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“Bhikkhus, one should not partake of gruel for a meal from another, unless invited; whoever partakes, should be dealt with according to the Dhamma.” (Mahāva. 283) Therefore, for one who partakes thus, there is an offense under the training rule concerning successive meals. “Gruel for a meal” means that which generates an invitation. “Should be dealt with according to the Dhamma” means should be dealt with according to the rule on successive meals. Discourse on Jaggery In the discourse on jaggery, “I allow, bhikkhus, jaggery for the sick, and jaggery-water for the not-sick.” (Mahāva. 284) Therefore, a sick bhikkhu is permitted to eat a lump of jaggery even at an improper time. One who is not sick, however, is permitted to partake by mixing it with water, as jaggery-water. In the commentary (Mahāva. Aṭṭha. 284) it is said: “’Jaggery for the sick’ means, for one sick with such a disease, I allow jaggery after the meal.” Since “with such a disease” is stated, it seems to be said that jaggery should be partaken of by one sick with such a disease, as if it were said, “only by one sick with such a disease”; this should be examined and understood. In these discourses, whatever is to be explained is not seen in the treatise. That, for the skill of gentle monks by us, having taken from the Pāli and from the commentaries, adorned with the words of the sub-commentary teachers, it has been placed. Therefore, being free from doubt, let the wise consider it. Discourse on the Four Great References 67. "Yaṃ bhikkhave" and so on, is called the Discourse on the Great References. There, great meanings are shown by these, thus Great References; or great meanings are manifested, are known in these, thus Great References; or the place of occurrence for great meanings, thus Great References. What are they? These very four texts, or meanings. Therefore it is said, "These four Great References," and so on. There, "the Elders who compiled the Dhamma" refers to Mahākassapa and others. "Taking the Sutta" means taking the Sutta beginning with "excluding grain and fruit juice" and considering it. The seven grains are – "Rice, paddy, and kudrūsa, wheat, varaka, barley; kangu – these are the seven grains, while nīvāra and others are their varieties." The seven grains are stated. "All other grains" refers to mung beans, black gram, and so on. The eight drinks are mango drink, rose-apple drink, banana drink, plantain drink, water-lily drink, grape drink, madhuka drink, and phārusaka drink. "By this method" means by the method of conformity with the Suttas. This is stated in the commentary: "Conformity with the Suttas means the four Great References." "Without considering the Pāli and the commentary" means not taking what has come from the definitive meaning in the Pāli. "And others" means others besides those. By this, it is shown that the Great References are not merely as stated, but indeed many and varied things revealed by the power of knowledge of one who upholds the Vinaya. Discourse on Advantages 68. In the Discourse on Advantages, "upholds the Vinaya" means a Vinaya-holder, a monk skilled in the study of the Vinaya through learning, reciting, reflecting, discerning, and acting in conformity with it, and so on. "Having the study of the Vinaya as their root" means rooted in the study of the Vinaya. What are they? The five advantages. These are advantages to be gained by making the study of the Vinaya itself the root cause, not by making other studies or practices, etc., the root k This is the meaning. Or, learning is 'pariyatti'. Learning the Vinaya is 'vinayapariyatti'. That is the root of these, thus 'vinayapariyattimūlaka'. Meaning, the advantages are due to the learning of the Vinaya. Having asked the nature of those five advantages, starting with "Which are they?", and having answered, starting with "one's own", to support that statement with the Pāli, it says, starting with "for it has been said". Having thus shown the nature of the five advantages, now, to show them in detail, having asked, starting with "How is it?", it answers, starting with "Here, a certain one". There, one's own well-guarded state of the aggregate of virtue comes about only by not committing offenses, not otherwise. Having shown the cause of committing an offense, to show the non-commission by its absence, it says, starting with "One who commits an offense commits it in six ways". There – "Intentionally commits an offense; Conceals the offense; And goes on a wrong course; Such a person is called shameless." (Pari. 359) – By the described characteristic of shamelessness, one who is not ashamed, not abashed, is 'alajjī'. The state of that is 'alajjitā' (shamelessness). One who has no knowledge is 'aññāṇa' (ignorant). The state of that is 'aññāṇatā' (ignorance). The state of ill-done is 'kukkucca' (remorse). Affected by that is 'kukkuccapakato' (remorseful). The state of that is 'kukkuccapakatatā' (remorsefulness). What is proper is 'kappiya'. What is not proper is 'akappiya'. One who has the perception "this is proper" in what is improper, is 'kappiyasaññī'. The state of that is 'kappiyasaññitā' (perception of proper in improper). The other should be understood as its opposite. In these five terms, the 'ya' is dropped. Therefore, they should be connected, starting with "commits an offense through shamelessness". And this is an ablative case in the sense of cause. What remembers is 'sati' (mindfulness). Forgetting is 'sammosa' (confusion). Confusion of mindfulness is 'satisammosa'. Therefore, through confusion of mindfulness. And this is an instrumental case in the sense of cause. Now, to show those causes in detail, it says, starting with "How?". That should be understood by way of logical inference. A monk named Ariṭṭha is 'Ariṭṭhabhikkhu'. A novice named Kaṇṭaka is 'Kaṇṭakasāmaṇero'. Born in Vesālī is Vesā- Likā. Sons of the Vajjis are Vajjiputtas. Vesālī-born and those Vajjiputtas are Vesālikavajjiputtas. Ariṭṭha the bhikkhu and Kaṇṭaka the novice and the Vesālikavajjiputtas are Ariṭṭhabhikkhukaṇṭakasāmaṇeravesālikavajjiputtakā. Other-blame and ignorance and doubt-crossing are Parūpahāraaññāṇakaṅkhāvitaraṇā. Who are they? They are doctrines. Those of whom these are the beginning are Parūpahāraaññāṇakaṅkhāvitaraṇādayo. They speak by these, thus they are doctrines. Parūpahāraaññāṇakaṅkhāvitaraṇādayo are doctrines, thus they are Parū…pe… doctrines. Who are they? They are wrong-doctrinaires. Ariṭṭha…pe… puttā and Parūpahāra…pe… vādā and the Mahāsaṅghikas and others are called enemies of the Dispensation. Thus, the connection should be made by way of a collective dvandva compound. The rest is easily understood. The discourse on advantages is finished. Thus, in the Vinayālaṅkāra, which is an elucidation of the Vinayasaṅgaha, The Ornament of Miscellaneous Determinations, The thirty-fourth chapter. Elucidation of the Concluding Discourse In the first verse of the concluding stanzas, the connection is: "I, being urged by King Parakkamabāhu, who desired the stability of the True Dhamma and illuminated the Dispensation, made this Vinayasaṅgaha." In the second and third verses, the connection is: "Dwelling in the delightful and charming Jetavana monastery, adorned with hundreds of palaces built by that very King Parakkamabāhu, filled with many kinds of trees, a dwelling place for bhikkhus devoted to meditation, endowed with cool water, or rather, I, dwelling there, made this Vinayasaṅgaha, which is beneficial and essential for yogis." In the remaining verses: "By this act of composing the text, whatever merit has been accomplished by me, and whatever other merit has been produced by me apart from this composition, by this meritorious deed, in my second existence, delighting in Tāvatiṃsa, devoted to the virtues of morality and conduct, unattached to the five sensual pleasures, having become a devaputta, having attained the first fruit, the fruit of stream-entry, and in the final existence" This is the manifest interpretation: "Having seen the Lord, the foremost person in the world, the refuge, who is a refuge, delighting in the welfare of all beings, Metteyya, named Metteyya, the chief of sages, the best of sages, and having heard the teaching of the Dhamma of that wise one, having attained the highest fruit, the fruit of arahantship, having obtained it, I would adorn the Dispensation of the Conqueror, I would make it shine." However, if this interpretation is accepted, scholars do not agree with the words of the venerable teacher. Why? Here, the teacher's aspiration is that in the second existence from now, having become a deva in the Tāvatiṃsa heaven, having attained the fruit of stream-entry, and in the final existence, having heard the Dhamma teaching of Metteyya the Blessed One, he would attain the fruit of arahantship. That is inappropriate. For a stream-enterer, there is no rebirth beyond seven existences. And for the Tāvatiṃsa devas, the time of Metteyya the Blessed One's arising cannot be reached even in a hundred existences, or a thousand existences, or a hundred thousand existences. Even if one were to say, "Having been reborn in the Brahma-world in between, he would become a human at the time of Metteyya the Blessed One," even so, it is not fitting. For noble ones who have gone to the Brahma-world, there is no return to the sense-sphere existence. For it is said in the Abhidhamma, in the Yamaka treatise: "For one who passes away from the fine-material sphere and is reborn in the sense-sphere, seven latent defilements lie latent." Even if one were to say, "Remaining in the Brahma-world itself, he would attain the highest fruit," such is not seen in the teacher's words, for it is said, "I would adorn the Dispensation of the Conqueror," which implies being a bhikkhu. For one who is not a bhikkhu cannot adorn the Dispensation. And in the Abhidhammatthavibhāvanī: "Then, with a pure mind, I would see and honor