English
because it is said, 'You, sirs, three of you, take it,' and for the others... For each command, one by one, there should be a dukkaṭa. How so? Someone, having stolen a strainer worth a month, having confessed, or having become disheartened, then making a needle worth a month in the same way, then another worth a month— would it be like this? Not so. Just as the lotus thief, by whom the object was completed, was pārājika due to his zeal, so these, with zeal, did not confess. Thus it is written in the Pāḷi and in the commentaries, in the cases where one is absolved, even though it is said that all are pārājika without a command, as it were. However, saying "this is its meaning," in the subsequent decisions, regarding one item, one place, etc., many command one person, thus the command is specified. Therefore, the command is to be desired, as it were, and to be investigated. "One item, one place" is also a reading, they say, "meaning the property of one family." 119-120. In the manner stated by Ocaraka, regarding goods that must be stolen. "That signal" means of that signal. Or, having passed that signal, afterwards, or before reaching it. This method applies to "that sign" here too. Actions like winking are light, for a short time. It's not possible to steal the goods at that very moment. Some goods are far away, some are heavy. By the time one goes to take them, by the time one lifts them, it is already after the sign. If those goods are as if found, close by, and light, is it possible to steal them at the moment of the sign? Is it said with that in mind? No. Even what was said before, "from then on, he steals by that very sign," is said because it was initiated. If so, the "pre-meal application" becomes the measure. But that measure is not valid, being stated after the view of Mahāpaduma Thera. The act of a sign should not be seen like the act of a signal. For there, a time limit exists; here, it does not. This is their difference. 121. And that, for the purpose of non-confusion, one says, "in pre-meal times, or..." or seeing digging and so on, take it," one makes it dependent on the object to be taken, saying, "Before noon, take an object of such color and form." In such cases, to avoid confusion, they show such a sign and mark, and as intended, the second speaks to the third, the third to the fourth, and so on in succession, this is the meaning. If the second speaks to the fourth, it is not as intended. "As soon as it is received, if he certainly receives it, it is a grave offense beforehand," it is written. The dukkata for the receivers is not mentioned because there is no room for it everywhere. It is said that they commit this dukkata by committing a pārājika offense. The intention is that at the moment of the intention to accomplish the purpose, he becomes a pārājika. There, which is like the path, which is like the fruit? Since it is said, "The intention that accomplishes the purpose is like the fruit immediately following the path," it is established that the intention is like the fruit. If the command were like the path, it would not be possible because it is co-existent with intention, and the certainty of the object being carried away would also not be possible. For at the moment of the command, it has already become certainly carried away. If it is for the one who carries away and receives, that too is not possible because it is in the future. If the intention is like the path, and one of the command and so on, or the certainty of the object being carried away, is like the fruit, the meaning is not possible. For only the pārājika offense is fit to be like the fruit, not anything else. Thus, in this way, the comparison here is possible: the intention is like the path, and its becoming a pārājika offense is like the fruit. Like what? Just as in the Paṭisambhidāmagga, "Knowledge of faith is the analytical knowledge of phenomena. Knowledge of the meaning of faith in faith is the analytical knowledge of meaning." Here, it is established that faith is one thing, and the meaning of faith in faith is another. And just as "one phenomenon, called non-delusion, is a condition for co-existent phenomena by way of root, predominance, co-existence, mutuality, support, faculty, path, association, existence, and non-disappearance." "Transgression" - here, non-delusion is one dhamma, and its causal conditions are different; thus it is established. Just as in the Vinaya Piṭaka there are six origins of offenses, so, as far as possible, "seven groups of offenses" are spoken of. Their origin-of-offense nature is one thing, their group-of-offense nature is another; thus it is established. By this method of groups of offenses, how many bases for the offense-matter? Seven groups of offenses are the bases. How many objects? Seven groups of offenses are the objects. How many grounds? Seven groups of offenses are the grounds, and so on, should be shown. For, since for that intention, which is like a path and accomplishes the goal, there is another state of pārājika offense, not different from it, called a specific mode, which is like a result, therefore it should be understood that "the intention that accomplishes the goal is like the immediate fruit of the path." Or, it is possible that the teacher spoke thus merely by way of simile, referring to the mere regularity of the dhamma, and so no comparison should be sought there. The teacher said, "All this, being spoken merely by way of reasoning, should be investigated and taken." The commentary on Bhūmaṭṭhakathā and so on is finished. Description of the Divisions of Offenses 122. Because it was said "from seeing the Vibhaṅga method," to accomplish that, "now in this and that" and so on was begun. There, "by way of the division of components and objects" means by way of the division of knowing the components of theft and the heavy or light nature of the object to be stolen. Or, it means showing both the components and the division of offenses by way of the object. "More than a māsaka, less than five māsakas" - here the word 'or' is not stated, meaning that all three express a single definition. "Not taken possession of" means not claimed by anyone, such as a forest-keeper. "Discarded" means thrown away by the owner due to being unwanted or in excess. "Lost" means its root is cut off, having searched and given up hope. "Ownerless object" means even if its root is not cut off, it has no owner, or people abandon it without concern, or what Abandoned by deities and so on, all this is called ownerless property. Whether abandoned by deities and so on, or by the Buddha-Dhamma, if taken by other guardians, it is indeed taken by others. In such a taking of what is not given, kings would seize the thief and inflict punishment like execution. But in an unguarded dwelling, without monks, without caretakers, and so on, whatever belongs to the Buddha-Dhamma, by the saying: "It should be protected, guarded, and cared for by monks who come and go," it goes into the category of "taken by others," like property belonging to the Sangha of a dwelling without monks. An implication to this effect is seen. Indeed, any monk who is master, if he is able to prevent such requisites from being taken even by thieves, should snatch them back by force, and place them in their proper place. In what is not taken by others, for one who perceives it as belonging to others, even if the six aspects exist, an anāpatti is seen, as it were. Although the factor "which is taken by others" is seen, it should be understood that it was said with reference to one who acts thus regarding others' property. One's own property, taken by thieves, because it is taken by thieves, becomes taken by others. Therefore, if another takes it with thievish intent, it is a pārājika. If the owner himself takes it, it is not a pārājika, because he can claim it, and snatch it back, saying, "I am taking my own property." If, having first abandoned his claim, he afterwards takes it with thievish intent, this is the rule. At the time the owner abandoned his claim, if that thief dies, and another takes it with thievish intent, it is not a pārājika. If he dies when the claim has not been abandoned, for the monk who takes it with thievish intent, it is a pārājika, because it remains the property of the original monk. When the thieving monk dies, if the Sangha divides it, saying "it is property of the deceased," and takes it, the original owner can take it, saying, "this is my property." Here it is asked: Are the types of taking (theft) only those ending with the act of removing from the ground, etc., as a sign? Or are there others? And here, if there are others, they should also be stated. Indeed not. The Blessed One lays down a pārājika with remainder. If they are not present, these forms of false weights, false measures, false scales, extortion, deception, fraud, false testimony, misappropriation, plundering, and violence, which are seen in the Sutta sections, when they come here, do they merge here? Or by characteristic, should their state of having merged be declared? It is said: By characteristic, it is indeed established. How? By the method beginning "by five aspects," by the distinction of factors and objects. Indeed, the distinction of offenses is stated in the Pāli (Pārājika 128-130), and in the commentary, because it is stated: "or by deceiving with false measures, false weights, false kahāpaṇas, etc., one takes; for one who takes thus, the taking is theft-taking," it is established that the taking of false weights, etc., merges into theft-taking. And the forms of misappropriation, plundering, and violence merge into forceful taking, as they appear in the commentary. Or to show this very forceful taking, having laid down the heading "village-situated, forest-situated," the division is stated by the method beginning: "goods situated in a village are placed in four ways." Therefore, this is said: It is made separate