English
means, because of its desirable nature, it delights the individual endowed with it, or it delights the associated phenomena within oneself. Thus, "sātaṃ" (pleasantness) is formed by changing 'da' to 'ta'. They say "sātaṃ" is sweet. "Sātalakkhaṇaṃ" means that which has pleasantness as its characteristic. In "having the flavor of strengthening" and so on, "strengthening" is the increase of associated phenomena. It is like not abandoning as in suffering, and not being indifferent as in neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, but rather grasping it again and again, or it is helpfulness, or support. "Sometimes" means in the first jhāna and so on. "Joy of attainment" means joy arising by way of attainment. Attained The experience of taste is the experience of the taste of the object that has been obtained. By this, joy and happiness are shown to be distinguished by their nature. Where there is joy, there is happiness— it speaks of the constant connection of joy with happiness, like thought with examination. Where there is happiness, there is not necessarily joy— like examination with thought, the inconstant connection of happiness with joy. Thus, by their constant and inconstant connection, it shows the distinction of joy and happiness. That which makes water cross over, that is a wilderness, a waterless desert region. A forest itself is a forest edge. Like in entering a forest shade and consuming water, there is happiness. Just as a man, having set out on a path through a great wilderness, overcome by heat, thirsty, parched, seeing a man on the way, might ask, "Where is there drinking water?" And he might say, "Beyond the forest, there is a natural lake and a grove, go there and you will find it." Hearing his words, he would become joyful and delighted. Then, as he goes, seeing lotus petals, water lily leaves, etc., fallen on the ground, he would become even more joyful and delighted. As he goes, he would see men with wet clothes and wet hair, he would hear the sound of jungle fowl and forest peacocks, he would see a blue forest grove like a network of jewels grown on the edge of the natural lake, he would see lotuses, water lilies, and night lotuses grown in the lake, he would also see clear, pure water. He, becoming more and more joyful and delighted, would descend into the natural lake, and as he wished, having bathed and drunk, his weariness calmed, having eaten lotus stalks, water chestnuts, and water lilies, having adorned himself with blue lotuses, etc., having thrown bundles of mandalava roots over his shoulder, having come out, having put on his outer garment, having put his wet cloth in the sun, lying in the cool shade while gentle breezes blew, he would say, "Oh, what happiness! Oh, what happiness!" This should be understood in the same way. For that man, from the time of hearing about the natural lake and grove until seeing the water, the period of joy and delight is like the joy and delight in the preliminary object, which is joy. Having eaten and drunk, in the cool shade, as a gentle breeze blows, saying, "Oh, what bliss! Oh, what bliss!" the happiness, like the time of lying down, which has gained strength, and is established in the manner of experiencing the taste of the object. "At that very time" means at the time of obtaining a desirable object, at the time of experiencing the taste of what has been obtained, at the time of hearing and seeing forest shades and so on, and at the time of enjoyment. "Due to its manifest nature" means due to the distinctness of joy and happiness, respectively. "Joy and happiness born of seclusion" – here, in the former sense, "born of seclusion" refers to jhāna. And from the word "joy and happiness," since this jhāna has a specific meaning, in "in this jhāna," the 'a' should be understood, as in "ariso." In the second case, joy and happiness themselves are born of seclusion, and "joy and happiness born of seclusion" is a compound of other words, and the elision of the possessive case has been made. Or, if there were an elision, the reading would be "vivekajapītisukha" – this is the distinction. "First, in the order of enumeration" – by this, it indicates the order of teaching. "First, in the order of enumeration" is also a reading. There, too, the meaning is "by the order of enumeration," or "this statement is 'first' merely by the order of enumeration." "He attains the first" – this "first" is not an absolute characteristic. For one who has mastered the practice, one who has attained the eight attainments, can attain them starting from the beginning and reaching the end, can attain them starting from the end and reaching the beginning, and can attain them by entering in between. Thus, "first" also means "arising first" in the sense of prior arising. Therefore, in the Visuddhimagga (Visuddhi. 1.75), only this much is said: "First, in the order of enumeration; 'first' also means 'arising first'." "He burns the opposing qualities" means he burns the opposing qualities such as the hindrances, meaning he abandons them by suppression. "Object" means the object such as a kasiṇa. "That" means that object. "He contemplates" means he sees. "Together with access" means together with access jhāna. "By contemplating the kasiṇa object" means the earth kasiṇa. Like a debtor gazing intently with the eye at the form of his own object. "Gazing intently at the characteristics" means gazing intently, as far as possible, at the three characteristics of impermanence, etc., and at the true characteristic of the Nibbāna element. Therefore, it is said, "Here, indeed," etc. By abandoning the perversions of permanence, etc., the path, being undeluded, gazes intently at the characteristics of impermanence, etc. This "gazing intently at characteristics" is said to be "the act of gazing intently by insight," etc. "True characteristic" means the unperverted nature, the unchangeable state of Nibbāna, which is of an indestructible nature. Or, it should be connected as the path's gazing intently at the true characteristic because Nibbāna is its object. First, showing a dissimilar example, it is said, "Just as a wealthy person," etc. "Another is worthy of designation" means a person who is wealthy and has a retinue, distinct from wealth and retinue, who exists with wealth and retinue, is "wealthy and with retinue," and is worthy of designation. It is said that he is worthy of being designated. "The designation 'army' is only among the army's components" means even though there is no army separate from the components like chariots, etc., because it exists with chariots and infantry, it is "an army with chariots and infantry." The meaning is that the term "army" is used only for the army's components like chariots, etc. Referring to the question, "Why is concentration of mind, not explicitly mentioned in the jhāna passage, taken as included here?" it is said, "Because it is not stated," etc. "It is stated thus" means it is stated in its own form in the Vibhaṅga. "With concentration of mind" means even though it is not stated here in its own form as "with concentration of mind" in this jhāna passage, it is, however, generally included by the inclusion of jhāna. Therefore, it is said, "By which, indeed," etc. This is what is meant: The enumeration "with initial application, with sustained application," etc., was made with the intention of clarifying that phenomenon which is to be associated with initial application, etc., and to reveal it. That very intention was revealed by the Blessed One in the Vibhaṅga (Vibha. 569) by designating it as "concentration of mind." Therefore, one should not think that it is not included in the jhāna passage. "Having attained" Here, "upa-" and "saṃs-" To show that it is meaningless, like in "is found," etc., having said "having approached," etc., then again, to show their meaningfulness, "having accomplished," etc., is said. Therefore, in "upasampajja" (having attained), the meaning is "having reached and achieved." "Iriyanti" means action. "Vutti" and so on are synonyms for it. Hindering one posture, protecting and guarding it with other postures. Because it is practiced by all Buddhas, only the mindfulness of breathing meditation subject is mentioned. For they say it is practiced by all Buddhas. The discourse on the first jhāna is concluded. Discourse on the second jhāna "Vūpasama" means due to pacification. Here, "vūpasama" means abandonment, and that is the transcendence of initial and sustained application, meaning their non-arising at the moment of the second jhāna. Thus, it is said, "by transcending," etc. Whose initial and sustained application's pacification is intended here? Is it that of those in the first jhāna, or those in the second jhāna? What is the case here? If it is that of those in the first jhāna, there is no pacification for them. For the first jhāna is never without initial and sustained application. If it is that of those in the second jhāna, even so, there is no pacification at all, because they are entirely absent there. Referring to this objection, it is said, "Although there," etc. Since pacification means bringing about the nature of non-arising at the moment of that particular jhāna for what is seen as a fault, and only initial application and so on, which are jhāna factors, are made to be so, not contact and so on associated with them, therefore, the term "pacification" for initial application and so on is found in jhāna. However, since the seeing of fault, "by this, this is coarse," is found in the Sutta for associated phenomena as well as for initial application and so on, therefore, when pacification and so on should be spoken of without distinction for initial application and so on and their co-arising phenomena, the pacification of initial application and so on alone being spoken of, implies an additional meaning. Thus, showing some distinction, it is said, "But of the coarse," etc. And this is the intention here: