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in brief and in detail everywhere, it would be too extensive, and because it must be stated completely in each training rule. This means it is by way of encompassing all offenses. Those training rules that are called “active” should be understood as involving body and speech together with intimation. Those that are “inactive” should be understood without intimation. Here, the mind is immeasurable, because the origin of reporting a true event is active, and because it is mindless. There, the active offense should be understood as originating from a mind that is not an internal factor. Something that does not generate intimation is also sometimes called “active” by way of common usage, just like the first pārājika. Even in the absence of intimation, “If he” "If he approves, there is an offense of defeat; if he does not approve, there is no offense," so it has been said. Action, which is called intimation, does not occur without the thought of approval, because it is born of the aforementioned thought, because it is a modified form, and because it follows thought. Therefore, this form of intimation, called action, does not exist without the generating thought, like other forms born of thought. The other, sound-object, exists. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say, "If there is action, there is certainly the generating thought of approval," and then, "If he does not approve, there is no offense." Since the thought of approval, even though it generates intimation, does not always generate intimation, therefore, it is said, "If he approves, there is an offense of defeat," assuming it arises by itself even without intimation. If it does not arise, it is called not approving, and for that, there is no offense. For this reason, the Blessed One determines the offense by thought, not by action, as is to be understood when he says, "What is your thought, bhikkhu?" Here, the purpose of taking "origin" is to show that one incurs an offense only by what is to be done or not to be done, depending on the distinction of body, etc., and not otherwise. Among these, the purpose of taking "action" is to show the distinction of body, etc., as having intimation and not having intimation. The purpose of taking "perception" is to show the distinction of thought, as being a factor or not a factor of the offense. By this, the thought that is present in the characteristic of action or in the characteristic of non-action, or from which action or non-action arises, is not, without distinction, a factor or not a factor of the offense. Rather, it is shown that the thought associated with the perception by which it is called "release by perception" is a factor, and the other is not. Now, the thought by which a training rule is with thought, and without which it is without thought, because of its blameworthiness without distinction, it is called "merely worldly blame." However, the purpose of taking "thought" and "worldly blame" is to show that, even though it is blameworthy, some is worldly blame, and some is blame by enactment. Since thought itself is called "worldly blame," it is undesirable that mental action also be an offense. The purpose of preventing an undesirable consequence is the taking of action which is for the purpose of preventing a slight attachment. The purpose of taking the triad of wholesome actions is to prevent an undesirable consequence, that is, the action which is characterized by non-doing here, might be free from the triad of wholesome actions. The purpose of taking the triad of feelings is to prevent an undesirable consequence, that is, the unclassified offense here, one who has attained the cessation of feeling, even without feeling in some cases, commits it, thus the triad of feelings is not obtained here. For a training rule, in terms of a person with consciousness, it is called "threefold consciousness, threefold feeling," and even if committed by one without consciousness, it is still called "threefold consciousness, threefold feeling." Here is a supporting sutta for that: "There is an offense that one without consciousness commits, one without consciousness rises from it (Pari. 324), there is an offense that one with wholesome consciousness commits, one with wholesome consciousness rises from it" (Pari. 470). It is written: "The exposition of an offense with consciousness, the liberation of perception is the exposition of non-offense, the non-consciousness is the not knowing of the object, the non-liberation of perception is the not knowing of the transgression. This is their difference" (Vajira. Ṭī. Pārājika 61-66, Pakinnakakathāvaṇṇanā). Regarding "sacittakapakkheti" (the side of conscious acts) here, this is the explanation of the difficult word: "sacittakapakkheti" is said with reference to unconscious acts like drinking alcohol. But among conscious acts, that which arises solely from unwholesome intention, both are called worldly offenses. For in drinking alcohol, knowing "it is alcohol" or "it is not proper to drink," if one drinks, it is unwholesome. The statement "knowing 'it is not proper'" here is not appropriate, because even a disciplinary offense would then be a worldly offense. Desiring to avoid this undesirable consequence, the Elder Vajirabuddhi wrote: "Here, the investigation of 'conscious' and 'unconscious' occurs only in the knowing of the object, not in the knowing of the precept. If it were in the knowing of the precept, all training rules would be worldly offenses, but not all training rules are worldly offenses. Therefore, it is appropriate that it occurs only in the knowing of the object. Why? Because in the Sekhiya rules, the knowing of the precept alone is the measure, not merely the object. "Knowing." Herein, the meaning is: Taking the offense by way of the training rule, that training rule, for which, when intentional, the mind is always unwholesome, that is a worldly offense. And for that which is unintentional, which is reckoned as intentional or unintentional, in the intentional aspect, the mind is always unwholesome, that too, like drinking liquor, is a worldly offense. Referring to this meaning, it is said: "That for which, in the intentional aspect, the mind is always unwholesome, this is called a worldly offense." For this word "in the intentional aspect" is said referring to the unintentional. For there is no purpose in qualifying the intentional absolutely with "in the intentional aspect." Even so, the meaning is that what is stated without restriction should be taken as restricted. "But for animals," the word "but" excludes the case of a grave offense and so on. Regarding "action," if it is asked how it is an action, since it is said "he delights in what is standing" (Pārā. 58), it is an action because it is said "he delights." If so, should it be said "bodily action, mental action"? No, because it is said "bodily action" by way of common usage. It is written that it is obtained by one whose knees are raised. It should be understood by comparing it with what was said before. Even by saying, "Monks, for a word or letter that is badly placed, the meaning is difficult to grasp" (A.N. 2.20), the well-placed state of words and letters is desired only for the easy grasping of the meaning, not for the sake of uttering letters. Therefore, it is said, "For the Lord declared the meaning to be the refuge," and so on. The explanation of the first Pārājika is finished. 2. Explanation of the Second Pārājika "From a village or from a forest" is stated at the beginning because it is a characteristic definition. Indeed, in the entire Vinaya Piṭaka, the five kinds of village distinctions should be understood: village, village precinct, village field, village boundary, village boundary precinct. Similarly, for a forest boundary, one is a non-village forest, one for the training rules of arrangement (Pāci. 180 ff.), one is a village forest, one for the boundary of non-separation, and one for one who falls behind the Saṅgha (Pāci. 691). Thus, five kinds of forest distinctions should be understood. to be understood. Therein, there is a village which does not receive village protection anywhere, there is a village which does not perform village duties. Similarly, there is a forest which does not receive forest protection anywhere, there is a forest which does not perform forest duties. This distinction also is to be understood. Therein, excluding the formal act of establishing a boundary for non-separation, in the phrase "village and village precincts" (Mahāva. 144), if the village is enclosed, "village" means within the enclosure; if not enclosed, it means within the area of the enclosure. This is what is meant by "within the village" (Pārā. 478) in the Udositā Sikkhāpada. In the Sāsaṅka Sikkhāpada, "within the house" (Pārā. 654) is used for a non-dangerous situation. As it is said: "If he places it within the house, he places it in the surrounding alms-gathering village" (Pārā. 654). Similarly, for the Sekhiya rules related to "within the house," this same definition is to be understood. In the rule, "Whatever bhikkhunī goes alone to another village" (Pāci. 687), this same definition is intended, as it is stated: "when she crosses the enclosure of an enclosed village, when she crosses the precincts of an unenclosed village." In those old manuscripts where "entering the precincts" is written, that is written by mistake, taking the method customary in the rules about entering a village at the wrong time, and is not authoritative. And in those manuscripts where, in the Vibhaṅga of the rule about entering a village at the wrong time (Pāci. 513), it is written: "enters a village" means "when one crosses the enclosure of an enclosed village, when one crosses the precincts of an unenclosed village," that is a mistaken writing. "When one enters the precincts" is the correct reading there. For it is stated in the Samantapāsādikā: "The precincts of an unenclosed village