past lives and mind-penetrating knowledge. "Are grasped by way of kamma" means: even though they are objects, the four aggregates are grasped by the knowledge of beings' kamma as merely wholesome or unwholesome through the door of kamma, and not by way of analysis. The state of bad conduct is characterized by association with greed, etc., and the state of good conduct by association with non-greed, etc. Thus, explaining bad conduct and good conduct also means explaining greed, etc. Therefore, it is said: "bad conduct... (etc.) ...becomes an explanation." 1435. For a non-existent phenomenon, by means of the designation "I" and so on, due to the appropriation of internal phenomena, there might be some internal designation. But for an existent phenomenon, it is not so, as it is not in the continuum of a being. Therefore, it is said: "existent... (etc.) ...not being." Thus, in "for one who reflects on one's own aggregates, etc.," regarding the word "internal object," by way of explaining its meaning, it will be said: "it grasps the designation 'I' as an internal object by the word 'etc.'" If so, should its internal nature also be stated in the internal triad? No, because just as external nature, internal nature is also intended in the internal triad without qualification. Therefore, it is said: "non-existent... (etc.) ...not stated." "The base of nothingness, etc." By the word "etc.," it includes the blameworthy preliminary and access consciousnesses, and the consciousnesses of reflection, enjoyment, etc., that arise with that as their object. It refers to the base of nothingness by drawing it in with the word "that," n But that which is called 'all', and that which is its forerunner, is the meaning. By 'partial statement' it is the statement of only a part, by suitability to a part, by having the same object. It adheres, it sticks, it clings by a part, thus it is 'lesa'. For those cittas of the sense-sphere wholesome, unwholesome, great functional, and advertence cittas, and of the wholesome functional division, and of the fourth rūpāvacara (jhana). Thus, in the descriptions of states accompanied by equanimity, etc., for which association with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is stated, having stated only one description of a state accompanied by equanimity, it would mean that the others should not be stated. By the word 'etc.' it includes the descriptions of sense-sphere states associated with roots, etc. There too, indeed, among the states mentioned as being of limited root-associated nature, etc., having stated only one, the others should not be stated. By 'occurrence of the cessation of non-existence' is meant the occurrence of the excellence of the mode of non-existence, or the occurrence of the excellence of non-existence. It should not be stated that it arises as an internal object, etc., is the intention. Those (cittas) having the same object as the sphere of nothingness are advertence, etc. If so, why is it said "in the commonality of non-existence"? For indeed, there is no occurrence in the mode of non-existence for cittas occurring by way of reviewing, relishing, etc., for the object of the sphere of nothingness, is there? No, because it is intended to be made non-existent. For 'non-existence' is that which is not made to exist, not that which does not make to exist. In "created by specific apprehension," etc., this is the intention: although in objects that are merely forms created by meditation-knowledge, in objects that do not exist in reality, mostly exalted states occur, but by way of apprehending external forms, there is an external nature for kasiṇas, etc., therefore, states having them as objects are called external objects. For the appearance of kasiṇas, having abandoned their continuity, is understood as a specifically expanded kasiṇa. But for the non-existence of the first immaterial consciousness, there is no external form, nor is there an internal form. In that which is devoid of both forms, that which occurs in a mode of occurrence not common to others, is the sphere of nothingness itself, an object that should not be stated. thus, not others acting in other ways. The mention of wholesome kamavacara states is to be understood as an example only. The vipaka of the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception is to be understood as the vipaka of the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception, and so on, the case ending should be construed according to the meaning. Because there is no possibility of projection means because there is no possibility of projecting the attainment consciousness. Having established that only wholesome states are the object of vipaka, it is said, "of vipaka," and so on. Even in mere non-existent phenomena, because they are graspable in an external manner, just as kasinas have an external nature, so too, here, because of the exclusive reliance on internal phenomena, there might be an internal nature for the designation "I," thus it is said, "internal," and so on. And they say, "by the word 'and so on' in 'khandhas and so on,' elements, sense bases, and so on, are included." This method refers to the descriptive style such as "having taken formless aggregates as aggregates." In the grasping of aggregates and so on by others, it means in the saying or uttering of the phrase "aggregates and so on by others." The connection is that the word "and so on" refers to all dependent designations. The explanation of the meaning-extraction of the Tika is finished. The explanation of the meaning-extraction of the Duka 1473. Otherwise, means in showing the stated manner. Indeed, because of showing the stated manner, the commentary does not show the application of sa-sankharika states, in the absence of sloth and torpor, as similar to a-sankharika states. In "attachment to existence and so on," it means in applications rooted in attachment to existence and so on. 1511. Two, means restlessness and ignorance as hindrances. Three, means restlessness and ignorance as hindrances, each with sensual desire, ill-will, and doubt. "Two or three" in the Pali indicates the elided nature of the word "or." Or, even in the proximity of a particle, the meaning of collection and so on is expressed by nouns and so on, not by particles, because they are not expressive of such. Thus, this meaning is obtained even without a particle. Similarly, the possibility of the intention of the saying is the authority here, thus "two, three" is said in the Pali. By "where they arise together," and so on, it states the general meaning that "two, three" is a characteristic statement. Thus, it is said, "and having done so, in the groups of defilements." Its intention is this: even though there is no thought-moment accompanied by two defilements, the Pāḷi text takes two, and it is understood that the characteristic of two or three is made because not all possible defilements are taken in their own form. If only one thought-moment of restlessness, which arises in all unwholesome states, is said to be the object, then it should also be said for the defilement of ignorance, and with this intention, he challenges by saying, "Why is it said?" and so on. The other person, to show that it is only the defilement of restlessness that is spoken of in this way, and that the defilement of ignorance is not spoken of in this way, says, "In the Suttanta," and so on. There, "among the five defilements mentioned in the Suttanta," is said, suspecting that restlessness accompanied by restlessness is accompanied by the defilement of ignorance. But is it not true that even in the Suttanta, ignorance is called a "defilement" in phrases like "beings whose defilement is ignorance" and so on? This is true, but in the Suttanta, the five defilements, such as sensual desire, are mostly mentioned as opponents of the jhāna factors, so this should be understood as being said in the sense of what is mostly stated. Some, however, say, "Just as in the Nikkhepa-kaṇḍa, even weak defilements that are opposed to wholesome states are shown as in the Paṭṭhāna. For example, in the Paṭṭhāna, it is said, 'A defilement dhamma arises depending on a defilement dhamma, not by pre-nascent condition. In the immaterial realm, the defilement of sensual desire depends on the defilement of sloth and torpor, the defilement of restlessness,' and so on. It is not so in the Aṭṭhakathā-kaṇḍa. In the Aṭṭhakathā-kaṇḍa, only the defilements that are opposed to jhāna are specified, so it is said, 'The defilement of restlessness arises in a thought-moment accompanied by restlessness.' In the Aṭṭhakathā,