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B030303Pañcapakaraṇa mūlaṭīkā(five treatises root commentary)

English

"Having made it non-conventional" means: because they are obtained together, by those not obtaining a single root nature, it is made devoid of conventional expression with a cause. Or, not as in the pair with a cause, is it here made non-conventional by way of connection or non-connection with a causal condition. Rather, it obtains only conventional expression with a cause, not conventional expression without a cause; thus it is made non-conventional. "By way of being obtained together" means: by way of material form being obtained together with root-condition-devoid states of consciousness and Nibbāna, which are devoid of causal conditions. 86-97. In the Pāli text where the reading appears: "the rootless is not one root with the root of name, the rooted is one root with the root of name" (Yama. 1. Mūlayamaka. 87), there, because names are determined by "whatever phenomena are names," when "rootless" and "rooted" are stated, it should be understood that "name" is not stated because it is already understood. But where the reading appears: "rootless name, rooted name" (Yama. 1. Mūlayamaka. 87), there "name" is stated for the sake of clarity. The explanation of the Exposition Section is finished. The explanation of the Root Yamaka is finished. 2. The Aggregate Yamaka 1. The Designation Section Explanation of the Outline Section 2-3. In the Aggregate Yamaka, the arising and cessation of aggregates, and their full understanding, should be stated in six time divisions, by way of person, place, and person-place. These aggregates are called by five terms such as "material aggregate," and they have ten constituent terms. There, is the phenomenon designated by the constituent term "material form" etc., the very meaning of the collective term? And is that which is stated by the collective term, the very meaning of the constituent term? In this place of doubt, the partial or entire meaning stated by the constituent terms "material form" etc., is the meaning of the collective terms. But that which is stated by the collective terms is entirely the meaning of the constituent terms "material form" etc. To show this meaning, the section on word purification begins with: "material form is the material aggregate, the material aggregate is material form." was said. Again, in the case of compound words like "form aggregate," since the meaning of the latter part is predominant, and the meaning of the predominant word "aggregate" and the meaning of the preceding words like "feeling" are possible, just as in the word "form aggregate," the state of being a form aggregate is expressed by the word "form component," and the words "form" and "aggregate" are in apposition, so too, in that case, the state of being a feeling aggregate, etc., is expressed by the predominant word "aggregate component," because the word "aggregate" is in apposition with words like "feeling." In this point of doubt, to show that some dhamma expressed by the word "aggregate component" is called by some compound word by someone, but not everything by everything, the chapter on the purification of terms, beginning with "form is the form aggregate, aggregates are the feeling aggregate," was stated. And by showing thus, the qualifying nature of words like "form," the qualified nature of the word "aggregate," and the appositional nature of the qualifier and the qualified are shown. Therefore, here there is a doubt: Is there any form other than the aggregate, from which form, being distinguished, becomes a qualifier of the aggregate? Are all aggregates to be qualified by form, which is a qualifier of the aggregate? And what is that form which is a qualifier of the aggregate? It is derived material form, because that alone is taken. In the exposition, the phrase "aggregates are the form aggregate" is extracted and explained. Thus, in this point of doubt, to show that there is no form other than the aggregate, and therefore what is called by this word "form" is called by the pure word "aggregate," and not all aggregates are to be qualified by form, which is a qualifier of the aggregate, and therefore they are to be distinguished, and this method applies to the feeling aggregate, etc., the chapter on the pure aggregates, beginning with "form is an aggregate, aggregates are form," was stated. Then, when "form is an aggregate" is assented to, immediately after the determination that "this word 'aggregate' is not only a qualifier of form, but also a qualifier of feeling, etc.," and the determination of the aggregate nature of form— Enough of the aggregates, and there is doubt in the application of the distinctions of form. Therein, not all aggregates are endowed with distinctions like feeling; rather, some are joined with some distinction. To show this, the chapter on the root-wheel of the pure aggregates was stated. Thus, for those whose arising and so on are to be spoken of, for the purification of the designation of those aggregates, for the determination thereof, the chapter on designation was stated, it should be understood. Regarding "having bound four, four wheels," here, because of being parts of a wheel, they are called "wheels," meaning pairs; four, four pairs rooted in each aggregate, having bound them. Indeed, this meaning should be here. Or the meaning should be understood as: "having bound" so that four, four pairs are rooted in each aggregate. Therein, taking the root phrase "form is the aggregate of form" and so on as the hub, "aggregates" as the rim, and "aggregate of feeling" and so on as the spokes, the wheel-nature is said to be understood, not because of being connected in a circular fashion. Indeed, even in the cases rooted in the aggregate of feeling and so on, the reading proceeds by purifying the lower one, not by circular connection. And for that very reason, having taken only the attainment of the pure aggregates, and not resting on the mere purity of form and so on in the distinction of aggregates, but to show the meaning of form and so on, which is called the nature of aggregate distinction, by joining it with the word "aggregate," and extracting the phrase in the manner of "aggregates, the aggregate of form," and so on, the meaning is that the meaning has been divided. The explanation of the Chapter on Enumeration is finished. Explanation of the Chapter on Detailed Exposition Regarding "that which is dear and pleasing": "The eye in the world is dear and pleasing... and so on... forms in the world... and so on... eye-consciousness... and so on... eye-contact... and so on... feeling born of eye-contact... and so on... perception of forms... and so on... volition regarding forms... and so on... craving for forms... and so on... initial thought about forms... and so on... sustained thought about forms..." Thus spoken, that which is the object of craving, belonging to the three planes of existence, should be understood. Therefore, that which is dear and pleasing, being the aggregate of the five aggregates, is in one aspect the aggregate of form, thus it is said: " "Form that is dear, form that is pleasing, is not the aggregate of form." Or, the aggregate of form enters into dear form by its nature of being dear, not by its nature of being afflicted. Therefore, it is said: "Form that is dear, form that is pleasing, is not the aggregate of form." In the Saññāyamaka, "perception of views" is a remaining part of the statement "distinction." There, view itself is perception, thus "perception of views." For in such passages as "Having oneself undertaken vows, a being, bound by perception, goes up and down" (Sutta Nipāta 798), and "For one detached from perception, there are no ties" (Sutta Nipāta 853), view is also called "perception." 28. "Are they not aggregates, not the aggregate of feeling? Yes." It should be understood that this merely purifies the designation, due to the absence of the term 'aggregate' and the absence of the term 'aggregate of feeling'; the existence of other phenomena is not the sole criterion here. And having done so, it will speak of "Are they not sense bases, not the ear sense base? Yes," and so on. 39. "Feelings and so on, other than form" – here, supramundane feelings and so on should be understood. For these are not dear forms and pleasing forms, because they are not objects of craving; thus they are other than form. And "form and the aggregates, excluding the remainder" – this too should be understood as stated with reference merely to the non-occurrence of the word 'not' with these. And having done so, it will speak of "the eye and the sense bases, excluding the remainder, are neither the eye nor the sense bases" (Yamaka 1.Āyatanayamaka.15), and so on. For there is nothing whatsoever that is taken by the term 'remainder' there. If there were, it would be the mind-object base. For it will say, "Is a phenomenon a sense base? Yes" (Yamaka 1.Āyatanayamaka.16). And it would not be an object of craving. If it were, then by being a dear form and a pleasing form, it would be form, and by the statement "Is form an aggregate? Yes" (Yamaka 1.Khandhayamaka.40), it would also be an aggregate. However, in the commentary, it should be understood that the term 'remainder' here refers to a designation, taking into account the existence of terms like 'man' and 'woman' even when they are not actually present. End of the Niddesa section. is completed. 2. Description of the Process Section 50-205. In the process section, the dyads are stated by combining the aggregates of feeling, etc., with the latter only—three, two, and one—not with the former. Why? Because there is no special meaning in the sections of unmixed time divisions. For the former, the dyad combined with the latter would be stated by reversing the order of the questions for combining the latter with the former, but there is no special meaning in the sense.