English
When asked "Is it otherwise than both?", he says, "It is not otherwise for me." Then, when told "It is not by any of the three ways, what is your doctrine?", he says, "It is not not for me." Then, "What is not-not for you?" When asked "Is it a view?", he says "No, it is not, nor is it mine, nor is it no." Thus he falls into equivocation, he does not stand on any one side. Then, when asked "Is there another world?" and so on, he equivocates in the same way, he does not stand on one side. Such a described eel-wriggling is what these people have, thus they are eel-wrigglers. But surely, this eel-wriggler, not understanding rightly good deeds and so on, or things concerning the next world and so on, when asked a question here and there, merely equivocates in response to the question. How can he be a holder of a view? For it is not right to say that merely equivocating, like one unwilling to speak, or one who does not know what is asked, constitutes holding a view, is it? It is said: Indeed, his holding a view is not merely due to equivocating in response to a question, but rather due to wrong adherence, due to adherence to eternalism. For a person wrongly adhering, due to dullness of mind, not rightly understanding good deeds and so on, or things concerning the next world and so on, being unable to make others understand what he himself does not know, and fearing false speech and so on, falls into equivocation. And thus it is said: "There are seven annihilationist views, the rest are eternalist views." Or else, due to not understanding and not believing in merit and demerit and their results, thinking that equivocating on questions concerning them is good, and having generated patience and liking, for one who adheres, this is indeed a distinct view, like the view of seven kinds of breaking up. This should be understood. And for that very reason it is said: "Boundless are the views and the words of one holding a view." Here, "Adhiccasamuppannikā" (fortuitous originists) means: The view that the self and the world arise fortuitously, without any specific cause, is "adhiccasamuppanna" (fortuitous origin). For the view that the aggregates, which are designated as self and world, arise fortuitously, is called "adhiccasamuppanna" (fortuitous origin) because it proceeds by way of relying on that mode of origin as its object, and because it is associated with that mode, just as one says: "The beds roar," "The spears wander." and so. That exists for them, thus they are accidental originationists. "Conscious-theorists" means the doctrine of consciousness exists for them, thus they are "conscious-theorists," just as "one who has enlightenment is enlightened." Or, "conscious" means a doctrine that proceeds by way of association with consciousness. Those for whom consciousness is the doctrine, they are "conscious-theorists." "The self is material, healthy after death, they describe it as conscious. The self is immaterial. The self is both material and immaterial. The self is neither material nor immaterial. The self is finite. The self is infinite. The self is both finite and infinite. The self is neither finite nor infinite. The self is conscious of unity. The self is conscious of diversity. The self is conscious of a limited extent. The self is conscious of an immeasurable extent. The self is exclusively happy. The self is exclusively suffering. The self is both happy and suffering. The self is neither suffering nor happy, healthy after death, they describe it as conscious." This is the designation for these sixteen-fold divided doctrines (Dī. Ni. 1.76). The "unconscious-theorists" and "neither-conscious-nor-unconscious-theorists" should be understood in the same way as stated for the "conscious-theorists." Merely, the "conscious-theorists" are spoken of in terms of those who hold "the self is conscious." And the "unconscious-theorists" and "neither-conscious-nor-unconscious-theorists" are spoken of in terms of those who hold "unconscious" and "neither conscious nor unconscious," respectively, and should be understood thus. Therein, the "unconscious-theorists" (say): "The self is material, healthy after death, they describe it as unconscious. The self is immaterial. The self is both material and immaterial. The self is neither material nor immaterial. The self is finite. The self is infinite. The self is both finite and infinite. The self is neither finite nor infinite, healthy after death, they describe it as unconscious." Thus, these are divided in eight ways. The "neither-conscious-nor-unconscious-theorists" are also divided in the same way, in eight ways, starting with "The self is material, healthy after death, they describe it as neither conscious nor unconscious" (Dī. Ni. 1.82), and should be understood thus. "Annihilationists" (say): "This self, material, composed of the four great elements, born of mother and father, is annihilated with the breaking up of the body, or... perishes, does not exist after death," and so on, the view of annihilation that occurs in this way is annihilation by way of co-occurrence. Those for whom annihilation is the doctrine are annihilationists, or those who have this doctrine of annihilation are annihilationists, or those who speak of annihilation are annihilationists. Here, "those who hold the doctrine of Nibbāna in this very life" means that "this very life" is a phenomenon understood by the knowledge that is seeing, meaning a directly perceived phenomenon. This is a designation for the state of having attained it in this very life. Nibbāna in this very life is "Nibbāna in this very life," meaning the cessation of suffering in this very existence. Those who speak of that are "those who hold the doctrine of Nibbāna in this very life." They, however, "Friends, when this self is endowed and complete with the five sense pleasures, and enjoys them, to that extent, friends, this self has attained the supreme Nibbāna in this very life," and so on, in this way, they declare Nibbāna in this very life. For they speak of the attainment of Nibbāna in this very life for those who have attained human sense pleasures similar to those of Mandhātu, and divine sense pleasures similar to those of the Paranimmita-vasavatti devas. "One who analyzes and explains" means one who analyzes and explains the state of being a disciplinarian, and so on, in the manner stated in the Verañja Sutta. For there, the Blessed One, having said, "Indeed, brahmin, I teach the Dhamma for the discipline of lust," and so on, and "but not what you mean," and so on, explained his state of being a disciplinarian, and so on, to the Verañja brahmin by analyzing it. Moreover, one who analyzes and explains the state of happiness, and so on, and the state of robes, and so on, as to whether they should be cultivated or not, is an analyzer and explainer. Or one who analyzes and explains the doctrines of eternalism and annihilationism is an analyzer and explainer. Or one who analyzes and explains by setting aside the questions that should be set aside, such as "the self and the world are eternal," and so on, and by speaking of the eternal, which is the destruction of lust, and so on, and the annihilation of bodily misconduct, and so on, which is lust, and so on, is an analyzer and explainer. Or one who analyzes and explains by not approaching the two extremes, which are eternalism and annihilationism, and by teaching dependent origination, which is the middle path, is an analyzer and explainer. The Bhagavā is one who speaks truthfully. This refers to the dispute that arose at the time of the Third Council, and also to future disputes that would arise until the disappearance of the True Dhamma. For at that assembly, this elder, in order to refute all the matters that had arisen then and those that would arise in the future, following the method given by the Teacher, and dividing the matrix established by the Tathāgata, brought forth five hundred suttas for his own doctrine and five hundred for the doctrines of others, making a total of a thousand suttas. By refuting the dispute that had arisen then, it was a refutation of the doctrines of others. Because it was characterized by the refutation of future disputes, he made the Kathāvatthu treatise, which is characterized by the refutation of future disputes. Thus, in the Sāratthadīpanī, a sub-commentary to the Samantapāsādikā Vinaya Commentary, The description of the Third Council is concluded. Description of the Lineage of Teachers In order to answer the question, "By whom was it brought?", having shown the lineage of teachers in Jambudīpa up to the Third Council, now, to show the lineage of teachers in the island of Sihala, the section beginning "But after the Third Council..." is commenced. "This island" means this island of Tambapaṇṇi. "For some time" means at some time. "The ancients" means the Aṭṭhakathā teachers. "Bhaddanāmo" means the Elder Bhaddasāla. For indeed, a designation is seen even with a part of the name, just as "Devadatta is Datta." "They do not commit fault" means Nāgas. The connection is "they recited the Vinaya Piṭaka." "In Tambapaṇṇi" is a locative case. "They recited the five Nikāyas" means they recited the five Nikāyas, such as the Dīgha Nikāya, excluding the Vinaya and Abhidhamma. "And the seven treatises" means they recited the seven Abhidhamma treatises, such as the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and Vibhaṅga. "Medhā" means wisdom, which strikes and harms defilements like a thunderbolt on a rock, or "medhā" means quickness in grasping and retaining. "Medhāvī" means one who possesses this wisdom. "Tipeṭako" means one who possesses the three Piṭakas, which is to say "Tepiṭako," meaning one who holds the Pariyatti of the three Piṭakas. King of stars is the star-king, the moon. "He shone exceedingly" means he shone very much. "Named Puppha" is Mahāpaduma Thera. "Skilled in the lineage of the True Dhamma" means skilled in the tradition of the True Dhamma.