English
This woman. "Kulumba" means the embryo. If it is asked, "How is that for the other?" When that (embryo) is not protected by a wicked mind, both that embryo and that psychic power are destroyed together. It happens in one moment, like the breaking and extinguishing of a pot-fire. "When examined in the suttas, it does not fit them," thus it is written. "Taking their view, when it is said 'this applies even to inanimate objects,' it should be rejected by way of the three (reasons)," say others, thus it is said. In applications done by oneself and those requiring relinquishment, the "done by oneself" nature should be understood by the bodily intimation arising together with the seventh volition that brings it to completion. But in the case of a command, because verbal intimation arises together with all seven volitions, the seven sounds, becoming one, going to the state of individual letters, by as many letters as one makes one's intention known, the "by command" nature should be understood by the verbal intimation arising together with the seventh volition that gives rise to the final letter. Similarly in applications involving magic. But in a command by body, it is just as stated for "done by oneself." In an application to inanimate objects, to the extent that another's death occurs, to that extent one is bound by kamma, and there is an offense. From that point... In excessive wandering, a great many karmic bonds should be understood when death occurs later. Here, there is one pārājika offense. Since the intention that accomplishes the purpose is found both here and in the second pārājika, not elsewhere, therefore, these verses are common to both— Those laws of existing phenomena, those phenomena are considered fixed. Those laws of future phenomena, those indeed are unfixed here. For the laws of existing phenomena, fixed indeed is that causal condition. For the laws of future phenomena, dependent is the causal condition. By that, another cause exists, that too is a law of phenomena. Its result is unfixed, the law is dependent on the result. Thus indeed for all phenomena, the law of phenomena is fixed. That which has attained the law of phenomena is the intention that accomplishes the purpose. Before the accomplishment of intention, and after the accomplishment of its purpose; without distinction, all six kinds accomplish the purpose. Since in command it is possible to make clear by distinction; therefore, in command alone is it said to accomplish the purpose. Whether in wrongness or in rightness, it is considered fixed or unfixed. In Abhidhamma, it is not everywhere, there it would be fixed. All intention of theft, whether by one's own hand or by command; by the Abhidhamma method, this would be absolutely fixed. Relying on the destruction of life, by one's own hand or by command, etc.; by the Abhidhamma method, this would each fall into that pair. The cutting off of the life faculty, and intention—this pair; not by an act of one's own hand, much less by command, is it equal. The cutting off of the life faculty, and intention—this pair; not by an act of one's own hand, much less by command, is it equal. At the moment of cutting off the life faculty, the intention of killing; what law makes it long-lasting, and fixes the offense? If at the moment of cutting off the life faculty there is a killer; whether dead, asleep, or awake, a skillful killer he would be. And the division into three kinds of wholesome, and also the division into three kinds of feeling; thus attained and accomplished would be the intention of killing by one's own hand. But those five laws of seed, season, kamma, dhamma, and mind which were brought forth and shown in the commentary, among them, a I think that if the intention which accomplishes the goal goes to union (i.e., is effective), then it is not the case that "there is no such rule for intentions that accomplish goals," because it would lead to the absence of intentions determined as wrong or right. It should be understood that all, being made to associate with whatever, associate with and go to the rules of kamma and mind, as far as possible. The danger in life is not distinct in the description of death. But here, in the context of resolution, it is distinct in meaning, because it is not clearly manifested as "perceiving death, intending death, having death as the aim," or because it is not obvious, or because it is not gross, or because it is made indistinct. This is not the name of thought (vitakka) means it is not *only* the name of thought, but it should be understood as the name of perception (saññā) and intention (cetanā) as well. In the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī too, it is said in the same way. 174. Because it is said "by the body," for the sake of verbal smoothness, instead of saying "with spears and arrows," it is said "with arrows, spears, etc." In the case of an unspecified action, the object of the action may be that one, or another. By both (strikes): although the first strike could not by itself (kill), having received the second, it was able to, and thus became the cause of the destruction of life. For that very purpose was it given by the killer. The second, however, was given with another intention. Therefore, it is well said "by the first strike alone." The teacher wrote: "'Intention is cruel' refers to the preliminary intention that arises concerning a serious matter, the intention of a killer by nature, it is not cruel." It is said: "The preliminary intention is secondary, only the killer's intention is cruel." According to intention, both are pierced. Even one's own hand, due to the indication, is not released, it seems. This specific action is not found in the commentaries. They say: "It is accepted by the teacher as conforming to the Pāli: 'Pierce thus, strike thus, kill thus.'" Striking from the front, etc., is indeed an indication of the object. When it is said "this one standing in the village," only the person is specified. But one who commands "kill the tall one... etc." without specifying by gender. Others say that if he were to speak specifying, he would say "this tall one." But the teachers say, "when 'tall' is said, n..." This is indefinite, speaking without defining, but the commander's intention is not to say, "Kill one of the long or others," they say. But it is written, "The meaning is that even if one intends one in mind, one commands without defining." "The other kills another such, the commander is absolved," is said because the intention was not fulfilled. "Thus, it seems proper that it is undefined in mind even in terms of long, etc.," is written in some commentary. Having thoroughly investigated, everything should be taken. Because the place is specified, when one specifies the place and points out, one intends to kill the one sitting in that place, but one is not there oneself at that time. Therefore, one's own life faculty is not the object along with the place. By that, the other, who was made to kill by oneself, is indeed made to kill. How? Being short and thin oneself, and having intended oneself in the former part, at the moment of command, when commanding, "Kill the long, short, fat, strong one," the mind proceeds making the life faculty of another such the object, because that characteristic is not present in oneself. By that, the original person is bound by kamma. This should be understood as such. In the explanation of the messenger chain, one commands, an offense of dukkaṭa. One informs the other, an offense of dukkaṭa. This is said with reference to dukkaṭa in the informing and receiving by the teacher and disciples, as appropriate. It is established that the killer does not receive, for him it is dukkaṭa. But that is not said due to lack of occasion. For the original person, the occasion for the offense to be committed is not limited. Therefore, for him, a thullaccaya is said in that occasion. If the killer receives, the original teacher commits a thullaccaya along with the previously committed dukkaṭa. Why? Because he employs the multitude in evil. But this dukkaṭa and thullaccaya are committed if the killer does not make that matter known. If he makes it known, he commits a pārājika. Why? Due to the absence of intention to accomplish the purpose. In the sub-commentary, however, "receives" then that is a wrong-doing. If so, why was it not stated in the text? The slayer, having accepted with "I will do it well," does not do it. Thus, in this rule, for those who have doubts, "What is it called for the principal? What is his wrong-doing?" to clarify that meaning, it is said, "For the principal, there is an offense of grave transgression." "The slayer accepts, there is an offense of wrong-doing, and for the principal, there is an offense of grave transgression," this statement is not consistent, because the authority is to show the offense to be committed by the principal, it is said, "The slayer accepts, there is an offense of wrong-doing." In the explanation of the term 'poison-messenger', it is said, "Because of the desire to speak, there is no purpose in speaking here with difficulty, so it was not stated by the Blessed One." But what is stated in the commentary is, "Only for the principal is there a wrong-doing." Here is the consideration: When the teacher, having commanded, Buddharakkhita reported it to Saṅgharakkhita regarding that matter, even though he who accepts with "Well done!" yet this wrong-doing belongs to the teacher himself due to the misunderstanding, not to Buddharakkhita. Why? Because it was committed with the intention of accomplishing the purpose. Therefore, it is stated in the Pāli, "For the commander and for the slayer, there is an offense of defeat." But that wrong-doing to be committed by the principal was not stated because its scope was not defined by "for the principal, there is no offense." Since it is stated in the case of no misunderstanding,