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B030303Pañcapakaraṇa mūlaṭīkā(five treatises root commentary)

English

Thus, "jātisaṅgaha" (inclusion by kind) as mentioned in the "rūpakaṇḍa" (section on form) refers to "sajātisaṅgaha" (inclusion of its own kind). Here, in the matrix of methods, these two, "inclusion, non-inclusion" and "association, dissociation," are the outlines of the method of questioning and answering about phenomena in general, without specifying the particular phenomena to be questioned and answered; the remaining ones are specified. Indeed, in "saṅgahitena asaṅgahitaṃ" (by the included, the non-included), when it should be "saṅgahitena asaṅgahitaṃ asaṅgahitaṃ" (by the included, the non-included, the non-included), the elision of one "asaṅgahita" word should be understood. By this, the specific non-included phenomenon, qualified by the specific included phenomenon, and the method of questioning and answering called "non-inclusion" based on that, is outlined. And "saṅgahitena" (by the included) should be understood as an instrumental case for specification. This method applies to the outlines of methods from the third up to the tenth, excluding the sixth. For in these too, by the method stated, having determined the specific phenomena to be questioned and answered by two terms each, the methods of questioning and answering are outlined by the third term, which is similar to the last term in each case. There, in the fourth and fifth, the instrumental case indicates the agent. And in the four from the seventh onwards, it should be understood as "with" (sahayoga), not as an appositional specification like in the second and third. For there, one nature is specified by another nature; in these, one phenomenon by another phenomenon. But in the four from the eleventh onwards, having determined the specific phenomena by the initial term alone, the methods of questioning and answering are outlined by the other terms. Here too, the instrumental case should be understood as specifying. Questioning and Answering. For the supporting phenomena do not distinguish their own conjoined or disjoined state by means of the special characteristic of being included, etc., which acts as a cause. "Vikappato" means "from various conceptualizations," the meaning is "from division." "By way of determination" means by way of association with resolve. And all mental states mentioned by way of determination are all mental states mentioned by way of determination; "by way of commonality among them" —this is the meaning to be understood here. For resolve is said to be common to the mental states mentioned by way of determination; the others are common to all. There, the common ones, the pervasive ones, and the manifest ones should be initially grasped. Therefore, a statement was made for the purpose of grasping their inclusion, etc. But the uncommon ones should also be grasped; thus, to show the inclusion, etc., of others by means of their great scope, resolve was pointed out. And it should be understood that "mentioned by way of determination" refer to the statement in the description of the Dhamma-saṅgaha and in the analysis of dependent origination. But if the meaning is "common to all of those mentioned by way of determination," then among what is to be said regarding common and uncommon, that resolve, which is of great scope among the uncommon, is mentioned because of its commonality with all mental states mentioned by way of it, and because contact, etc., are common to all. And resolve is of great scope among the uncommon, because there is no other such thing. This intention should be understood. And here, the life faculty is not mentioned because it is mixed with matter, it should be understood. But one-pointedness of mind, being of the nature of non-concentration, is to be spoken of by general terms alone, and by general and specific terms, as being of the nature of concentration. There is nothing else to be pervaded or excluded that is expressible by a specific term. Thus, by showing the general and specific that neither pervade nor exclude anything else, it is to be spoken of by terms that reveal the distinctions of that very phenomenon. Not like feeling, which is of the nature of pleasure, etc., by general and specific terms that are contrary to the stated characteristics. Therefore, this general term "one-pointedness of mind," operating independently of a specific term in the nature of concentration, is itself a specific term. Not attaining it, one would reveal only the nature of non-concentration, and the other only the nature of concentration. Thus, mental one-pointedness, divided into two, being both uncommon and of limited scope, is not suitable for mention here. Even if undivided, due to its lack of obviousness like contact and so on, and because it is spoken of by relying on other phenomena, it is not suitable for existence, and thus is not mentioned. The explanation of the mātikā is finished. 2. Explanation of the Niddesa 1. The First Method: Explanation of the terms 'inclusion' and 'non-inclusion' 1. Explanation of the term 'khandha' The aggregates, sense-bases, elements, and great elements are stated as phenomena to be directly known. But for showing the specific qualities like full understanding of these phenomena, which are directly known by their nature, the Truths are stated; and for showing specific functions like dominance, the faculties and so on are stated. Thus, just as the specific qualities of the Truths and so on, the specific qualities of inclusion and non-inclusion, when spoken of in reliance on what is to be directly known, become easy to understand. Therefore, it should be understood that the introductory matrix "Inclusion by three. Non-inclusion by three." is established. And having done so, the conjoined and disjoined (phenomena), spoken of as "by four," are questioned and answered by relying on what is to be directly known, namely the aggregates and so on. "The material aggregate by one aggregate" – This shows the inclusion (or enumeration) by the count of the nature of the material aggregate, or by the designation of the material aggregate, in that those phenomena called "material aggregate" have the nature of the material aggregate among the five aggregates. Therefore, it says "whatever..." and so on. For "material aggregate" shows the phenomenon to be included. The phrase "by one aggregate" is the showing of that inclusion by which it is included. The meaning here is: it is counted by one aggregate-count among the five aggregate-counts. And because inclusion is spoken of by terms like 'aggregate', therefore, further on, it will say "included by the aggregate-inclusion" and so on. The explanation of the method of non-inclusion – this should be understood as stated as a partial method of that same method, "inclusion and non-inclusion," not as a different method. Here, the dyad based on the material aggregate... That the four are shown, by this, when rooted in the feeling aggregate and connected with the former, there is no distinction. So connecting with the latter, three pairs, two triplets, one quartet, rooted in the perception aggregate, two pairs, one triplet, rooted in the formations aggregate, one pair— these are obtained, thus it shows. But from their distinctions, after the explanation of the five-fold questions, the explanation of the questions should be made concise, thus it should be understood, or it can be known by the method stated, thus it is not included in the Pāli text. Explanation of the Term 'Sense-Bases' and So On 40. And since in pairs and triplets, although in single instances there is a similar explanation, but for single instances with similar explanations, such as the eye faculty, ear faculty, pleasant feeling faculty, etc., a dissimilar explanation is seen in pairs and so on. Here, there is no mutually similar explanation for the pairs of eye-ear or eye-pleasant feeling, nor from pairs to a triplet. But here, for the pairs of suffering-origin and suffering-path, there is a mutually similar explanation with the triplet, thus, it states the reason for the similar explanation in pairs and triplets, and for mentioning the path truth after the origin. 6. Explanation of Dependent Origination 61. Even though it should have been written: "Without starting a question, ignorance is one aggregate, formations conditioned by ignorance are one aggregate," due to oversight, "ignorance is one aggregate" was not written, thus it should be understood. Or, by making it a case of elliptical retention of form, the explanation of ignorance is shown by the mention of ignorance. Here, in "all resultant consciousness," the qualification by "resultant" should not be made. For indeed, the inclusion of consciousnesses, even wholesome ones and so on, in the Discourse on Elements, by terms like "consciousness conditioned by formations" and so on, is shown by their explanation similar to the explanation of "resultant phenomena" in the exposition of terms included and not included by dissociation, and here, by the statement of the inclusion of name-and-form by the eleven sense-bases, the inclusion of even non-kamma-born things is understood. 71. Of those arising, maturing, and breaking up, due to their mere state of arising and so on, birth, aging, and death, when separated in ultimate reality, are not perceived... wandering, being only the nature of ultimate realities, they are the results of the arising of form, distinguished by their nature of being oppressed, thus they are akin to the aggregates of form. But for the non-forms, which are the cause of their arising, like the arising of form-kalāpas, they are single entities, arising together with the four aggregates, not grasped by the ultimate functions of feeling, perceiving, and cognizing, but grasped by the non-ultimate function of conditioned formation, thus they are akin to the aggregates of formations. Similarly, both kinds of these, not grasped by the ultimate functions of the eye-base and so on,