English
It should be understood that he thought thus, avoiding an obstacle to the comfortable living of those Suttanta-reciters and others due to their association with Suttanta-reciters and others, and avoiding their discomfort due to their lack of delight in trivial talk, and thereby their falling away from recluseship. They say, “The nature of those created means created by disciples, not by Buddhas.” When it is said, “The most effective instrument,” the meaning is that the third case ending is in the sense of an instrument. 383-4. They go to where. It is written, “Kattā (doer) means a doer, not a non-doer.” The strong accusation is from the woman saying, “He behaves towards me as if I were his wife.” In “tena hi” (in that case), just as in the story of remorse over mere touching, where he, knowing the possibility of attachment from physical contact, prescribed a Saṅghādisesa without asking, so too it should be understood that it was said after knowing her immoral nature beforehand. If she was expelled based on a true confession, the elder is the agent. If it was based on a false one, the Buddha should not have said, “You should expel her,” but it was said. Therefore, it is said, “If she was expelled based on a true confession, the elder is the agent.” Then, without a confession, meaning without this confession, “I was defiled by the venerable,” her natural… having in mind the state of being of good conduct, he was expelled, the elder is not the doer. The Abhayagiri dwellers also, stating their own teaching, say: "In your view, the elder is the doer." Why? Because a dukkata should not be expelled on account of a false statement leading to the expulsion of the mark. For only a pārājika should be expelled by the expulsion of the mark. And because it is said "you should expel," they have become pārājika. Having what in mind, then, does the elder become the doer? But when it is said "you should expel by his own confession," the meaning is that even non-pārājikas should be expelled by their own words. The Mahāvihāra dwellers also, stating their own teaching, say: "In your view, the elder is the doer." Why? For when it is said "you should expel by his own confession," the reality of the confession arises from the saying "you should expel." For it is by a real confession that one should be expelled, not by an unreal one, this is the meaning. By the former method, that is, in the case of a dukkata. The former is understood to have proceeded by way of reason, the latter by way of the Pāli text. 385-6. In "with joy and happiness," the mention of "joy" where "happiness" could have been said, is to exclude the happiness of the third jhāna and bodily happiness, and is said for the associated joy. If it is groundless, done by way of the accused, he would say "not fallen into, not done." These will do it. Therefore, the reading is "he accuses, having such a perception." The reading is "by this method, even those heard, seen, and suspected should be understood in detail." "By one of the four" is said, taking what is already present in the Pātimokkha recitation. It is not our opinion, says the teacher, that if one does not censure by one of the others, it is a saṅghādisesa. For it is capable of removing one from the state of a bhikkhu. From the saying "standing nearby," the accusation does not fall upon the head of one who accuses or causes to accuse from afar. If one accuses or causes to accuse what is seen with what is heard or suspected, or what is heard or suspected with what is seen, etc., the accusation does fall upon the head, because it is accused without basis. For this is said: "If one falls into a pārājika dhamma that is seen, and one accuses him, saying 'I heard... and so on... suspected...'" of a Saṅghādisesa.” (Pārā. 387). “A person is impure having committed a Pārājika offense. If, being of impure view, he accuses him with the intention to expel him, without making him confess, there is an offense of Dukkata. If he accuses him with the intention to expel him, after making him confess, there is no offense.” (Pārā. 389). This seems to be inconsistent, how so? A person who is seen to have committed a Pārājika offense is an impure person. “If, being of impure view regarding one, he accuses him, saying, ‘I heard that you committed a Pārājika offense,’ there is an offense of Saṅghādisesa for each word spoken.” According to this statement, there is an offense by the former method. “If he accuses him with the intention to expel him, there is an offense of Dukkata.” According to this statement, there is an offense of Saṅghādisesa by the latter method. Thus, these two Pāli methods appear to contradict each other. But the Buddhas do not speak contradictorily. Therefore, a justification must be sought here. The Commentators have said: “There is no offense for one who accuses with a root or with a perception-root. But there is an offense for one who accuses without a root or without a perception-root.” Its meaning is: There is no offense for one who accuses with a root based on seeing, hearing, or suspicion, or with a perception-root even without that basis. There is an offense for one who accuses without a root due to the absence of seeing, etc., or with a perception-root even with that basis. Therefore, for one who is seen: In “a person committing a Pārājika offense,” etc., if one accuses with a root based on seeing, or with a perception-root, saying “I heard,” there is an offense of Saṅghādisesa. To clarify its meaning, it should be understood that the cases like “doubtful about what is seen” are stated. But in “a person is impure,” etc., there is no offense because the accusation is made with a root or with a perception-root. Similarly, those cases are stated to illustrate that meaning. For there, the cases like “for one not seen” are stated to show that there is an offense for one who accuses without a root. By “doubtful about what is seen,” etc., without a perception-root. It is said to show that there is no offense for one who does not accuse. Otherwise, phrases like "it is for one who has seen, one who is doubtful about what is seen" would be without distinction. This is the conclusion here: just as for one who accuses an impure person without giving an opportunity, there is a dukkaṭa, and for one with the intention of reviling, by speaking disparagingly, there is a dukkaṭa, similarly, if one with wrong view accuses an impure person with wrong view without basis, there is an offense. Or if one accuses with basis, there is no offense. That conclusion should be taken as it corresponds with "no offense for one with wrong view regarding a pure person, and for one with wrong view regarding an impure person." Otherwise, a different justification should be sought. Here, regarding "endowed with virtue," it is said: "The word of an immoral person is not authoritative." For a bhikkhunī has no authority over a bhikkhu, therefore, the Elder spoke with reference to the rule in the higher sense. By the second Elder, it was said with reference to this: "Even if a bhikkhunī accuses unknowingly, or if probationers accuse, having heard them, the bhikkhus themselves investigate and make him confess." "What is the fault here?" this was said with reference to that. By the third, it was said: "Even having heard the words of sectarians, the bhikkhus themselves investigate, therefore no one fails to obtain it, thus everything is reconciled, say others." Thirty are those with thirty. "Anuyoga" means a reply. "Ehi" means "he will come." "Diṭṭhasantānena" means "by the method of seeing," the intention is "by the manner of seeing." "Patiṭṭhāya" means "having obtained a footing." "Ṭhāne" means "in a place of shame." "Gāhanti" means "taking up the self-assertion 'I will accuse'." "Cetanā" means "the volition of taking up the self-assertion." "Vohāra" means "making known, having understood from this and that." "Paññatti" means "conceptual designation." Which is understood by the mind-door consciousness that arises immediately after the stream of ear-door consciousness, whose object is the sound of speech, with a previously perceived sign, and by the understanding of which, its meaning, whether ultimate or non-ultimate, is understood by the mind-consciousness that arises for the third time, which is declared in the Pāli by six expressions such as name, etc., that (paññatti) is "existing designation, non-existing designation," etc. shown by the teachers in six ways. The state of being related to it and the state of not being related to it are applicable only to an accomplished phenomenon, not to a designation, because it is a matter to be dealt with, and because it occurs in a case, like the word 'bed' used for a bedstead. And it is written: "By way of designation" means there is no groundless mere designation. It is merely a designation, it does not exist in reality. It is merely a name, there is no object to be named." "Herein" means in this very training rule. "Not everywhere" means not in disputes and cases, etc. Why? "For not" and so on. There is no groundless case just as there is the existence of disputes, etc. "By the pacifications mentioned before" means "by the pacifications that occur concerning what" is the intention. Moreover, "it does not exist in reality" is said because it has not attained reality, like unarisen consciousness, etc. For the designation of disputes, etc., is not a case. That is, pacifications do not occur concerning a designation, therefore it is not a matter to be dealt with for it. That is the intention of "the designation of disputes, etc., is not a case." And here it is said: "If a pārājika offense is groundless, Then the path and fruit phenomena, which are mere designations, being the basis of the fourth pārājika, would likewise be mere designations. "Then the path and fruit phenomena would be of two kinds, and so would past and future; the sixfold designation would not exist from that,