English
“Is capable of being a condition” – by this, it states that the specific mode of the aforementioned wind element is a co-operative cause in producing the actions of stiffening and movement. That specific mode is merely a particular state of the great elements, like invisibility and impingement, and is nothing in ultimate reality. Thus, it says: “shows its non-existence in ultimate reality.” Its origin from mind is denied in ultimate reality. As for its origin from kamma, etc., there is no possibility at all. Thus, the aforementioned change, having no origin from anywhere in ultimate reality, becomes unconditioned. For there is no form that is unconditioned, and if it were unconditioned, it would be permanent. And no phenomenon, except Nibbāna, which is a real entity, is permanent. “Like its origin from mind” – this shows that the intimation’s being a derived form originating from mind is conventionally established. By intimation as the instrument. “What is the instrument” means what mental action, mental activity. “Known by intimation” – this is what causes it to act. This manifestation of intention is not seen in the movement of trees, etc., which are devoid of intimation-change, but it is seen in the movement of hands, etc. Therefore, it is understood that there is some change, distinct from the grasping of color, which is an indicator of intention, called bodily action. And an indicator, being a cause, makes known the object to be known only when it is itself known, not merely by its existence. Thus, after the grasping of color, the grasping of change is also understood. For sound, only when it has become an object, reveals meaning, not otherwise. Therefore, it says: “For intimation is not,” and so on. But if the movement-mode of mind-born forms is ññatti, Lest it be thought that because eye-consciousness has as its object the appearance of a moving colour, it too might grasp it, to prevent this, it says, "of eye-consciousness," and so on. By "forms like palm leaves," and so on, it shows that communication is to be known, and that it is to be known only by mind-consciousness. "Saññāṇaṃ" means that by which one cognizes; "taṃsaññāṇaṃ" is the cognition of water, etc.; "taṃsaññāṇākāro" is its mode, and that mode is a manner associated with water, etc. Thus, "udakā…pe… kāro" means having taken and known that. "Tadākārassa" means of the mode of making known water, etc. If the grasping of the aforementioned manifestation is the sole cause for grasping the intention, then why is it that for one who has not grasped the convention, there is no grasping of the intention? It is not merely the grasping of the manifestation that is the cause for grasping the intention. What then? It says, "but of this," and so on. Then, by "Atha pana," and so on, it shows that communication is to be grasped by inference. "Sādhippāya…pe… nantaranti" means immediately after the series of eye-door consciousness, which consists of grasping the colour-object co-arising with the manifestation accompanied by intention. "Adhippāyaggahaṇassāti" means of the third javana, which ascertains the intention. "Adhippāyasahabhū vikārābhāve abhāvatoti" means that in the absence of the manifestation co-existent with the intention, there is no intention; by this, it infers the aforementioned manifestation from the grasping of the intention. By "Evaṃ satīti," and so on, it shows the inferred meaning by way of conclusion. There, "udakādiggahaṇenevāti" means immediately after grasping the colours of palm leaves, etc., by the mere knowing of the presence of water, etc., supported by previously established connections. Just as the mode of cognition of palm leaves, etc., as being associated with water, etc., is known, not by immediate contiguity, so too, immediately after grasping the moving colour, communication is known by the mere knowing of the intention to go, etc., supported by previously established connections, and in its absence, it is absent; this is the application of the simile. "Sabhāvabhūtanti" means being in accordance with its meaning. "Dvidhāti" means in two ways: as that which makes known and as that which is to be known. "Kāyaviññattiyā tathāpavattamānāya cetanāsaṅkhātassa kamma" means the kamma, which is called volition, manifesting in that way through bodily communication. Its state of bodily action arises, being characterized by it. But not as a condition among the twenty-four conditions. Showing this, he said, "accomplished in that door," and so on. Thereby, even actions like killing, arising from the speech-door, are included, showing their inclusion. Or, regarding the volition that is bodily action, arising from the body-door, it is said, "because it is to be known through that door." And regarding that same volition arising from another door, it is said, "because it obtains its name through that door." And the mind-door adverting is certainly a producer of intimation. Therefore, he said, "of the eleven functional consciousnesses." "Moving in other doors" means operating as other doors. "Confusion of doors" means from the mixing of doors. For if doors attain the state of other doors, the body-door would become like the speech-door, and the speech-door like the body-door. And there would be confusion of actions arising from those respective doors. Therefore, he said, "there would also be confusion of actions." If so, bodily action... (etc.) ... would not be distinguished. If actions move in other actions, then bodily action, etc., would become speech action, etc., leading to "confusion of actions and confusion of doors." Thus, the distinction between bodily action and the body-action door would not exist. To convey this meaning, he said, "the same principle applies to actions moving in other actions." "Moving in other actions" means being characterized by other actions. Therefore, he said, "as a door." "Moving in other doors" means arising in other doors. "In its door" means in its own door. "In another" means in another door. "Actions" means actions pertaining to those respective doors. "Other" means actions pertaining to other doors. Doors do not move in a door; they do not operate as other doors, nor do they transfer to another door. Although intimation, among the twenty-four conditions, is not a condition for volition by any condition, yet, only when intimation is operating do actions like killing occur, not otherwise. Thus, intimation could be a cause for volition. Therefore, it is said, "by doors that are causes." "Bodily action and verbal action" referring to the cause of the determination of action itself, it is said, "by the doors as causes." Although it is said, "actions by the doors," yet because it is said, "mutually determined," this meaning is also established: that doors are determined by actions. To show this, "not only" and so on is said. By "those acting without doors," it speaks of the doors being self-determined, not of their non-determination. The intention is determination itself. Now it clarifies that determination with "not depending on action" and so on. There, just as time is determined by a mind determined by time, so too are doors determined by actions determined by doors. This is the brief meaning. By "being of such a nature," it means being of a nature to be characterized by the body and so on, which are doors. "Command... etc. ...of the mind" refers to bodily and verbal actions being expressible by verbal and bodily intimations. By "body and so on," it means by bodily and verbal intimations. Therefore, because even actions moving in another door move characterized by their own door, therefore. "Nor is action of the door" means of that door in which other door the action moves, which is not its own. "That very door" means its own door. "Of action" means of each respective action. If doors are determined by actions, how is "because action is not bound" to be understood? It says, "but previously" and so on. That is intimation. Of that, means of action. "By some mode" means by some mode among the twenty-four modes of condition. By "co-arisen with that," it clarifies the causal nature of intimation for action by implication, that the existence of bodily action is only in the existence of bodily intimation, not otherwise. Therefore it is said, "stated as the place of origin." By "by the rule stated as above" and so on, it speaks of the absence of deviation in action being the place of origin. There, "by the rule stated as above" means by the rule called the logic of determination stated in the commentary. "In moving through a door" means in moving through another door. The explanation of the discourse on the door of bodily action is concluded. The discourse on the door of verbal action... Explanation of the Hāva Here, regarding "with four factors," to show the volitional nature of the factors mentioned in the Sutta— "one speaks only what is well-spoken, not ill-spoken. One speaks only Dhamma, only what is pleasing, only what is true, not false"— the phrase "speaking what is well-spoken," etc., is stated. "Thus arisen" means arisen in the manner of speaking what is well-spoken, etc. "Arisen together" means produced simultaneously. For verbal intimation does not exist without sound. Thus it is said, "that intimation by that speech." By saying "speech, utterance, path," etc., not merely a very subtle sound-speech, and then connecting it with "that intimation by that speech," because verbal intimation is stated, the intention is also that the sound-ayatana, like the rūpāyatana, is not an object of the senses due to its being a subtle object, etc. Therefore, it says, "that by that... is known." Now, to show the contradiction of the Mahāaṭṭhakathā view that the sound of vitakka-vipphāra is not knowable by the ear-consciousness, because the Pāḷi states that sound arisen from mind is an object of ear-consciousness without distinction, the phrase "arisen from mind," etc., is stated.