English
But what is the difference from the previous question? In the previous question, it was said that the fifty-sevenfold division of dhammas is apprehended by its true nature, and likewise, the person is apprehended. Here, however, the difference is this: that division of dhammas, being apprehended by its true nature, is apprehended by the mode of suffering, etc., and its conditions, etc. Is the person also apprehended by that mode? If the opponent were to say, "Just as feeling, though apprehended by its true nature like form, is not apprehended by the mode of suffering, so too the person, though apprehended by its true nature like the division of dhammas, is not apprehended by the mode of suffering, etc., and its conditions, etc.," this would not be a blameworthy statement. And it would not be right to censure him for his contempt. But since no other real ultimate meaning apart from the division of dhammas is established, he challenges by the mode of the division of dhammas itself. He shows censure by contempt itself. The accepting and contemptuous sides, the sides of affirmation and rejection by common and specific characteristics, the direct and reverse sides, these are to be understood as the differences between the first and second methods. Saying, "Therefore, it should indeed be said," he implies a fault in not saying what should be said. It should be understood that "because censure is incurred" is said with this intention. It is said, "Thus, this direct pentad, 'is apprehended,' etc., is called so because of the fourfold imputation of censure, both direct and reverse." But with two establishments, it should be a heptad, both direct and reverse. Or the reason for omitting it should be stated. What he will say, however, is: "Establishment is merely an establishment to show 'this is your fault' by establishing the opponent's side." it is so, not for suppression or remedy or making it manifest” (Kathā. aṭṭha. 2). With this intention, here too, the two kinds of establishment are avoided. Just as there, without stating the five kinds of remedy, the four kinds of remedy will be stated, so here too, the four kinds of suppression should be stated. However, since the pure suppression is primarily suppression, the suppression mentioned as an enumeration should be understood as stated separately. Those who say, “because it is an unreal suppression, the remedy is not stated separately there,” for them, in the second mode of argument, the four kinds of suppression and the five kinds of remedy would arise. 2. The intention is that it refers to conventional truth, meaning that what one considers to be truly existent. For it will be said, “The opponent’s further question, ‘What is truly existent?’ refers to pure conventional truth or conventional truth mixed with ultimate truth” (Kathā. aṭṭha. 6). If there, what the opponent considers truly existent is conventional truth, then a person who says that a person is found in the manner of conventional truth should not be refuted by one who holds the same view, and this discussion should not even be started. If the meaning is that the opponent says, “What is truly existent?” and so on, referring to what the proponent and the opponent both consider truly existent. Then it would follow that the proponent considers only conventional truth to be truly existent. If both are intended, then it should not be said again, “Or he says this by combining conventional truth and ultimate truth.” And if both truths are truly existent ultimate realities, then one who desires the finding of a person in a part of the truly existent should not ask, “Is a person found by truly existent ultimate reality?” and so on, nor is it appropriate to ask about a part of the truly existent. For feeling, which is found in the manner of feeling, should not be asked about as being found in the manner of affliction, nor does the opponent desire a person with the nature of affliction and so on, but rather as truly existent ultimate reality. Other than ultimate truth When a true state exists, its ultimate truth should not be questioned. For those who say, "Imposing the designation of a true state on an untrue state, he questions concerning that," the designated true state is not reasonably the true state intended by oneself. And if both designated ultimate true states are true states, the fault is as stated before. And what is apprehended in the mode of conventional truth may or may not be apprehended in the mode of real existence. If it is apprehended in the mode of real existence, then one who concedes "the person is also apprehended in the ultimate sense of a true state" should not be questioned. But if not in the mode of real existence, then a true ultimate mode of conventional truth, distinct from that, should not be spoken of, as it is unestablished. And it will be said: "Just as forms and so on exist by way of individual and general characteristics, not so is the person." Therefore, the intention here should be sought. Regarding "two truths," here, because it is not apprehended in the mode of two truths, this might be conceded, or nothing at all should be said. Just as the non-apprehension in a partial ultimate mode is not a reason for concession, so too the apprehension in a partial conventional mode is not a reason for rejection; thus, the intention here too should be sought. "It is not apprehended" is merely a common expression. The meaning is: "This very statement, 'it is not apprehended,' is both conceded and rejected, relying on this sophistry." Just as I am to be refuted by conceding and rejecting "it is apprehended," so too are you by conceding and rejecting "it is not apprehended" — the imagining of what is generally impossible, while being thus possible, can here be sophistry. Therefore, it should be understood that "it is not apprehended" is called "sophistry" because this mere common expression is the cause of sophistry. Or the meaning is: relying on both the mere common expression and sophistry. This should be investigated: that setting aside is not making clear the refutations and counter-refutations. For by setting aside a position, it is not... Not having approved the former, despising the latter, or for one despising the latter, approving the former, is wrong, it is possible to impute. 3. "Yours," and "confessing," are words of ownership in relation to oneself, with this intention he said, "you yourself confessing." 4-5. Because the censure was brought about by four imputations of wrong-doing, by "we are ill-censured, indeed!" and so on, the censure made by you to me is wrong, like the censure made by me to you. Thus, in that "forward five-fold," of the censure made by four imputations of wrong-doing, of its being a wrong action by that method, because it was brought about together with the censure made by oneself, or because it reached the state of being no censure, this meaning should be understood. Just so, "Therefore, if you censure, indeed... (etc.)... this is wrong for you." Of this conclusion of being no censure, the fourfold conclusion should be understood. The commentary on the forward-contrary is finished. 2. Commentary on the contrary-forward. 7-10. Having said, "The opponent's assertion is based on his own doctrine," it was again said, "The opponent's refutation is due to the non-existence of a person in the ultimate sense." If this refutation is made according to one's own doctrine, that a person is found in the ultimate sense, by another true ultimate sense, then this becomes his doctrine. And if that is so, he should not be censured by one who desires an understanding in the conventional sense. But if, having concealed his own doctrine, he refutes according to the opponent's doctrine, because it does not contradict the former assertion, he should not be censured. For no fault arises for one who states both his own and the opponent's doctrine. But having asserted by one's own doctrine, and refuting by the opponent's doctrine, having abandoned one's own doctrine, the opponent's doctrine is taken. Therefore he should be censured. This might be the intention here. The commentary on the contrary-forward is finished. The commentary on pure ultimate truth is finished. 2. The ultimate truth of opportunity. 1. Commentary on the forward-contrary. 11. "Everywhere" means "in the whole body," showing this meaning. He said, "referring to the body." There, in that abbreviated text. Because when it is said, "referring to the body, it is not found everywhere," it implies that it is found outside the body. Therefore, by "the opponent's refutation is the speaker's own view," this meaning is stated: "the person is not found by any nature." For there is no occasion for finding, apart from the body and what is other than it, for that which is found by any nature. 3. The meaning of time-truth. 1. Explanation of the direct-opposite. 12. "And the times of former and latter births" means referring to the finding of that same (person) in the times of former and latter births, who is found in the time of the middle birth. The rest is similar to what was stated in the first method. In these three, it is similar to what was stated in the first method, "everywhere." What is that? It means the abbreviation of the text. Here too, because when it is said, "it is not found always," it implies that it is found at some time. Therefore, "the opponent's refutation is the speaker's own view" should be applied. 4. The meaning of part-truth. 1. Explanation of the direct-opposite. 13. And in the third method, because when it is said, "it is not found in all," it implies that it is found in one. Therefore, "the opponent's refutation is the speaker's own view" should be applied. Therefore, he said, "it is similar." The meaning of space-truth, etc. 2. Explanation of the opposite-direct. 14. There, in "of the direct pentad, etc.," the direct pentad should be understood as the five negations,