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it is unallowable." He himself states the second objection. And here, because it is said "it is similar to the second bowl," when the price is given to the owners of the price, and the bowl is given to the owners of the bowl, it becomes allowable. It should be understood that it is permissible to take and use it after giving an allowable item. "Because the price was not relinquished": because the price with which the bowl was bought, was not relinquished in the midst of the Sangha. By this, he shows that only the silver should be relinquished, not the non-silver item based on it. For if that received price were relinquished in the midst of the Sangha, then the bowl, taken and given by the monastery attendants and so on, through that allowable act, would be permissible for the rest, excluding the receiver of silver. In the fourth case, "because it was ill-managed": because it was taken by saying, "Give these coins, and give this (item)," from the laypeople's coins... because it was badly investigated, it is not fitting for this monk who investigated it. This is the meaning. By "because the root was not accepted," it shows that the root belongs to a layperson. And thereby it shows that the bowl was not acquired through a silver transaction. And thereby it indicates the absence of relinquishment for that bowl, and the absence of a pācittiya offense for the monk. And thereby it declares that it is merely a dukkaṭa offense due to the bad investigation. "Relinquishment" here is said in the sense of a gift, not in the sense of a Vinaya act. Therefore it is said, "having it filled with ghee." In the fifth bowl, it is entirely allowable: allowable for oneself and for the five co-dhamma practitioners, and for Buddhas and Paccekabuddhas. Therefore it is said, "fit for the use even of Buddhas." Thus, in the Vinayālaṅkāra, which is a commentary on the Vinayasaṅgaha, The Ornament of the Discourse on the Determination of Buying and Selling and Acquisition Is the Eleventh Chapter. 12. The Discourse on the Determination of Accepting Silver, etc. 59. Having thus spoken on the determination of buying, selling, and acquisition, now, speaking on the determination of accepting silver, etc., he begins with "acceptance of silver, etc." Here, "rūpiyaṃ" (silver) is that which has a form made for the purpose of recognition, any wealth that is used in transactions. Therefore it is said in the Samantapāsādikā: "Here, whatever is fit for transaction, such as kahāpaṇas, is intended." "Ādi" (etc.) means "that which is taken first." What is that? Silver. Those of which silver is the first are "rūpiyādayo" (silver, etc.), such as male and female slaves, fields, and land. "Paṭiggahaṇaṃ" is "paṭiggaho," meaning acceptance. The acceptance of silver, etc., is "rūpiyādipaṭiggaho." "Jātarūpaṃ" (gold) is that whose form arises at the time of its birth, and does not undergo change; it is gold. "Rajataṃ" (silver) is that which delights beings due to its white nature; it is silver. A coin made of gold is a "jātarūpamāsako" (gold coin). A coin made of silver is a "rajatamāsako" (silver coin). He states that these four kinds alone constitute the object of relinquishment, not copper coins, etc., saying, "by copper, iron, etc. ...pe... included." Copper, iron, By the word "etc.", it shows that even if made of bronze, iron, tin, lead, etc., it is just a metal coin. Is this alone a nissaggiya object, or are pearls, etc. also? He says: "Pearls... (etc.)... are objects of dukkaṭa." What is the distinction between these two kinds of objects? He says: "There, a nissaggiya object... (etc.)... is only dukkaṭa." There, a nissaggiya object, for one's own use, is a nissaggiya pācittiya. For the use of others, it is a dukkaṭa. A dukkaṭa object, for the use of all, is only a dukkaṭa. This is the connection. Now, to show the detailed determination of what is allowable and unallowable regarding these objects, he says: "Here is the determination." There, it is not allowable to accept. Why? Because it was given with the unallowable expression "I give this to the Sangha." Having given, he departs; it is allowable. Why? Because it was given into the hands of carpenters, etc., not into the hands of the Sangha. Even so, it is allowable, because it was placed in the hands of laypeople. It is not allowable to refuse, because it was not touched by the Sangha, a group, or an individual. It should be refused with "It is not allowable," because it was said, "You take and keep it." There is an offense both in acceptance and in use. Because it was said, "I give to the Sangha," there is a pācittiya in acceptance, and a dukkaṭa in use. That very one is liable to an offense. He speaks with reference to the dukkaṭa offense. He speaks, it is allowable, because it was said with the allowable expression, "You may use the requisites." What is given for robes should be applied to robes only. Why? Because one should act as the donors say. Showing the distinction of the lodging requisite from the other three requisites, he says "for lodging," etc. By this, he shows its non-transferable and non-divisible nature. Even so, showing the method to be followed in emergencies, he says "if indeed," etc. 60. Thus, having shown the method to be followed regarding nissaggiya objects, now, showing the method to be followed regarding dukkaṭa objects, he says "if someone to me," etc. Here, however, that there is an offense both in acceptance and in use, is said with reference to dukkaṭa only. Taḷ Even in accepting it, an offense is stated, because it is included as a field. Where it is given, saying "Consume the four requisites," if one says, "I give the pond for the monastic community to consume the four requisites," or "I give the pond for the enjoyment of the four requisites," it is permissible. But if it is said, "I give the requisites produced from this pond," there is nothing to be said (it is clearly permissible)." This is stated in the Sāratthadīpanī (Sārattha. ṭī. 2.537-539). And in the Vimativinodanī (Vi. Vi. ṭī. 1.538-539), having said the same, it is stated, "This is said only with reference to what is given to the Saṅgha. But for an individual, even if a pond, field, etc., is given in this way, it is not permissible. But for one with pure intention, wells, ponds, etc., for the use of water, are permissible. For it is stated everywhere, 'The Saṅgha has a pond, how is that?' and so on, it is said only in terms of the Saṅgha." "It will be in the hand" means "it will be under control." When it is said, "Appoint a suitable attendant," it is said in a proper sense; even if not said, there is no fault for one who appoints. Therefore it is said, "Water may be prevented." Because it is not permissible for monks to destroy another's property, therefore it is said, "not during harvest time." Even during harvest time, it is permissible to scare them away and release them; but for one who does not release, there is a penalty for goods. By "owner of the district," it is meant that whoever governs that district, even if given by him after seizing it, it is permissible, they say. "Gives again" means seizes and gives again; even so, it is permissible, this is the connection. By this, it shows that if any ruler, perceiving "this is abandoned by the monks, ownerless," takes it for himself and gives it, it is permissible. "Water-carrier" means "water-channel." The rest of the passage is: "I will explain the decision even in proper usage." "By means of water" means "for the use of water." "For those with pure intention" means "only for the use of water." This is said with reference to those who do it by their own hand and with improper usage. But for those with impure intention, such as "for the purpose of crop production," even if they do not do it themselves, but through proper usage... It is indeed permissible to command. It is said that it is not permissible to appoint a steward because it is unsuitable due to the pond being made by oneself, etc. However, for the one who appoints, or for the Sangha that consumes that requisite, an offense is not apparent, or an offense should be understood here according to the commentary's standard. When it is caused to be done by a shameless one, there is nothing to be said, so it says "by a conscientious bhikkhu," meaning when it is caused to be done in digging up earth, etc. 61. "New crops" means in fields not previously cultivated. By "kahāpaṇa" (coin), it shows that in raising grain, it is unsuitable for him alone. "Undetermined share" means in an undetermined share of land, such as "so much share is to be given in so much land." If one cultivates for raising grain, even in the act, it is an offense of wrong-doing (dukkaṭa), not like in raising coins. By the phrase "cultivate and sow," it might be unsuitable for everyone, so it says "without saying." In "so much share," it also refers to "so many kahāpaṇas." Even if it is said thus, since kahāpaṇas did not exist at that time, what arises in the future is indeed permissible for others. Therefore, it says "it is unsuitable for him alone." For him, however, in all uses and consumption, it is a dukkaṭa. Some say that the offense is only in the consumption of grain, not in the prior share. That is not appropriate, because it is not right for there to be no offense in performing the act (like measuring, guarding, etc.) by which an offense occurs later in the consumption of grain. But in a figurative sense, there is no offense everywhere. Therefore, in the specific statement "bring this and that with so many grains of rice," it is said to be unsuitable. The same method applies to the consideration of kahāpaṇas. And the statement "such a thing exists, and there is no kappiyakāraka to be appointed" is also supportive here. In "by rope or by stick," they say "it is not permissible to measure even with the feet." In "standing in the threshing floor and guarding," however,