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it is not fixed by necessity for the results of the sense-sphere that "this action is the object." Therefore, even if it could be obtained, it was not stated. But by "that object," due to the similarity in characteristic with the state of being a wholesome object, rebirth-linking and so on, which have action as their object, are also shown—this should be understood. Or, by saying "in reverse order" or "alternately," it is shown that in direct order attainment, the object-state is mostly that of the nearest attainment—this should be understood. But just as for one attaining in reverse order or alternately, even a non-proximate attainment becomes an object, so too it might be for one attaining in direct order. Having said, "Mind-penetrating knowledge and so on are to be construed with attention later," the meaning "of the attention to these" was stated. If so, "of the knowledge of psychic powers" should also be said. But because wholesome aggregates are not objects for the unconditioned knowledge of psychic powers, that was not stated. And because they are for mind-penetrating knowledge and so on, those were stated. Therefore, the meaning should be understood thus: wholesome aggregates are a condition by way of object-condition for the functional mind-penetrating knowledge and so on, and for any attention that has a wholesome object. 407-409. Remorse and so on. By 'vasena' and so on, by showing the danger, it gathers merely the unpleasantness by nature, or the breaking of patience. 410.By 'the visible object for eye-consciousness' and so on, by the consciousness-groups with fixed objects, it demonstrates the object-conditionality of the indeterminate for the indeterminate. For it is impossible to speak of everything, it makes a partial demonstration of phenomena in a single continuum. 413-416.Four-fold wholesome (consciousness) is shown as object-dominant condition. But the conditioned (resultant) is only sense-sphere. 417.The arising from an unprecedented mind-continuum is indeed bhavanga. And that is called root-adventitious bhavanga, tadārammaṇa, and natural bhavanga. In 'Anuloma for the fruit-attainment of a learner', since any fruit-attainment of a learner is to be avoided, there is nothing to be said. Therefore, removing this undifferentiated fruit-attainment, 'fruit-attainment' from 'wholesome consciousness of the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception for fruit-attainment', he shows it by saying "by fruit-attainment is meant the fruit-attainment of a non-returner." In 'sense-sphere functional consciousness for both kinds of arising', what is to be said regarding tadārammaṇa-arising after functional consciousness, that has already been stated in the chapter on the arising of consciousness. 'Both of them... (etc.)... for twelve' this is said in terms of mind-consciousness-element accompanied by joy. But accompanied by equanimity, it should be understood that it is for the ten consciousness-elements mentioned, and for the determining functional consciousness, and for the mind-element functional consciousness, thus for twelve. 423.The connection is 'having penetrated all attainments dependent on meritorious deeds like giving'. But this should not be taken absolutely. The meaning is that "only strong volition is obtained, not weak" should not be taken absolutely, or should not be taken firmly. What is the reason? Because the strong or weak (deed), having been given an opportunity, ripens after warding off obstacles. And because it should not be said that "whatever generates a result, is not a strong support condition," he shows this by saying "for what has been given an opportunity..." and so on. But in the 'Resultant Triad', in the negative section of the question-chapter... "A state that is of the nature to produce result is a condition for a resultant state by way of object condition, by way of decisive support condition, by way of kamma condition" (Paṭṭhāna 1.3.93). Since kamma condition is separately extracted, and in the negative section of the question-chapter on the triad of feeling, it is stated: "Not by way of root condition, not by way of object condition, not by way of decisive support condition, it stands" (Paṭṭhāna 1.2.87). Therefore, it is possible to say: "Even some kamma that generates result is not a decisive support condition." Or, "opposed on account of that" is the meaning of "Tasmiṃ viruddho", or "viruddhaṃ" is the reading. "Omāna" means the contempt shown by another. Passion (rāga) is craving for sensual pleasure arising by way of attachment. "Thus may my eye be in the future, thus may forms be" – this craving, which is the mental aspiration for the attainment of what has not been attained, is 'patthanā' (aspiration). This is the distinction between them. "Also another among them" means, among those, he kills any other living being different from the one previously killed. "By way of repeatedly commanding" – they speak, attributing the name "matricide" even to a previously arisen volitional act of commanding, due to its similarity with the act of matricide. The same method applies to "by two blows" here. "Just as... (etc.)... produces" – it is with this intention that it is said: "He gives a gift relying on passion" means "he produces faith by way of giving a gift relying on passion." Just as "he gives a gift relying on passion" and so on occurs, so too it shows that "passions and so forth are decisive support conditions for faith and so forth" also occurs. By showing "bodily pleasure" and so on together, it should be understood that their conditionality is not only separate, but also together. 425. "By being a condition by way of supporting" – by this, it shows this: not, as in previous sections, is the arising by way of condition spoken of here, but rather the conditionality of those various states for that which has arisen by way of condition. And the subsequently arisen aggregates are not conditions by way of supporting. Therefore, this subsequently arisen condition is presented here in the direct order. 427. Volition indeed. ...is a condition, meaning it is a condition of kamma, which is its own support. Why are the questions ending with the "two roots" not raised here in the condition section, as they are in the support, presence, and non-disappearance sections? Because they are not obtainable. There, due to the prominence of the conditioned, when wholesome and indeterminate phenomena arise together, wholesome and indeterminate conditions are obtained. Thus, it is said, "Wholesome and indeterminate phenomena arise conditioned by wholesome and indeterminate phenomena." There, only the mere arising of the conditioned from either or both conditions is intended, not that both are conditions for both. Here, however, due to the prominence of the condition, wholesome and indeterminate phenomena, as supports for both wholesome and indeterminate phenomena, are not obtainable. Thus, it is not said, "Wholesome and indeterminate phenomena are a condition for wholesome and indeterminate phenomena by way of the support condition," and so on. The explanation of the section on questions is finished. The arrangement of the section on questions: the forward enumeration. 439. It is said, "Here, pre-arisen is also obtainable." If so, why is "likewise" said? Due to the general similarity of the count "three." 440. The previous reading, "Excluding investigation in the adhipati condition, the remaining adhipatis are dissimilar," should be understood as an example. Since, however, without giving an example of a single dissimilar object for the hetu condition, it speaks of the anantara and so on, it shows all the dissimilar ones. Therefore, the indriya and magga conditions should also be shown as dissimilar. Thus, they read, "Excluding wisdom in the adhipati, indriya, and magga conditions, the remaining phenomena are dissimilar." Likewise, due to the presence or absence of being a hetu condition, and due to the presence of being a sahajāta and other conditions. But just as the hetu condition of roots other than non-delusion does not have the nature of an adhipati, indriya, or magga condition, so there is dissimilarity in adhipati conditions and so on, for those other than wisdom. Similarly, due to the absence of the vipāka condition in the hetu condition of wholesome and other roots, the vipāka condition of those other than hetu... Should there be dissimilarity? No, there should not be, because in the aggregate of consciousness and mental factors accompanied by both conditions, when there is the condition of cause, there is no absence of the condition of result. Just as, in the aggregate accompanied by both cause and co-nascence conditions, even though there is the presence of things other than causes, when causes are in the condition of cause, there is no absence of the condition of co-nascence, and thus dissimilarity of co-nascent things other than causes to the cause is not stated, so it is here too. This method applies to the dissociated condition as well. Moreover, conditions are spoken of only for the conditioned things; thus, when similarity is spoken of in terms of presence and absence at the moment of the conditioned thing, dissimilarity in terms of different moments should not be spoken of for that very thing. This "skillful investigation" should be stated as "skillful investigation as predominance." For investigation that is not predominant does not become a predominant condition. 441-443. "If the dissociated condition enters, it obtains the other two" is the former reading. But "a skillful phenomenon for a skillful and an indeterminate one" is not obtained, therefore they read: "a skillful one for an indeterminate one, an indeterminate one for an indeterminate one," thus obtaining two. "In lesser counts" means in those where, when they enter, the count becomes lesser.