English
And since each of those acts has been understood from the beginning, since the section on acts that has come in detail has been understood from the beginning through the explanation, the decision will be made—this is the connection. 216. In the Pāḷi, "ajjhattaṃ vā" means in oneself or in one's own assembly. "Bahiddhā vā" means in another or in another's assembly. "Anavassavāya" means for non-arising. 220. "Is a dispute-case wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate?" This is the question. "A dispute-case may be wholesome," and so on, is the answer. This method applies to the rest as well. 222. Even for an offense that is conventional in nature, when it is spoken of as unwholesome or indeterminate by way of its cause, because even wholesome things can be a cause for an offense... By that usage, it should be said, "an offense-case might be wholesome." To show the reason for saying, without saying that, "there is no wholesome offense-case," it was said, "here the meaning should be understood in terms of what was intended." And here is the intention: If indeed an offense were by nature an ultimate reality, then the saying "an offense-case might be unwholesome," etc., would be appropriate. Since, due to the fault-implications shown in the commentaries on the rules concerning corrupt faults, etc., its nature as ultimate reality is not appropriate, it is solely of the nature of conventional reality. Therefore, "it might be unwholesome, it might be indeterminate" should not be said without qualification. But if, taking only its arising from unwholesome and indeterminate states, it is said by way of implication, "it might be unwholesome, it might be indeterminate," then taking also its arising from wholesome states, it should also be said by way of implication, "an offense-case might be wholesome." And since this statement, regarding an offense's suitability for being called unwholesome or indeterminate, and its unsuitability for being called wholesome, was spoken with a distinct reason in mind, therefore, the particular reason with which this was spoken, by that very means should the meaning here be understood. Now, however, if someone were to grasp that, the unwholesome nature, etc., of an offense was stated only with reference to the mind that is the cause of the constituent, and not with reference to any other specific reason, showing the fault in that grasping, he says, "For in that..." etc. There, "in digging the earth, etc." means in the offenses of prescription, such as digging the earth. "A wholesome mind is a constituent in an offense-case" means that, not knowing the rule, with a wholesome mind, in the courtyards of stupas, etc., at the time of digging up the earth, destroying villages, etc., by way of cleaning the ground, etc., a wholesome mind is the cause. "When that exists" means when that offense-case exists, meaning, when an offense exists that is worthy of being called wholesome due to its arising from a wholesome mind. In the Sāratthadīpanī (Sārattha. ṭī. Cūḷavagga 3.222), however, for "when that exists," it means "in that..." The meaning "taken as an offense in a wholesome mind" is stated, but that is not appropriate, because the offense-basis referred to by the word "in which" should be referred to by "in that." It is not possible to say this: If, even for an offense of conventional nature, the designation "unwholesome, etc." is made due to its arising from unwholesome, etc., then the designation "wholesome" should also be made. Therefore, "there is no wholesome offense-basis" cannot be said. Otherwise, its unwholesome, etc., nature would also have to be denied— this is the intention. Therefore, since even though the three (wholesome, etc.) are similar in being a sufficient condition for an offense, only the designation "wholesome" is denied for an offense, not the designation "unwholesome, etc." Therefore, this statement— "An offense-basis may be unwholesome, may be indeterminate; there is no wholesome offense-basis"— is not said with reference to a mind that is merely a sufficient, causal condition for the arising of an offense. Otherwise, "an offense-basis may be wholesome" would also have to be said— this is the intention. By this, even the unwholesome, etc., nature of an offense is stated indirectly by some sign, not in the ultimate sense— this is shown. As it is said: "That which is committed with a wholesome mind, that is wholesome; by others, other." In "But this," etc., this is the intention: The statement, "An offense-basis may be unwholesome, may be indeterminate," is not said with reference to any cause that may exist anywhere, at any time, as an indeterminate cause. But that which is capable of being a cause for an offense in all training rules— it is said with reference to this very cause. Indeed, the unwholesome is a cause for all offenses for one who transgresses knowing the rule. But for offenses blameworthy by the world, it is a cause even for one who does not know the rule. Only in offenses blameworthy by rule, at the moment of the arising of wholesome or indeterminate minds, the unwholesome does not occur. Elsewhere, it occurs by itself. But the indeterminate, being bodily and verbal (action), at the moment of the arising of wholesome, unwholesome, etc., for one who has attained cessation, together with Regarding offense, it is indeed a component of all offenses, because the six origins of offenses are never without bodily and verbal components. Therefore, referring to these unwholesome and indeterminate states as the root of all offenses, this unwholesomeness and indeterminacy of offense is stated. But where, in digging the earth and so on, even wholesome (intention) is a cause of offense, even there, to designate the offense as wholesome by way of that metaphorical usage is inappropriate, because the designation of blameworthy and blameless as one is contradictory. To the extent that they are mutually contradictory, to that extent the designation of cause and effect for them is also inappropriate. Therefore, even the wholesome existing there is not to be designated, only the bodily and verbal doors are the exclusive cause. Therein, "is exclusively unwholesome" is thus stated because it arises from an unwholesome mind, by way of metaphorical usage of cause. "Therein" refers to worldly offenses. "There is no alternative" shows the non-alternative meaning of the word 'siyā' (might be). "It is unwholesome" means it is unwholesome by way of metaphorical usage of cause, because it arises from unwholesome (intention). "It is indeterminate because it is incurred by way of lying down together, etc." means the offense is indeterminate, only by way of metaphorical usage of cause, because it is to be incurred only by way of the indeterminate form, which is called the bodily door, operating by way of extending the back with women, and so on. "Therein" refers to that context of offenses prohibited by rule. "By way of intentional and unintentional" means this statement is made, referring to this state of alternative, designated as unwholesome and indeterminate, and referring to this aforementioned nature of alternative, by way of incurring (offense) knowing the rule and not knowing it. If so, in the case of unintentional incurring, because it is incurred even with wholesome (intention), referring to that alternative also, why is it not stated "the offense might be wholesome"? (The text) says "If however..." and so on. To explain the meaning already stated, "of those without mind," by way of origin, "even of those with origins like sheep's wool, foot-washing, etc." is stated. For those with mindless origins, by "one might incur with a wholesome mind," it shows that for an offense that is blameworthy, even by way of metaphorical usage of cause, the designation of blameless wholesome is inappropriate. . With "Na ca tatthā" and so on, it is rejected that even though skillfulness is a cause for an offense, it is not proper to speak of it as such. Instead, it shows that only the unskillful, consisting of body and speech, is the cause. Therein, "calitappavattānaṃ" means of the moved and of the active. For the body is moved, and speech is active. And here, either body or speech is an element. And that… is unskillful, thus it is stated that the unskillful is the cause of an offense. "An offense case may be unskillful, may be unskillful" this is stated indirectly by way of the cause, not directly, thus it is established. However, what is extensively elaborated in the Sāratthadīpanī (Sārattha. ṭī. Cūḷava. 3.222) to prove that an offense is directly of an unskillful nature, that should not be accepted as essential, because it is rejected in the commentary on the rule concerning malicious fault. Therefore, here too, by "yaṃ cittaṃ āpattiyā aṅgaṃ hotī" and so on, it is shown that even an unskillful mind is distinct as a cause of an offense. What needs to be said here has already been shown below, so we do not elaborate here. Thus, "Evaṃ vītikkamato yo vītikkamo" here means that for one who transgresses knowing with an unskillful mind, the offense of transgression arising from bodily and verbal transgression is called an offense of transgression. The same method applies to the unskillful section. The explanation of the case story is finished. Explanation of the story of the settlement of cases 228. In the Pāli, "Pāḷiyaṃ vivādādhikaraṇaṃ ekaṃ samathaṃ anāgammā" and so on is the question. "Siyā" and so on is the answer. "Siyātissa vacanīyaṃ" means it should be said that it may be settled by this. "Sammukhāvinayasminti" should be understood as an explanation emphasizing the state of being a face-to-face settlement. This applies to all sections. "Kārako ukkoṭetī" this is merely an illustration; whoever revokes, it is an offense of expiation. In the case of "ubbāhikāya khīyanake," an offense of expiation is not stated because there is no giving of consent there. 235.