English
" For by not saying that, a nun, appearing in the male gender, standing in the state of a monk, might say thus: "I did not enter the training and livelihood of monks at the time of my ordination, therefore, even if I have not renounced the training, I am not defeated by sexual intercourse." It is said: As it is stated, it should not be stated thus, due to undesirable implications. Thus If it is said, there is also a renunciation of training for bhikkhunīs, it leads to that. And that is undesirable. This is another undesirable thing: "All training rules are common, not uncommon." Moreover, this was said to show that a bhikkhu is one who has entered the training and livelihood: "I allow, bhikkhus, that same preceptor, that same ordination, those years, to associate with bhikkhus," and so on (Pārā. 69). Then, the division of the offense: from that analysis, "when the body is not consumed, it is a pārājika; when mostly consumed, it is a thullaccaya," and so on (Pārā. 73, Pari. 157), there is a division of the offense. No offense otherwise: from that very analysis, in a way other than that in which the offense was stated, there is a division of no offense. For if there were no analysis like, "If he enjoys it, there is an offense of pārājika; if he does not enjoy it, there is no offense," it would not be understood. Thus far, the verse "the origin, the division of the mātikā" has been explained in brief. The specific reasons will become clear in each training rule. The first promulgation, having surpassed the first enlightenment, was promulgated at the time when Venerable Sudinna was eight years old, having attained the greatness of long experience. The second promulgation, at the time of attaining the greatness of extensive learning. For that Venerable, who committed the pārājika with a monkey, thinking that just as in training rules concerning women, a female animal is not intended, so it is here, said, "It is true, friends... but that is with a human woman, not an animal" (Pārā. 41). The third promulgation, arose at the time of attaining the greatness of supreme gain, from the saying "having eaten as much as one desires" (Pārā. 43). The greatness of abundance is also found here. Thus, it should be understood that this first pārājika training rule, taking all three kinds of basis, was promulgated having reached all four kinds of time. Therein, "whoever" is a word of complete exhaustion. "Bhikkhu" is a word of restriction for its over-application. "One who has entered the training and livelihood of bhikkhus" is its qualifier. utterance. Not indeed everyone named 'bhikkhu', who by the Blessed One, by whatever ordination, for ordained bhikkhus, the training to be trained, prescribed as the lowest standard, and the 'living together here' that is spoken of, is endowed with both. But when is he endowed? Immediately after being ordained by whatever ordination, whether knowing both or not knowing both, by having undertaken them, he is indeed endowed. 'Living together' means as long as he does not renounce the training, or does not incur a pārājika offense. But what is said in the Andhaka Commentary: "One who fulfills the training is endowed with training, one who does not transgress the 'living together' is endowed with 'living together'," that is said in terms of the highest standard. For it is not that one who does not fulfill the training, or is abundant in sensual thoughts and so on, or transgresses some remaining part of the 'living together', is not called 'endowed with training and living together'. But by the highest standard, a fourfold classification is obtained: "There is a bhikkhu endowed with training, reflecting on the precepts, but not endowed with 'living together', transgressing a training rule unintentionally. There is one not endowed with training, abundant in sensual thoughts and so on, but endowed with 'living together', being without offense. There is one not endowed with training, and not endowed with 'living together', having incurred an unremitting offense. There is one endowed with both, fulfilling the training and not transgressing the 'living together'." Here, this fourth bhikkhu, the highest, might be intended here. If it is said, "Is it not proper for the Blessed One to speak of the not-highest?" No. Because of the contradiction with the statement: "Therein, this training in higher morality, this is the training intended in this matter." If the intention were to take the highest, then it would simply be said, "Training means the three trainings." For one endowed with the three trainings is the very highest. If it is said, "Considering the statement later, 'Should engage in sexual intercourse,' only the training in higher morality is spoken of?" No, because even that is impossible. For one who fulfills the training in higher morality, and does not transgress the 'living together' is capable of engaging in sexual intercourse, and he engages in it without fulfilling that training, and by transgressing the livelihood. This is the intention. Therefore, the meaning here should be understood thus: Since the livelihood, which is the training rule, encompasses only the training in higher virtue, and not the other two trainings, therefore it is said: “Among these, this training in higher virtue is the training intended in this context.” Therefore, the livelihood that encompasses the training in higher virtue is called the training-livelihood. Thus, the word “training” is used to specify the livelihood. And to clarify its meaning, the Vibhaṅga, without referring to training, says: “He trains in it, therefore he is called one who has attained the livelihood” (Pārā. 45). By this, it is shown that these are one and the same term. And because the authority to train begins immediately after ordination, it is called “he trains” and “he has attained.” He who is thus called “one who has attained the training-livelihood,” relying on such a condition, later on, without rejecting the training which is the livelihood, and without revealing any weakness in it, should engage in sexual intercourse— this meaning is appropriate. However, the commentary's method is rejected, and it is not worthy of rejection; the intention here should be sought. Among all the training rules, this characteristic of a bhikkhu is common: “one who has attained the training-livelihood of bhikkhus.” An Arahant disciple commits an offense unintentionally, as does a Sekha, but a worldling (puthujjana) even intentionally. Therefore, considering this to be the common characteristic of a bhikkhu for Sekhas, Asekhas, and worldlings, and by the method of partial inclusion and ekasesa, of merely one who has attained training, merely one who has attained livelihood, and one who has attained both, it is summarized as “one who has attained the training-livelihood.” And by taking the highest, the inclusion of the non-highest is established. Therefore, in the commentary, only the highest is mentioned. To achieve this, in “He trains in it, therefore he is called one who has attained the livelihood,” the omission of the word “training” is a loss. Saying 'enough', since he has undertaken the training, therefore, it should be understood in meaning as 'one who has undertaken the training', and saying, "the training he has undertaken, without renouncing it, and the livelihood he has undertaken, without revealing weakness therein" – this is said. This is the intention of the commentary that should be understood. In this intention, the taking of the higher morality training alone is because it is universally applicable, and because the Vinaya is concerned with morality, this should be understood. Just as one who undertakes a training rule is said to undertake morality, so too, it is proper to say that one who renounces a training rule renounces morality. Therefore, it is said there, "the training he has undertaken, without renouncing it." Thus far, the determination of what is to be said regarding "one who has undertaken the training and livelihood" is concluded in brief. What is the purpose of this specific phrase? Is it not enough to say, "And whatever monk, without renouncing the training, without revealing weakness... [etc.] ...is no longer in communion"? No, it should not be said, because of undesirable consequences. "But if one who has undertaken the training and livelihood, a monk by mere designation, or by mere declaration, even for him there is a renunciation of training, and for one who engages in sexual intercourse without renouncing the training, there is a pārājika offense. Or one who later commits a pārājika offense and is not one who has undertaken the training and livelihood, and for him, or one who, being a 'half-eunuch', by becoming a eunuch, is not one who has undertaken the training and livelihood, for him, both of these would apply. And in the case of a eunuch, it is said, 'a eunuch is not a fit subject for ordination'." Therefore, it is established that in the other case, he is a fit subject. In that case, one who is ordained, being a eunuch in the case of a eunuch, is not one who has undertaken the training and livelihood. If he, due to the absence of training to be renounced, without renouncing the training, were to engage in sexual intercourse by taking another's sexual organ into his mouth, from where would he incur a pārājika offense? the intention. This method applies to one who does not obtain the non-eunuch side. But for one who obtains it, even if there is an interruption of the life-continuum at the moment of wholesome and other attainments of formless beings, just as there is no death, so too, in the case of being a eunuch, there is the state of being a monk. And for one who consents to cohabitation, there is no state of being a cohabitant by theft, like one who has fallen into the final offense. And it does not generate sleeping together and so on. But he is not a quorum member,