English
for the purpose of showing the distinction of modes of taking. Indeed, it is not by ground level, etc., that something is village-situated or forest-situated. Therein, that which is false weight, even in four ways— by false form, false part, false taking, and hidden falsity— merges into the "situated in the air" category. In the three kinds of false measures, by way of heart-breaking, peak-breaking, and rope-breaking, it merges here, where it is said: "this heart-breaking breaks the boundary." Indeed, heart-breaking occurs at the time of measuring ghee, oil, etc. Here, even peak-breaking occurs, where it is said: "causes to tremble, makes it enter one's own vessel." That is said to occur at the time of measuring sesame, rice, etc. At the time of measuring fields, rope-breaking merges. Here, extortion merges, where it is said: "practicing the Dhamma, one defeats the owner." And similarly, even deception and fraud. The description of the distinction of offenses is concluded. Description of the Non-Offence Distinctions 131. And he is not pleased with what is taken. That which belongs to him, even if taken by way of trust, must be given back. This seems inconsistent with: “At that time, two bhikkhus were companions. One entered the village for alms... (etc.) ... There is no offence, bhikkhu, in taking by way of trust” (Pārā. 146). For here, by the words: “he, knowing, reproached him, ‘You are no ascetic!’” displeasure is shown. If it is said: “Again, by the words: ‘There is no offence, bhikkhu, in taking by way of trust,’ it is shown that taking by way of trust is valid even if there is pleasure (on the part of the owner)?” That is not so, because the meaning must be taken otherwise. This is the meaning here: There is no pārājika offence when there is taking with the perception of trust. And that bhikkhu, being a companion, did not reproach in anger. Being affectionate, he reproached, saying: “Are you perhaps not an ascetic? Go, make a decision and stand in purity.” Even if he had reproached in anger, this “no offence” merely indicates the absence of a pārājika, not the validity of taking by way of trust. But if one endures out of shame in the midst of an assembly, saying nothing, that is the meaning. It is said: “However, with the intention of wanting to speak again, he can also have it returned.” If a thief, even wishing to take by force, says: “Venerable sir, endure these robes for me here,” and the robes are given by the elder, or he takes them himself without being given, and goes, the elder can later gain an opportunity and reproach him. The previous endurance does not count as endurance because he was silent out of fear. It is said: “The robe which the owner can have returned here.” It must be made normal for the owner. It is said: “This is indeed the rule.” If something belonging to the Saṅgha is taken by some bhikkhu, and there is a benefit to the Saṅgha or the Dhamma by it, then after announcing the amount taken, it should be given. It is said: “He, by making it normal as it was taken, becomes debt-free. The same method applies to the sick and others.” The description of the analysis of words is finished. Miscellaneous. Explanation of the 'ṇaka' matter. 'By one's own hand and by command' means only one object. "This is heavy. You too take one side, I too will take one side," having agreed, when moved from its place by the effort of both, it occurs by body, speech, and mind. Otherwise, it is written that it contradicts this: "either 'by one's own hand' is not an element of 'by command', or 'by command' is not an element of 'by one's own hand'." But Elder Dhammasiri said: "This method is not only taken in the case of heavy objects. Even if two people, having agreed, take something worth five māsa coins, for both individually, that action is called 'by one's own hand', because of the direct effort on one and the same object. Therefore, the statement 'by one's own hand is not an element of by command' does not obstruct this method." It is said there that 'the direct action is not an element of the object of direct action'. But here, because it is said with reference to the effort, he said, "it is fitting." That is unfitting, because there is no statement 'action by body and speech'. Therefore, in the efforts of 'by one's own hand' and 'by command', an offense arises by one of the efforts. Nevertheless, this is said in terms of taking and causing to take, having become very quick in acts like snatching. Just as, with reference to the very quick arising of phenomena concerning one's own time and another's time, they are called 'internal and external objects' (Dhammasaṅgaṇī, Tikamātikā 21), this should be understood as similar. Even there, those like the unexcelled are exclusively external objects, those like the sphere of infinite consciousness are exclusively internal objects. The others are called 'internal and external objects' because their objects are not fixed, not because they are both objects at one moment. But this offense, by the method stated above, is indeed both 'by one's own hand' and 'by command'. Therefore, it is unfitting to say 'this is not an example'. Some teachers said: "Just as they are called 'internal and external objects' because their objects are not fixed, so too, because its efforts are not fixed, this offense is called 'by one's own hand and by command' — this is indeed an example." But these teachers, of both, one... there is no making of an object. If there is, then thinking 'a phenomenon that is an internal-external object arises conditioned by a phenomenon that is an internal-external object, by way of root-condition' and so on, according to the Patthāna text (Patthāna 2.21.1, Ajjhattārammaṇatika), they said, by their opinion, the statement 'it might be internal-external' would be meaningless. But it is not meaningless. Therefore, there is indeed a phenomenon that is both internal and external as an object. Again, because there is no such thing as phenomena that are internal-external objects to be specifically pointed out as 'this is that', it is not extracted. There, precisely because it is not extracted, in the Dhammasaṅgahaṭṭhakathā, concerning the phenomena that are both internal and external, instead of saying 'internal-external objects' in the sense of phenomena that make both into one object, it is said 'at times, in the occurrence of internal-external, it is an internal-external object'. Therefore, the method stated in the Gaṇṭhipada is the essence, so is our reasoning," said the teacher. There, the non-mention of "bodily and verbal action" is because of its direct application, and because one application can involve many actions. If it were, mental action would also have to be mentioned. Just as mental action, though present there, became non-conventional, so too in that direct command, verbal action should be understood as non-conventional. That, however, became merely a strong support for bodily action, becoming just a part of it, like the mind. Therefore, it is said "because of its direct application", and "it is only by referring to its being merely a part that 'direct command' is said, so is our reasoning". This should be understood after consideration. Arising from body and speech, whatever offenses there may be; There, the action is not the mind, the action perishes, it wastes away. Whatever is action and non-action, and so on, whatever is action and non-action, and so on; That is not fitting, being contradictory, only one action is appropriate. Explanation of the Vinaya Story 132. 'No offense, monk, he generates a thought.' Here, it is merely the thought. The meaning is that there is no offense from the offenses to be generated by that very thought. Here it says – in the cases of accepting what is deposited, and so on, And in all non-action training rules, no bodily or verbal movement, but there is an offense. Why in this training rule alone is there no offense? Not in all offenses? No, why? The training must be fulfilled, with body-speech declaration; Without body or speech, by non-declaration, one touches it. Not due to its being a mere trace. Having stood in a suitable object, having obtained familiarity, thereafter it runs well, thus it 'runs together'. Then, having become accompanied by covetousness or ill-will, it runs especially, thus it 'runs intensely'. 137. "Having made a wound, one takes it"—here, although there is no offense by this training rule, some say that for touching a woman's form, there is a dukkata offense. They say, "It is proper to take what is attached to the body; it is said that it is permissible with reference to that." Both should be considered and taken. Explanation of the story of the transference of grass 138. What was said in the Mahāpaccari and others, "It should be done by the removal of the foot," that is well said. But this was said to show that the mere intention of taking it away is not seen. He incurs an offense by removal, therefore, for one who goes having seen it, it is said that "it should be done by the removal of the foot" is ill-said there. How? "One who desires a cloth, having taken only the seam of the cloth, having gone outside, having known it to be a cloth, thinks 'I will take it later' and thus takes it, he does not incur an offense by removal itself. When, having stood outside, he goes having seen 'this is a cloth', then 'it should be done by the removal of the foot' is not said, but although the intention is seen, it is not seen at the moment of taking in the earlier part, so it is not a taking with intention. This meaning is stated in the Great Commentary, therefore they say 'it is indeed the proper method'." "Kammantasālā" means the houses of farmers and forest-cutters. This, then, if it is the boundary of access, etc., up to the Theravāda method of the Great Commentary, then "some, however," etc.