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or by way of designation, it is called a conventional statement." "They revile" means they abuse. "To be done" means the state of being performable. "What is that?" If it is asked, "The act of announcement" and so on. "To be done" here is probably intended to mean the mind that gives rise to a communication. 387. "Because of the absence of hearing, etc., it is groundless." Here, one who, even having seen, is unable to say "I have seen you," but says "I have heard you" by his own fixed perception. For him, there is an offense due to his impure perception. But here, one who, having heard before, is not guilty of an offense, and later, having forgotten it, being of pure perception, says it. That is what is referred to. "This method applies everywhere, say others," it is said. The elder monk, like a crow's behavior ā. 'Yadaggena' means 'as far as', or 'when'. 'No kappeti' and so on, it shows, were said only to indicate the absence of doubt. Therefore, it is concluded that a doubter does not perish, being called 'confused'. That is not appropriate due to its immediate consequence. Therefore, the second Elder's statement was made later. 389. 'Sabbattha' means 'in all commentaries'. 'Okāsakamma' means 'making an opportunity'. It is written: 'Action by opportunity is okāsakamma'. Just as in 'A maiden sees no sun', it means the maiden does not see the sun, so when 'having made no opportunity' is said, it means 'having not made an opportunity'. The explanation of the first training rule concerning a corrupt fault is finished. 9. Explanation of the second training rule concerning a corrupt fault. 391. 'In Veḷuvana itself' was said with reference to the time they spoke. The statement 'Formerly, friends, we spoke by hearing' and 'She was encouraged by us, who were angry and displeased' and so on, was said with reference to this. 'This belongs to another part' means that this goat-born case belongs to the animal goat-part, which is another part from the human monk-part. Or, 'it has another part' means that other part, which is the state of being an animal goat, belongs to this goat. So this goat is called a case of another part. There, 'the body of a statue', 'the body of a stone image' are examples. The first explanation here is stated according to the view of those who say 'jāti is the meaning of the word'. For it, being primary by its own nature and by its permanence, stands in the nature of power. It should be understood that the second explanation was stated according to the sutta 'Because of being contrary to that, the manifest form and jāti are the meaning of the word'. Here, 'the basis of the naming-perception' means that the name itself is the naming. The perception of those who name is the naming-perception, of that. One of human birth is the basis of goat-birth, so called. The meaning is that that name is not without a basis, like tortoise hair. But that name given to the goat as 'dabba' is called 'deso'. Therefore, the Elder, by 'without foundation' and so on, also another matter of the Elder's... It sticks, it adheres by mere conventional usage, not in reality. The meaning is: "a little bit adheres" is "lesa". Since "desa" and "lesa" are not different in reality, it should be understood that after extracting "taking some part, a mere trace" it was said, "the ten traces are the trace of birth," and so on. Just as in the Nidāna, so too in the Pātimokkha rule formulation and in the Mātika, the meaning is the same. Since "of another's share of the case" refers to a goat, the meaning "taking the name 'Dabba'" for "taking some part, a mere trace" has become clear only by way of the origin story, therefore it is not distinguished. And further, due to its irregularity. For not all cases of another's share are goats, as in the case of Mettiyabhūmajaka. There can be other things like cows, buffaloes, etc. And not all people take merely a trace of a name, like Mettiyabhūmajaka. They also take other things like the trace of birth, and so on. Therefore, due to its irregularity, it is not distinguished in the manner stated. And further, if it were stated thus, only a goat would have another's share, not others, which is why only it was shown. And "lesa" is just "lesa," not "jāti" and so on, which is why only it was shown. Thus, due to the possibility of wrong grasping, it was not distinguished in that way. 393. "Of another's share": of someone other than the accused. "Of the case": it should be said, "of a human, or a non-human, or an animal." For if it is said thus, the traces of birth, etc., are said to belong only to humans and so on. Otherwise, they would apply to the four kinds of cases. If it is asked, "Because the genitive case 'of the case' precedes 'some part, a mere trace'?" No, because the possibility of a fixed basis for birth, etc., in humans and so on, like a name, is not fixed as a case. It is said that it is not fixed. And if there were a fixed rule, the basis of birth would be birth, the basis of gender would be gender, the basis of an offense would be the offender, the basis of conflicting and unaccepted robes and bowls would be the owner, by which it would fall into the category of a case. Therefore, the word "of the case" should be divided. It should not be removed, it should be removed. Therefore, everything should be said, such as "because of the common meaning of the word 'case'." They are not evident, because there is no place shown other than this. And they must be known by those skilled in the Vinaya, because otherwise, in the Parivāra, in a future passage, when "why?" is asked, regarding "a dispute case belongs to the dispute case among the four cases," the reason would not be understood. Therefore, their belonging to that category and their belonging to another category must be known by those skilled in the Vinaya. For when these are understood, a dispute case belongs to a dispute case. Why? Because it belongs to that category. The other does not belong, because it belongs to another category. Thus, they are understood as a cause of ease. Therefore, relying on the case obtained from the common meaning of the word, and so on. There, since the offense belonging to another category is of a wide scope, and its description is unlike the others, therefore, even though it is included in the cases, it is stated separately as "or it is an offense belonging to another category." And because it is included in the cases, it should be understood that it is stated here as "or belonging to another category of cases." There too, because of its wide scope, and because it is mentioned in the matrix, the belonging to another category is stated first, and the belonging to that category is stated later, so it should be understood. There, since it is established by the method of implication through the phrase "belonging to another category of cases" that a case belongs to that category, therefore, without making such an enumeration as "a case belongs to that category," a description preceded by a question is made: "How does a case belong to that category of cases?" There too, although the belonging of an offense case to another category is stated only in terms of the pārājika offenses, due to the authority of not being destroyed by a pārājika, it should also be understood in terms of the other groups of offenses. And that accusation, such as "a certain monk is seen having committed a saṅghādisesa," there, such statements as "he has the view of a thullaccaya in a saṅghādisesa, he has the view of a saṅghādisesa in a dubbhāsita," are stated in the Vinaya due to lack of clear understanding, or due to similarity to that particular matter. is to be known. In all cases, it is not said, “there is a view of defeat.” Because those with such a perception are not guilty. “By consideration of that division” is said because in the definition of the term “that division,” other divisions are also specified. By similarity of the object, means by similarity of the object of the accusation. Otherwise, the statement “four kinds of failures” would be contradictory. And from similarity and dissimilarity of nature, meaning from being similar and dissimilar in nature. There, even by dissimilarity of the object like jhānas, by similarity of nature, the offense of defeat regarding a superhuman state becomes a matter of that division for that person. Similarly, regarding the object, the accusation case and the business case, each of the four kinds, are not of the specified other division. Therefore, when that other division is known, that division is accomplished by the logic of seeking, even if not stated. Thus, it is appropriate to say, “the other division is specified first.” It is not definitively of that division. By way of similarity, arahantship, offense, non-offense— due to the existence of disputes, even a dispute case could be of the other division in an indeterminate sense. This is said because the offense case is mentioned in the Pāli. From the very beginning, meaning from “of the other division of the case.” It is written, “by sexual desire, a human body, by hatred, etc., and by similarity.” That is established by dissimilarity of the object. But this is not a conjecture that even when there is similarity of the object, there is similarity of the nature of the offense. For even in one object, there are differences in offenses, says the teacher. The connection is: it is to be known by the method stated later. Because it is said, “business itself is the business case,” this is a designation for Saṅgha acts. The characteristic of an act is the nature of the acts. Relying on that, for the Saṅgha performs an act after having arranged it beforehand. Or, it is said because the subsequent acts like abbhāna (rehabilitation) and osāraṇa (restoration) arise relying on the previous Saṅgha acts like parivāsa (probation) and ukkhepaniya (suspension). Therefore, although a Saṅgha act itself is the business case, nevertheless,