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and so on, is said. Although it was established by the Suttanta elders, still, the volitional determination is present in both cases, say the teachers. If it is asked, "How is the object determined in the killing of many?" When the life faculty of one among those to be killed is taken as an object, it is as if all are taken as objects. Even in the death of one, it is not possible to take his entire life as an object, neither that which is arising, nor that which has arisen, nor that which is ceasing. The volition of destroying life is itself present-objected and past-objected. Therefore, that too is fitting. When, at the last moment, that life, having existed as past-born for one mind-moment, is made the object, and an attempt is made by the volition belonging to the seventh javana, in reality, the entire life faculty of that being is taken as an object and destroyed. Otherwise, it is not possible. Similarly, in the earlier part, having thought, "I will kill many beings," at the time of determination, when one performs an act like putting poison, the volition of the aforementioned kind arises, making the life faculty of the aforementioned kind of one of them its object. When such a single volition has arisen, all of them are killed by it, because the death of all is accomplished by that very volition. Otherwise, it is not possible to destroy or to take as object. If it is asked, "How is the mass of unwholesome karma in the killing of many by one volition?" Because the volitions that occur for each individual death perform their function. How? All of them are to be experienced in a subsequent birth. Therefore, when rebirth is given by any one of them, all the others, "from that having been repelled by powerful wholesome karma, they partake of the portion beginning with "karma," and cannot generate results again. Just as wholesome volitions, having repelled that, give rebirth as "subsequently felt," so too this volition, because it performs the slight task of giving rebirth in the very next existence, is called a "heap" even though it is one. But the rebirth given by it has an extremely sharp result. This is the distinction here, as elaborated in the sub-commentary. Since the intention is "desiring not to die," there is an offense even in spontaneous death. If it is said, "Since 'having arisen' is stated, falling is not seen?" "Spontaneous arising and falling are one and the same," it is written. Or, since the saying is "in every way without specifying," the intention "may he die" is possible here, so it is well said, "he dies unable to get out, it is a pārājika." If it was dug with the rule "he falls and dies," and a spontaneously arisen person, by the rule of having arisen and stood, thinks "it is impossible to get out" and dies, the shadow of a pārājika is not seen. Therefore it is said, "unable to get out." For he, unable to get out, falls repeatedly and dies, so his falling is also established, this is the intention. Here it might be said: He who is said to "die unable to get out" lives in the formless realm at the moment of digging the pit. And the murderous volition, by the saying "'undetermined dhamma is a condition for the wrong-view-determined dhamma by way of object condition, the life faculty of form is a condition for matricide, patricide, killing an Arahant, and causing blood to flow, by way of object condition' (Paṭṭhāna 2.15.38, Micchattaniyatattika)," has the life faculty of form as its object, and that does not exist for a being in the formless realm. Nor is that volition "'undetermined dhamma is a condition for the wrong-view-determined dhamma by way of pre-nascent condition, object pre-nascent, base pre-nascent, object pre-nascent. The life faculty of form is a condition for matricide, p "by way of pre-arisen condition, it is a condition" (Paṭṭhāna 2.15.48, Micchattaniyatattika) Thus, it has a future object. No other being here, having fallen, dies. If so, what is the object of the killer's intention? The present life-faculty of any living being here is the object. Even if he does not die, still, it is the destruction of life. Just as, having thought beforehand, "I will kill seven people standing in order with one arrow," at the time of resolve, making the life of one of them the object, he releases the arrow, the arrow misses him and kills the other six people, even so, he is still a destroyer of life. Similarly here, the killer's intention, when he thinks "whoever it may be," operates by making the life of any being the object. Even if that one does not die, he is a destroyer of life on account of another. If he is an Arahant and attains Parinibbāna, he is an Arahant-killer. This method applies everywhere in such cases. This is said to be the reasoning and decisive explanation handed down in the tradition of teachers here. Here, the form of falling is the measure. Just as when a mother falls and dies, having changed her gender, he is a mother-killer, not merely a man-killer. Therefore, the offense is by way of the falling itself. Why? Because the form of falling and the form of dying are of one continuum. That indeed is her life-faculty. For it, there is no change. Only the female and male faculties arise and cease in the course of existence. And "female" and "male" there are merely conventional terms. Therefore, he is a mother-killer, not a man-killer. Just as his offense is by way of the form of falling, so too here, the grave offense is by way of the form of falling, due to being of one continuum. This is the reasoning in the view of the First Elder. In the second case, although a ghost fell, and a yakkha, still, because of being a rootless rebirth-linking, and because of the commonality of all forms, like the rebirth-linking of yakkhas mentioned here in the result of unwholesome kamma, "by the left, he becomes a pig" (Dī. Ni. Aṭṭha. 2.296; Mahāni. Aṭṭha. 166), And because of being of a lower birth, if one dies in the form of an animal, it is a pācittiya offense due to the manner of death. In terms of the object, it becomes a lighter offense, just like the pācittiya offense of cutting down trees born in that place changes. This is more appropriate, therefore it was stated later. But for a pārājika, a human being, however he falls or however he dies, it is a pārājika because of its gravity. For a grave offense, there is no change, it is said. A thullaccaya in an animal, if it dies, is a cause for distinction; Death in its own form, Tisso, Phussa thinks otherwise. In the Gaṇṭhipada, however, it is written: "It is said in the second statement concerning a common person who, having fallen, attains arahantship and then dies." Here, regarding "in an animal," some say "devas are intended." And they say, "Death occurs only in one's own form, not otherwise." Even if one dies in the form of a yakkha or peta, this is the same principle, meaning it is a thullaccaya. It is written: "Like the death of a human body that has gone into an animal." "Having received a blow" is said because it was done for the purpose of killing beings. 177. "May he die well, properly" makes a distinction in speech. "Unsuitable disease" means a boil, a sore, etc., located in the body. 178. "Kāḷānusārī" is said to be the root of a certain creeper. Or a flower made by a great tortoise. "Haṃsapuppha" means the wing feather of a swan. The method of origination from body, speech, and mind should be shown here, combining the principle of direct command as stated below. The commentary on the word-division is finished. Commentary on the Vinaya story 180. "Being desirous of death" - because the intention is to reach heaven by the breaking of this body, those who are truly desirous of death, having such an intention, are called "desirous of death." Thus, not knowing their own desire for death, they incurred a pārājika. For they are not said to "not know the workings of their own minds." "In terms of conventional usage" means in terms of the conventional usage of the preceding part. But in the conclusion, this is not present. It is not like releasing a boar caught in a snare. "According to the connection" means without dying in between. Meaning. "Without reflecting" means without considering. For if something exists in the lower part, a wrinkle is perceived. "Shown" means having been lifted up and placed. "They obstruct" means an obstruction by you, meaning, "Do not cause an obstacle to the Sangha's use." 181-2. Since an action cannot be given, therefore "first received" is said. Even previously, giving the choicest from the almsfood he himself had received, he gave his own work there too. Here, in "unintentionally," when pulling one thing, if another falls, there is absolutely no intention. "Not with the intention of killing" means there is aversion and regret, but no intention to kill. Here, in "unknowingly," "there is no fault for one who does not know due to not knowing the object; this is indeed their distinction. 'I am unintentional' is not seen in the Pāli. Since it is stated in the commentary, there must be such a Pāli text," they say. If not, here in "grave offense," "if no painful feeling arises, it is merely a minor offense," they say; it should be investigated. "Muggarā" are pounding sticks. "Vemā" are sticks to be tied horizontally below and above those pounding sticks," it is written. Both types read "below." It seems like "reached by hand," "let there be no scattering of it," he cuts off. Having declared special attainments, being ashamed of the honor arising from them, he cuts off food because it has been declared to his peers. For they report the permissible field. 186. "By unmade request" means not by request. For since it is permitted, even if made, it is as if unmade, thus "unmade request." "''Venerable Sir, you should speak what is needed'— a request made in such an unmade situation is an unmade request," it is written. It is not permissible to give with one's own hand