English
The "Peṭaka" is the commentary on the Tipitaka taught by the Elder Mahākaccāna; in that Peṭaka. "Regarding the sphere of the five kinds of sensual pleasures" means regarding the sphere of the specific kinds of the five sensual pleasures such as forms. "Regarding the sphere of the various bases of resentment" means by the word "seclusion from ill-will," the suppression-seclusion of hatred is spoken of, regarding the sphere of the various bases of resentment such as "he acted to my detriment." By the word "seclusion from sloth and torpor, etc., which are dominant in delusion," the suppression-seclusion of delusion is spoken of, regarding the sphere of the various kinds of suffering, past, etc., by way of concealment. This suppression of sensual passion, ill-will, and the sloth and torpor, etc., that are one with them, because it is by nature the opponent of all unwholesome states, it belongs to all wholesome states. Even though it is by that nature the abandoner of all unwholesome states, it is only by nature the suppression of sensual passion, etc., because it is of that nature. Thus, without distinguishing, it is said that the suppression-seclusion of the hindrances, unwholesome roots, etc., is spoken of. "There is no mastery over the intrinsic phenomena that arise according to their conditions." To prevent the state of mastery, it is said, "vitakkanaṃ vitakko" (initial application is the act of applying). "Vitakkanaṃ" means the act of applying, and that is merely the arising of initial application by its own conditions, thus the meaning is stated. This is for preventing the state of being under control. This thinking, "This is like this," is the conceptualization of the object, and it is said to be "pondering." Because the mind, by the power of initial application, is as if mounted upon the object, therefore it is said to have the characteristic of directing the mind onto the object. Just as someone, relying on a royal favorite, a relative, or a friend, ascends and enters the royal palace, so too, relying on initial application, the mind ascends to the object. If so, how does a mind without initial application ascend to the object? By the very power of initial application. Just as that person, through familiarity, enters the royal palace without him and without apprehension, so too, through familiarity, a mind without initial application ascends to the object even without initial application. And by "familiarity" is meant familiarity in the sense of the cultivation of initial application that has occurred in the continuum. Indeed, the mind's ascending to the object, by virtue of initial application frequently occurring in the continuum, is long familiar; therefore, sometimes it occurs there even without initial application. Just as that which, being accompanied by knowledge, has long been familiar in the mode of comprehension, sometimes occurs in the mode of comprehension even without knowledge; or just as that which, having occurred accompanied by defilements, occurs entirely without defilements through familiarity with the latent tendencies of defilements; this case should be understood similarly. Regarding the "striking and repeated striking" flavor: Initially, striking directly is "striking." Around, or striking repeatedly, is "repeated striking." The occurrence like one who repeatedly taps, saying "form, form," "earth, earth," should be understood as "striking and repeated striking." Indeed, when the mind directs itself to an object, initial application is like one who taps, making it suitable for grasping. If so, by the Elder Nāgasena, "Initial application has the characteristic of striking. Just as, O great king, a drum is struck, and then afterwards it resonates and echoes, even so, O great king, just as the striking, so should initial application be understood. Then afterwards, the resonating and echoing, so should sustained application be understood." Thus, the characteristic of striking... Why is it said to be a thought? This is not a contradiction. For the Elder stated the characteristic in relation to its function. There is no action separate from the nature of phenomena, nor a way of grasping it as such. But in accordance with those to be awakened, even the ultimate unity of a natural phenomenon is revealed in many ways by figurative expressions, as if by superimposed forms. Thus it is well revealed. In "bringing and presenting," bringing is the leading of the object to the mind, or drawing it in. Wandering about, roaming around. This distinction, being found in the continuum, is to be understood as becoming manifest in the continuum. The same method applies to the rest. Anumajjana is the mind's massaging of the object, meaning polishing. Thus it is said, "Vicāra is like a massaging hand, like a wandering hand." Therein means in the object. The urging of co-arisen things is to be understood as massaging, which is wandering about in the object. Anuppabandhana is the mind's activity in the object as if uninterrupted. Thus it is designated as "uninterruptedness." And by this it is said to be "like the reverberation of a bell, like wandering around." Somewhere means in the first jhāna and in slight mind-moments. By its grossness means by its grossness compared to vicāra. Just as the sound of a bell striking is the first impact, so thought, by its nature of implanting towards the object, is like the first impact of the mind. Thus he said, "like the sound of a bell striking," and so on. In "vibration," vibration is the opposite of sloth and torpor for thought, non-clinging and non-contraction in the object. But this, by its nature of implanting, is like movement. With this intention, he said, "the mind's state of trembling." In "like wandering around," it is to be understood as wandering around to investigate the absence of danger. But in the commentary on Dukanipāta— "A great bird going in the sky, taking the wind with both wings, settling its wings..." just as going is the mind's fixing itself on an object, thus is initial application; just as going is the flapping of wings to catch the wind, thus is sustained application, as if stroking. This, as stated, is fitting for continuous occurrence. For in access concentration or in absorption, in continuous occurrence, initial application becomes steady, as if entering the object, and is not evident at the first impact. Just as initial application at the first impact on an unfamiliar object is expansive, it is not so in continuous occurrence on the same object; rather, it is not overly expansive there, being settled. It is evident in the first and second jhānas. The distinct characteristic of initial application, which is fixing, is evident in the first jhāna due to its grossness. In its absence, in the fivefold system, the distinct characteristic of sustained application, which is stroking, is evident in the second jhāna. Here is another method: Just as when one holds firmly a bronze vessel stained with dirt with one hand, and with the other hand rubs it with a pad made of powder, oil, and lamb's wool, the hand holding firmly is like initial application, and the hand rubbing is like sustained application. Similarly, when a potter spins the wheel with a stick and makes a pot, the hand pressing down on the lump is like initial application, and the hand moving here and there is like sustained application. Similarly, when making some circle or round line on bronze vessels, etc., the spike fixed in the middle is like initial application, which is fixing, and the spike revolving outside is like sustained application, which is stroking. This should be understood. Just as a tree, even though it does not exist separate from its parts like flowers, fruits, and branches, is spoken of as "having flowers, having fruits," so too jhāna, even though it does not exist separate from its factors like initial application, is spoken of as "with initial application, with sustained application." To show this, it is said, "like a tree," etc. In the Vibhaṅga, etc., the jhāna development is to be taught according to individuals. "Here, a bhikkhu, quite secluded from sensual pleasures..." Thus, beginning with this, (Vibh. 508) the jhānas are taught based on the individual. Although in the Vibhaṅga the teaching is made based on the individual, the meaning there too, even in the Vibhaṅga, just as here, "by this thought" and so on, is stated in terms of phenomena. It should be seen in the same way, because ultimately there is no individual. This is the intention. Or, by showing the one endowed with jhāna as endowed with initial and sustained thought, the jhāna itself is said to be with initial and sustained thought. Therefore, it is said: "The meaning there too should be seen in the same way." Referring to the word 'viveka' as an abstract noun, it is said: "Therefore, from seclusion." And this is an ablative case in the sense of cause. Therefore, it means: "from seclusion as the cause." Referring to the word 'viveka' as an agentive noun or an objective noun, it is said: "Or in that seclusion." For by "vivitto" (secluded), it means "separated from hindrances" and "secluded by them." Both derivations are indeed included. "Pinayati" means it satisfies or it increases. "Characterized by delight" means "characterized by satisfaction." "Having the flavor of invigoration" means "having the flavor of strengthening." "Having the flavor of pervasion" means "having the flavor of pervading the body with exquisite forms." The state of being elated is elation. "Sukhayati" means "sukha" (happiness). It means it makes the associated phenomena attain a pleasant taste within oneself. This agentive designation is obtained indirectly, for the purpose of negating an agent other than the phenomenon. But directly, only the abstract noun is obtained. Therefore, it is said: "The act of making happy is happiness." "Characterized by pleasantness"