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the complete cessation of arising for all formations. For by the three lower paths, some formations cease, some do not cease, due to the remaining cessation of ignorance. But by the highest path, due to its complete cessation, no formations fail to cease. "Thus ceased" means thus ceased by the cessation of arising. The word "kevala" also means "without remainder," as in "the whole Anga and Magadha." And it also means "unmixed," as in "pure rice fields." Therefore, it speaks of the meaning in both ways: "of the whole, or of the pure." There, "of the whole" means of that which is without remainder, gone to all existences and so on. "Devoid of beings" means devoid of the soul imagined by others. Moreover, here, even though "with the cessation of ignorance, formations cease; with the cessation of formations, consciousness ceases" — by this much, the complete cessation of the entire mass of suffering, without remainder, is stated. Nevertheless, just as in the direct order, to show the meaning that "due to the existence of each conditioning phenomenon, each conditioned phenomenon does not cease but continues to exist," it is said, "with ignorance as condition, formations... ...and so on... there is arising." Similarly, in the reverse order, to show that "in the absence of each condition, each conditioned phenomenon ceases and does not continue to exist," here it is said, "with the cessation of ignorance, formations cease; with the cessation of formations, consciousness ceases; with the cessation of consciousness, name-and-form ceases... ...and so on... there is the cessation of the mass of suffering." Not p not like the direct order, for showing the cessation of the mass of suffering encompassed by the three times. Indeed, the cessation of the mass of suffering worthy of arising in the future, when there is no development of the Noble Path, is desired through the development of the Noble Path. This distinction should also be understood. Here, in "Yadā haveti," "haveti" is a particle in the sense of "it is clear." But some say "haveti" means "in battle, in war," for indeed, by the saying "Fight Māra with the weapon of wisdom" (Dhp. 40), their intention is "it is the time to fight the defilement-Māra." "By the characteristic of object-contemplation" means by the nature of object-contemplation. "By the characteristic of characteristic-contemplation" here too, the same method applies. There, object-contemplation refers to the eight attainments, because they contemplate a kasina object. Characteristic-contemplation refers to insight, path, and fruit. For insight contemplates the three characteristics, hence it is characteristic-contemplation. The path accomplishes the task that comes from insight, hence it is characteristic-contemplation. The fruit contemplates the characteristic of cessation, the truth of cessation, hence it is characteristic-contemplation. "Not a proper question" means an inappropriate question, a bad question. By the word "etc." – "I do not say 'one touches.' If I were to say 'one touches,' then there would be a proper question: 'Who, indeed, Venerable Sir, touches?' But I do not say so. If, when I do not say so, someone were to ask me: 'What is the condition for contact, Venerable Sir?' That is a proper question. There, the proper explanation is: 'Contact is conditioned by the six sense bases; feeling is conditioned by contact.' 'Who, indeed, Venerable Sir, feels?' 'Not a proper question,' the Blessed One said. 'I do not say 'one feels.' If I were to say 'one feels,' then there would be a proper question: 'Who, indeed, Venerable Sir, feels?' But I do not say so. If, when I do not say so, someone were to ask me: 'What is the condition for feeling, Venerable Sir?' That is a proper question. There, the proper explanation is: 'Feeling is conditioned by contact; craving is conditioned by feeling.'" thus (S.N. 2.12) – Such remaining Pāli texts are included. And in "by the method of 'ādi' (etc.)", by the word 'ādi' (etc.), it includes such as: "What, venerable sir, is birth? And whose is this birth?" The Blessed One said, "The question is not proper." Is it not that here, "What, venerable sir, is old age and death?" (S.N. 2.35) is well-asked? Although it is well-asked, just as when a piece of excrement the size of an āmalaka fruit is placed on top of delicious food served on a golden plate worth a hundred thousand, all the food becomes bad food and must be discarded, even so, with the statement "And whose is this old age and death?" — this excrement-like statement of the view of a self-entity — that food becomes bad food, and this entire question becomes a bad question. Sixteen doubts: "Was I in the past? Was I not? What was I? How was I? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be? What shall I be? How shall I be? Having been what, what shall I be in the future? Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? From where has this being come? Where will it go?" (S.N. 2.20; M.N. 1.18) Such are the sixteen kinds of doubt concerning the past, future, and present. Therein (M.N.A. 1.18; S.N.A. 2.2.20), "Was I, or was I not?" — relying on the view of eternalism and the view of accidental origination, one doubts one's existence and non-existence in the past. It should not be asked what the cause is. For a foolish ordinary person behaves like a madman, in whatever way. Moreover, unwise attention is the cause here. And what is the cause of such unwise attention? That very state of being an ordinary person, or not seeing the noble ones, and so on. But even an ordinary person, wisely he pays attention. Who says, "he does not pay attention"? But the state of being an ordinary person is not the cause there; hearing the Good Dhamma, good friends, and so on, are the causes there. For fish and meat, etc., are not fragrant by their own nature; but by the condition of preparation, they become fragrant. "What was I?" referring to births, genders, and existences, he doubts, "Was I a warrior, or one of the brahmins, merchants, workers, householders, renunciants, devas, or humans?" "How was I?" referring to forms and appearances, he doubts, "Was I tall, or one of the short, fair, dark, of limited size, or unlimited size?" Some say, "Referring to creation by a lord, etc., he doubts, 'By what cause was I?' regarding the reason." "What having been, what was I?" referring to births, etc., he doubts his own succession, "Having been a warrior, was I a brahmin? ... Having been a deva, was I a human?" In all cases, "addhānaṃ" is a term for time, and that should be understood as a locative case expressing a sphere. "Shall I be? Shall I not be?" referring to the eternalist view and the annihilationist view, he doubts his own existence and non-existence in the future. The rest here is as explained. "Am I?" he doubts his own existence. Is this appropriate? What is the concern here about appropriate or inappropriate? Moreover, they relate this story here: It is said that the son of the younger mother was bald, the son of the elder mother was not bald. They shaved the one who was sleeping. He woke up and thought, "Am I the son of the younger mother?" Thus, the doubt "Am I?" arises. "Am I not?" he doubts his own non-existence. There, too, is this story: It is said that a certain man, catching fish, thought his own thigh, which had become cold from long immersion in water, was a "fish" and struck it. Another, guarding a field near a charnel ground, lay down frightened and huddled. He woke up and thought his own knees were "two ogres" and struck them. Thus, "Am I not?" “Am I?” he doubts. “What am I?” A Khattiya, being a Khattiya, doubts his Khattiya-ness, like Karna, who thought he was a Sūta’s son. This is the method for the rest. But a deva, being a deva, does not ignore his deva-ness. Yet he doubts, saying, “Am I material or immaterial?” and so on. If it is asked, “Why do Khattiyas and others not know?” it is because their birth in those various families is not directly perceived. Householders like Pātalika also think they are renunciants. Renunciants also think they are householders, saying, “Is my karma faulty?” and so on. Some humans also think they are devas, like kings. “How am I?” is as explained. Only here, taking that there is a being inside, and based on its form and shape, one who doubts, “Am I long, or short, square, hexagonal, octagonal, sixteen-sided, or some other kind?” is to be understood as doubting “How am I?” But no one is ignorant of their present bodily form. “From where have I come, and where will I go?” He doubts the coming and going place of his existence. “Vapayanti” means “vi-apayanti”; this is an indication by the elision of the ‘i’. It means “byapayanti.” Therefore, it says, “vapayanti, they depart.” And departure is in the sense of non-arising and cessation, so it says, “they cease.” 3. When do the Bodhipakkhiya Dhammas or the Four Noble Truths appear, arise, or become manifest to him? When insight and path knowledges are occurring. There, in the insight knowledge, the mindfulness and other factors associated with insight knowledge, and the insight knowledge itself, each in their respective domains, abandoning perceptions of beauty and so on by way of temporary suppression, arise separately by way of contemplation of the body and so on. But at the moment of the path, they, taking Nibbāna as their object, abandoning their opponents by way of eradication, arise simultaneously in all four Noble Truths, by way of accomplishing penetration without delusion. Thus, it is in this way that the Bodhipakkhiya Dhammas arise here. manifestation should be understood. And the manifestation of the Noble Truths, in the case of the mundane, is to be understood as their becoming an object of insight at the moment of insight, and in the case of the supramundane, as their being the object of direct comprehension at the moment of the path,