English
For indeed, a Sutta is that which comes down in line with the Suttas, not otherwise. Therefore, it is said, "What is found in the Pāli is understood." Even if this much is established, it is also said, "What is found in the Pāli that has been included in the three recitations is understood," and so on. "Such are careless writings," says the teacher. "He who, having eaten the food given, avoided dangers, and established mindfulness, dwells, becomes eternal," (Dhammapada 21) by this saying, even a Sutta that has been included for such a meaning should not be accepted. Therefore, it is said, "If it is not understood thus." Even if it is established, "If it is not understood thus, it does not come down." it does not agree. Because it is said "or an external Sutta," one's own Sutta, if it does not agree with the meaning, should not be taken. In the two methods, "the other's teacher's doctrine" and so on, the commentary statements found here and there due to errors in writing, should be understood by connecting them with the Theravāda teachings. Now, taking this teacher's doctrine, he speaks: Regarding "the other's Sutta," when the opponent, because of your reading "root-seeds are turmeric, ginger, calamus... if one, perceiving a seed as a seed, cuts or causes to be cut, breaks or causes to be broken... there is an offense of pācittiya" (Pāci. 91), says "there is a pācittiya offense for cutting a turmeric rhizome," the proponent, showing "or whatever else exists that is born from the root, arises from the root" and so on, rejects it with that teacher's doctrine, which is considered a commentary. For a rhizome does not arise from a rhizome. Regarding "the other's Sutta-conformity," when the opponent, in conformity with the statement "there is no offense; such is the understanding of our teachers," says, "our ancient monks, having closed off a room in a single palace, came having done so, saying it is permissible to sleep with an unordained person; therefore, it is permissible for us," and some among you say, "nothing can be said to you," the proponent, showing the commentary statement "only the understanding of teachers who have learned the Sutta and Sutta-conformity is authoritative," rejects it. Regarding "the other's own opinion," in "among those who lie down without asking, having opened the door, who are freed?", because it is your Theravāda teaching that both persons are freed – he who is possessed by a yakkha, and he who was bound and made to lie down – he rejects the idea that all others who lie down in any way are also freed. Now, taking this own opinion, he speaks: Regarding "the other's Sutta," when the opponent says "they incur an offense," the proponent, showing the commentary statement "one who is tired during the day, sitting on a couch, without lifting his feet from the ground, lies down due to sleep, for him there is no offense" and so on, asserts that even those who lie down in a single posture are freed. Thus he refutes. Then this one, taking his own opinion, says. When the opponent says, "By conforming to such statements as 'O king of devas, I declare dejection to be of two kinds: to be cultivated and not to be cultivated' (Dī. Ni. 2.360), there is no fault for you in supporting your wife and children, therefore it is said, 'support of children and wife' (Khu. Pā. 5.6; Su. Ni. 265), according to the suttas," he refutes, saying, "Even if one's own proponent is not learned, it must be unwholesome, accompanied by lust." In the remaining cases too, it should be applied by this method, or otherwise, appropriately. All this Upatissa Thera and others said. But Dhammasiri Thera says, "Here, 'opponent' refers to one of another school. He, for his part, brings forth his own suttas and so on. The proponent, having brought them into his own suttas and so on, if they agree, he accepts them. If not, he rejects them." So it is said. But wasn't it said below, "the sutta itself is stronger than conformity to suttas"? But here, why is it said, "the sutta should be brought into conformity to suttas," and so on? This is not a contradiction. For "the sutta itself is stronger than conformity to suttas" was said with reference to the sutta within one's own school. For there, with reference to the suttas and so on belonging to one's own school, it was said, "One's own opinion is the weakest of all. The teacher's doctrine is stronger than one's own opinion. Conformity to suttas is stronger than the teacher's doctrine. The sutta itself is stronger than conformity to suttas." But here, with reference to a sutta from another school brought by the opponent, "the sutta should be brought into conformity to suttas," and so on, was said. Therefore, the sutta and so on brought by the opponent, having been brought into one's own conformity to suttas, teacher's doctrine, and one's own opinion, only what agrees should be accepted. The rest should not be accepted. This method is stated here. Thus there is no contradiction between earlier and later statements. This is the method from the Sāratthadīpanī (Sārattha. Ṭī. 2.45). But in the Vimativinodanī (Vi. Vi. Ṭī. 1.45), to show that any false sutta or statement from external suttas and so on should not be accepted, "the sutta, the sut..." It has been said, "It should be brought into conformity with them," and so on. "External suttas" means the suttas not included in the three recitations, such as the Guḷhavessantara, and the suttas of those living in the Mahāsaṅghika sect. By "Vedalla and so on," it should be understood that the word "and so on" includes Guḷhaummaggā, etc. Other blameworthy suttas should not be taken. By "One should stand by one's own opinion," it shows that one's own opinion is stronger in one's own sect, even than suttas brought from other sects. The turn was not stated in terms of similar types, such as "The proponent takes the sutta and speaks, the opponent only the sutta." The bringing of a sutta into a sutta does not appear as if it were different; it can be connected in the way stated. Now, showing the method to be followed when a dispute arises concerning the proper and improper states of the proponent and opponent, he says, "Then, if this one takes it as proper and speaks," and so on. Or, having generally shown the dispute through the means of sutta, sutta-conformity, and so on, he now states "Then, if this one is proper," and so on, to specifically show the subject of the dispute and its determination, as well as the sutta, etc. There, "it should be brought into the sutta and sutta-conformity" means that the proponent should bring it into his own sutta and sutta-conformity. "The other finds no reason" means the opponent finds no reason. "He shows many reasons and determinations from the sutta" means the opponent brings forth and shows many reasons and determinations from his own sutta. By "having assented with 'good,' one should remain in the improper," it says that the proponent, not finding suttas, etc., in his own sect, should remain in the opponent's statement. In "in the sutta and sutta-conformity," the word "ca" (and) has an alternative meaning; thereby, the teachings of the teachers, etc., are also included. Therefore, he says, "He shows reasons and determinations." There, "reason" is a cause drawn from one's own opinion, relying on the method of the sutta, etc. "Determination" is the determination of the commentaries. "A semblance of reason appears in both" means the proponent A semblance of reason, capable of proving the permissibility or impermissibility for both the proponent and the opponent, is seen. Here, a semblance of reason means a reason that is not clear, which must be established with difficulty, serving as a sign for the acceptance of "permissible" or the acceptance of "impermissible" in the suttas and so on. It is a likeness of reason, this is the meaning. If a semblance of reason is seen for both, why should one stand only on the impermissible? He says, "Having reached the Vinaya," and so on. Making the meaning of "Having reached the Vinaya" clearer, he says, "Having come to the investigation of permissible and impermissible." In "should be obstructed," and so on, when there is a difficult-to-discern decision regarding permissibility or impermissibility, the acceptance of "permissible" should be obstructed, the acceptance of "impermissible" should be made firm, the stream of repeated acceptance of "permissible" should be cut off, and one should stand on the impermissible, which is considered a grave matter. This is the meaning. Or, "should be obstructed" means the cause of transgression due to the perception of permissibility should be obstructed, and the mind that prevents it should be made firmer. "The stream should be cut off" means the occurrence of transgression there should be cut off. "In a grave matter" means in an impermissible matter. "By many reasons of sutta decisions" means by many suttas and by the reasons for decisions derived from them. Or, by reasons obtained from the sutta and the Aṭṭhakathā decisions. "One should not abandon one's own acceptance" means the proponent should not abandon his own acceptance of "impermissible." Now, concluding the meaning already stated, he says, "Thus," and so on. There, "whoever" means whoever among the proponent and the opponent. Some, however, say, "Here, whoever among the proponents alone is intended." If this were so, then in "But if he says, having accepted it as permissible," and so on, both would always be proponents only, because it is stated with "Thus," and so on, as a conclusion of what was said below. Therefore, that should not be accepted. "Obtains an additional reason" here means the earlier and earlier additional reason in the suttas and so on, or whoever. In the four, beginning with suttas, he obtains much reason. He indeed obtains an extra reason. "Excellent conduct is his," or "he conducts himself excellently by virtue," thus is 'suppavatti'.