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it is shown that even in cases where suitable agents are designated by the owner of the property, and it is given for the purpose of almsfood and so on, all matters like the place, the accusation, etc., should be done in the manner stated below. Since it is said, "or the Sangha... without touching," it should indeed be rejected when they speak, touching it, saying, "We give this for the residence of the Sangha," and so on. "The Sangha accepts" this is said in an excellent sense; even in the case of groups and so on, when they accept for the Sangha, there is a dukkaṭa offense in both acceptance and use. In the Sāratthadīpanī, it is said, "a pācittiya offense in acceptance" (Sārattha. ṭī. 2.537-539), that is not appropriate because a dukkaṭa offense is stated for the purpose of the Sangha, cetiya, and so on. "He accuses" means even knowing that he has no fault, he accuses him, saying, "It is a thing to be given," either out of anger or out of greed. Indeed, he himself becomes liable to offenses such as pācittiya and dukkaṭa, due to factors like false speech. But for one who, having spoken with a neck-over-head intention, then knows his blamelessness and refrains, there is no offense. Since the pond has entered the field, it is said, "It should not be accepted." "He gives, saying, 'May the Sangha use the four requisites,' it is permissible." Here, it is also permissible to say: "I give the pond for the bhikkhu Sangha to use the four requisites," or "I give the pond for the bhikkhu Sangha to use the four requisites," or "I give the four requisites arising from this pond." And this, when given for the Sangha's use... This is not said in reference to. But even if given to an individual, a pond, field, etc., is not allowable. But for one with a pure mind, wells, ponds, etc., for water use are allowable. For it is said everywhere, "The Sangha has a pond, how is that?" and so on, only in the context of the Sangha. "Hatthe" means "in the power of." "When it is said 'Let it be placed'," this is said in a proper sense; even if not said, there is no fault for one who places it. Therefore it is said, "It is allowable to prevent water." Even during harvest time, it is allowable to scare (animals) away and release them; but for one who does not release them, there is a fine. "Gives again" means taking it back and giving it again; the connection is that even this is allowable. By this, it shows that "what is given by any lord, having taken it himself with the perception 'this has been abandoned by the bhikkhus, it is ownerless,' is allowable." "We will also explain the decision in allowable dealings" is the remaining part of the text. "By means of water" means for the use of water. "For those with pure minds" is said in reference to those who do it with their own hands and with unallowable dealings. For the purpose of producing crops, even for those with impure minds, it is allowable to have it done through allowable dealings without doing it themselves. "It is not allowable to appoint an allowable doer" is said to be "unsuitable" because the pond was made by one's own hands, etc.; however, for one who appoints, or for the Sangha who consumes that requisite, no offense is known, or an offense should be understood here according to the authority of the commentaries. "By a conscientious bhikkhu" means even by a conscientious one, much more so by an unconscientious one, when made to do things like digging up earth; this is the intention. "New crops" means in fields not previously cultivated. By "kahāpaṇa" (coin), it shows that in the raising of grain, it is unallowable for him; and in the use of grain, there is only a dukkaṭa offense, not like in the raising of kahāpaṇas. When it is said, "Cultivate, sow," it would be unallowable for all; therefore, it says "without saying." "Such and such a share" here refers to "such and such a kahāpaṇa." Even if it is said thus, since kahāpaṇas did not exist then, what arises in the future is indeed allowable for others. They I do not say, "That is unallowable for him alone." But for him, in all uses, and in enjoyments, it is a dukkaṭa. Some, however, say, "The offense is only in the enjoyment of grain, not in the prior use." That is not proper. Because, by the use of measuring, guarding, and so on, an offense arises later in the enjoyment of grain. It is improper for there to be no offense in the doing of that use. But in indirect speech, there is no offense everywhere. Therefore, in a specific statement like, "Bring this and that with so much rice," it is said to be unallowable. The same method applies to the consideration of kahāpaṇas (coins). And such a thing exists, and the statement "There is no allowable agent" and so on, is supportive here. "I give a forest..." (etc.) "It is allowable." Here, because it is a dwelling place, it is allowable for an individual to accept it with a pure mind. "We give a boundary." Because it is stated with a general term like a monastery boundary, it is said, "It is allowable." Even when it is said, "A steward," and so on, it is allowable for an individual to accept a servant, because it is specifically permitted, "I allow, monks, a monastery attendant" (Parā. 619; Mahāva. 270). And that, indeed, is in the manner of what was accepted and enjoyed by Pilindavaccha, not in the manner of a householder's enjoyment of a servant. But all fields and so on are allowable only for the Saṅgha. It should be understood that it is not permitted in the Pāli to accept them individually. "We give to the monastery" is said with reference to a Saṅgha-owned monastery. The prohibition found in the suttas, "He abstains from accepting fields and lands," (Dī. Ni. 1.10, 194) and so on, was made by the Blessed One even as a cause for an offense. Therefore, it should be understood that the Great Elders of the Saṅgīti, knowing the intention of the Blessed One, declared all these Vinaya decisions outside the Pāli (but based on it), which are dependent on the acceptance of fields and so on. The designation of an allowable agent, the presentation by a messenger, further effort, and acquisition by that means— these are the four factors here. The commentary on the training rule concerning kings is finished. The first chapter on robes is finished. 2. The Chapter on Kosiyas. 1. The commentary on the training rule concerning Kosiyas. 542. The first of the second. In the Pāli, "kosiyakāraka" means because the silkworm creatures are born from the cocoon, making cloth, etc., with silk thread. "Saṅghāta" means destruction. 544. Since "not woven" is stated, there is no offense if it is made by weaving. "Missetvā" means mixing with sheep's wool. "Paṭilābhena" means by completion, as "finishes, is to be relinquished" (Pārā. 545) is stated. The mixing of silk, causing a rug to be made for oneself, and its acquisition— these are the three factors here. The explanation of the Silk Training Rule is finished. 547-552. The second and third are indeed clear. However, there, with the perception of mixed white, etc., by making a rug only of pure black, and here, when the pure black exceeds two parts, by making a rug with the perception of it not being excessive, blamelessness should be understood. 4. Explanation of the Six-Year Training Rule 557. In the fourth, "hada" (excrement) and "karīsussagge" (defecation), referring to the meaning of the root "miha" (to urinate), it is said: "making both feces and urine." Here, regarding those under six years, due to suspicion of being over six years, etc., blamelessness should be understood. The explanation of the Six-Year Training Rule is finished. 5. Explanation of the Sitting-Rug Training Rule 565. In the fifth, "there will be seen" means it will be seen by the wise as improper conduct according to one's own agreement. The three factors, such as the forest-dweller's practice, in the Pāli, are stated as the initial factors of the three requisites, such as lodging. It should be understood that they also undertook the others. 566. "Pihayantā" means desiring. Because the rug is not woven, and because it is a requisite for lodging, he says that it is not a robe and not to be determined. "by the perception of a fourth robe," means by mistaken perception. Some say, "This sitting-rug is indeed the sitting-robe among the nine robes, not another. Even in the Sitting Rule (Pāci. 531 onwards), just as in this training rule, 'nisīdana' is called a 'sadasa' (rug), and in its commentary, 'spreading a rug-like thing, at one end, a Sugata-span..." "having split it in two places in a cubit-sized area, three fringes are made; by these fringes, it is called 'sadasa' (Pāci. Aṭṭha. 531) and so it is said," that is not suitable, because the rule of measure is not stated here, and because the spread is not a woven robe, and because there is no suitability for determination, and because it is not stated in the commentary. But the sitting-cloth, they make it like a spread, having spread out pieces of rags from six robes, according to the measure. Therefore, the word 'like' is used in "like a spread," so that robe is suitable for determination, and not this one, it should be understood. 567. Here, the absence of intention should be understood by way of the perception of taking when not taking a Sugata-span, and the perception of not being deficient when it is less than a Sugata-span. Since it is said there is no offense when made for the purpose of canopies, etc., even if one makes it for lying down, there is an offense. It is said that it is not permissible to use it, because pure black cloths of silk are not allowable. Therefore, in the Pāli, it is said in various places: "Having received what was made by another, if he uses it, there is an offense of wrong-doing" (Pārā. 545, 550), but in the other two, "no offense" is said. There, in the fourth, even if made for another's purpose, there is no offense; in the fifth, there is a wrong-doing, it should be seen.