English
the trembling of the body of a compassionate person when he sees another being harmed. As for the specific formations of matter, just as there is a term for the collision among specific formations of matter that arise closer to each other by way of impact, so too, the becoming an object and the state of being an object for consciousness and its objects occurs by way of impact. And that specific mental factor, dependent on consciousness, is spoken of by the term collision, as stated in "thus," etc. Some, however, say: "The collision-flavor of contact is only for the five sense doors, not for the others, because there is no collision of object and base." This is not appropriate, as collision is established by metaphor. Otherwise, it would not be possible even for the five sense doors. When the faculties and attention proceed as they do, consciousness arises regarding those respective objects; their proceeding in that way is what makes them objects for consciousness. "Whatever happiness and joy arise, monks, dependent on these five cords of sensual pleasure, this is called the gratification of sensual pleasures," (A.N. 9.34) from such a statement, it is the feeling of happiness that is gratification. Thus, he says "by way of being gratification." The apprehension of objects by way of touching, etc., is a partial experience. Thus, he states the function of experiencing by contact, etc., as unfigurative. By sign: by a blue, etc., sign, and by a long, etc., sign. By this method: just as in a mind-state where knowledge is predominant, perception follows knowledge, so too, he shows that in a mind-state where concentration is predominant, it follows concentration. It establishes: it sets the associated mental factors to their respective functions. Therefore, explaining its meaning, he says "it causes to proceed." The word "hoti" (is) indicates existence. And the existence of conditioned phenomena without arising, there is none, thus it is said, "consciousness does not truly arise in that way." Therefore, since consciousness does not not arise, but only arises, thus it is said, "consciousness exists" – this is the meaning here according to the commentary. When this is established, by the words "exists" and "arises" having the same meaning, no purpose is seen. Or, "being" means beings, and beings are endowed with arising, etc. The inclusion of contact, etc., within the three moments is expressed by the word "exists" in phrases like "contact exists." There, whatever state is endowed with arising, it is not that it does not exist, therefore, the expressibility by the word "exists" of the meaning expressed by the word "arises" is not impossible. But here, in "that which has arisen exists," although the state of being endowed with arising, etc., is expressed by the word "arisen" itself, the non-transgression of that state, however, is expressed by the word "exists," because the word "arisen" applies even after the three moments have passed. Therefore, here, the showing of "arises" is not contradictory, like the showing of the existence of the same meaning with the word "arises," because it is a clarification. Otherwise, if by "consciousness, having arisen, exists" the existence of consciousness is shown, it cannot be said, "what then is the purpose of again showing existence?" The repetition of "consciousness" is to show that consciousness, though stated with distinction in terms of temporal determination, is even more undifferentiated, by its co-arising with contact, etc. Here, only the enumerated phenomena are analyzed in the section of exposition, not all words included in the Pāli text, as in the Vibhaṅga. Thus, the meaning "for collection in the enumeration section, for analysis in the exposition section" is also firm. For example, in phrases like "at the time when one develops the path to rebirth in the rūpa-world," the path, etc., are not analyzed. Moreover, just as in the case of faculties by way of dominance, because it is to be taken as a common aggregate for all consciousness-moments, together with contact, feeling, perception, and volition, even consciousness, though mentioned in the temporal determination, should be understood as mentioned in the group of five with contact. Description of the aggregate of jhāna factors. Thinking means the act of thinking, and this is just the arising of thought through its own conditions, so the explanation of development is to prevent the state of being under control. The thought, making the object suitable for grasping, as if striking or turning it over, is said to have the characteristic of striking and the function of pervading. This characteristic is stated in relation to its function. For there is no action of phenomena apart from their own nature, nor is there a manner of grasping. But in accordance with those to be enlightened, even a single natural phenomenon, though ultimately of one nature, is explained in many ways, as if by figurative words and superimposed forms. For thus it is well explained. Vipphāra means the non-adherence and non-contraction of thought to the object, which is the opposite of sloth and torpor. But because of its nature of being directed, it is like a movement, and with this intention, it is said, "Vipphāravā means endowed with movement." It shows that in access and absorption, it arises in a continuum, just as the thought that is the first impingement on a new object is vibrant (vipphāravā), but not so when it arises continuously and uninterruptedly in the same object, for there it is not excessively vibrant, being settled. Therefore it is said, "having become still," and so on. From the statement "pervades with joy and happiness" and so on, it is said "with refined forms" to show that the pervasion of joy is such that it relates to the body. Avisāra is the nature opposite to the agitated state of being scattered, not merely the absence of being scattered. To show that both are stated, by way of the face and by way of being conjoined, even though there is no difference in meaning due to the concentrated nature of non-scattering and non-distraction, it is said, "avisā...pe... vikkhepo." "Visesato" should be understood as "especially" or "exceedingly." For happiness is a special cause of concentration, as stated, "the mind of one who is happy becomes concentrated." Indriya Description of Faith There, the word 'there' refers to the characteristic of determination, which is faith. When it is said "the person has faith," this also shows that faith, and the mental states associated with it, which are distinguished by faith, are the agents of the act of having faith. For the activity of a part is attributed to the whole. It is not merely the arising of a non-believing state towards an object worthy of belief that is the unwholesome lack of faith, but also the arising of a believing state towards an object unworthy of belief, as shown by the phrase "wrong determination." This means that in the case of filling up, etc., belief is the highest lack of faith. By "being belief," it refutes the lack of faith that is non-belief. By "object-gone," it refers to wrong determination. By "belief is a clear decision," making the already explained meaning clear, it says "it is not a mere temporary determination." Purity is belief, and that, because of its unshaken nature, is called "uncloudedness." For faith, when it establishes itself in associated mental states, has purity as its proximate cause. And because it is to be understood in the manner of determining, it has determination as its proximate cause. In "objects like the Buddha," it should be understood that connections to actions and their results in this world and the next are also included. "The noble disciple, Mahānāma, has faith as a hand," "Faith is indeed the best wealth for a person here," "Faith is the seed, austerity is the rain" —from such sayings, faith should be seen as like a hand, etc., for taking up wholesome states. "Here, a monk has a task to perform. He thinks thus: 'I will have a task to perform, and while performing it, it will not be easy for me to keep the Buddha's teaching in mind. Come, let me arouse energy for the attainment of what is not attained, for the realization of what is not realized, for the direct experience of what is not directly experienced.'" These are appropriate reflections, and so on. "Rooted in that" means rooted in the path to be traversed, and so on. Here, "the path is to be traversed," and so on, are shown in the commentary. It should be understood that they are stated without order, not in the sequence found in the Pāli. When mindfulness proceeds, making the object, like one long-practiced, vivid, it approaches it and stands firm, not letting go. An object that is forgotten is like something that has floated away or moved. But to show the opposite, that it is not forgotten, he says, "like a gourd in water," and so on. There, by "sāraṇa" (remembering), he clarifies the meaning, "they remember by it." For mindfulness is a condition for phenomena to proceed in the act of remembering, in the sense of being dominant there. For when it is a condition in that way, those phenomena are remembered, not forgotten, not floated away. "By these causes and conditions these phenomena arise" – by arising. "They produce this fruit" – by fruit. Phenomena are said to be accomplished by arising and by ripening. "Vatthubhūtā" means "object-become." Although all phenomena with an object grasp an object, the mind does not grasp by delimiting others, so the mind is said to "know by means of delimited perception." Among mental factors, some are unable to grasp an object by delimiting, and some remain only in the delimitation, not grasping the object like consciousness. To show the absence of this in those who might be suspected, he says, "not perception... ...by means of piercing." And that joy attains the state of pleasure –