English
‘‘having a cloth screen erected all around.’’ ‘‘Inside the cloth screen’’ means within the cloth screen. ‘‘Of the same doctrine’’ means holding the same doctrine. ‘‘What does he say by way of conduct?’’ means what does he preach? Or, what kind of doctrine is it? ‘‘What kind of doctrine’’ is that which he has, thus ‘‘what kind of doctrine.’’ ‘‘They declare and make known the self and the world as eternal by way of conduct’’ means they are eternalists. Or, ‘‘doctrine’’ is that by which they declare, this is a designation for view. The eternal doctrine is ‘‘eternal doctrine,’’ they have this, thus ‘‘eternalists,’’ meaning, those with the eternalist view. But why is it said, ‘‘they have the eternal doctrine,’’ when their intention is that the self and the world are eternal, not the doctrine? This is true. But because the doctrine is associated with eternity, it is called eternal, just as ‘‘spears are moving about.’’ Or, the elision of the word ‘‘iti’’ (thus) should be understood in ‘‘this is the eternal doctrine for them.’’ Those who take any of the aggregates like form as self and world, and declare it to be eternal, immortal, permanent, and stable, they are to be known as eternalists. For this is said in the Niddesa and the Paṭisambhidā: ‘‘If form is the self, then and that the world is eternal, thus they declare the self and the world. Feeling… perception… formations… consciousness is the self and the world, and is eternal, thus they declare the self and the world. And this meaning is stated in terms of the five kinds of identity view: “He regards form as self, feeling… perception… formations… consciousness as self.” But in terms of the fifteen kinds of identity view, such as “the self as having form,” taking four aggregates as “self” and the other as the world, this meaning is obtained. Similarly, taking one aggregate as “self” and the other as the world for one's enjoyment, or taking the aggregates that fall into the continuum as “self” and the other as the world, thus the meaning here should be understood. Among beings or formations, some are eternal for him, thus some-eternal, the doctrine of some-eternal. This exists for them, thus some-eternals, proponents of some-eternal. They are of two kinds: some-eternals regarding beings, and some-eternals regarding formations. Among these, the doctrines that arise thus: “The Lord is eternal, other beings are impermanent,” are some-eternals regarding beings, just like the doctrines of a Lord. Doctrines that arise thus: “Brahmā is eternal, other beings are impermanent,” should also be understood as some-eternals regarding beings. Doctrines that arise thus: “Atoms are eternal, dyads and so on are impermanent,” are some-eternals regarding formations, just like the doctrines of Kaṇāda and others. Those who speak thus: “Eyes and so on are impermanent, consciousness is eternal,” should also be understood as some-eternals regarding formations. Now, in this doctrine: “Some phenomena are eternal, some are impermanent,” the ascertainment of the impermanence of eyes and so on is just the comprehension of their true nature. So how is this wrong view? And who says this: “The ascertainment of the impermanence of eyes and so on is wrong view”? But the clinging to the eternality of some phenomena that are themselves impermanent is the wrong view here. And by that, arising once, The understanding of impermanence of the eye and so on is corrupted due to its being mixed. Like all ghee mixed with poison, it is unable to perform its function, and thus does not deserve to be placed in right view. Even if determined as impermanent, the eye and so on are grasped by those with wrong views as having an imputed living nature. Thus, the state of that understanding as wrong view cannot be prevented. And having done so, by means of the unconditioned and conditioned elements, respectively, "some phenomena are permanent, some are impermanent" – even the analytical doctrine that proceeds thus, falls into the partial-permanence view. A criticism of this kind is without basis, due to its conformity with the unperverted nature of phenomena. Although here, even in the former permanence view, the grasping of impermanent phenomena as permanent is specifically wrong view. But the grasping of permanent phenomena as permanent is not wrong view, due to its being a grasping according to reality. But indeed, among the impermanent ones, that only some phenomena are permanent, among the phenomena to be grasped, by the distinction that proceeds, of this doctrine, a distinctness from other doctrines is stated. And here it is not that due to a part being included within the whole, the grasping of partial permanence merges with the grasping of total permanence. It can be said that the two doctrines proceed due to the distinction of their subject matter. Indeed, some with wrong views are fixated on "all phenomena are permanent." Others on "some are permanent." The exhaustive inclusion of all conditioned things, and the grasping of a part, are indeed clear distinctions of the two doctrines. Here, regarding "finite and infinite": "End" is where nature ceases, it is the limit, a boundary. By its negation, "infinite." But of what is this finite and infinite? It is spoken of by those with wrong views who seek liberation from saṃsāra. Or here by them, merit and demerit and their results are called "world" – of one's own nature, which has gone to calculation, such as a counterpart sign. "Finite and infinite," "finite and infinite," and "neither finite nor infinite" – "finite and infinite" by general designation, or by ellipsis: "from name-and-form arises the six sense bases..." like in the case of the three. The view associated with finitude and infinitude is finitude-infinitude, as in "spears are moving about." Or the view based on finitude and infinitude, as in "beds are making an uproar." Since this exists for them, they are "finitude-infinitude-ists," "finitude-infinitude-speakers." "This world is finite, this world is infinite, this world is finite and infinite, this world is neither finite nor infinite"— this means views that arise concerning finitude, or infinitude, or finitude-infinitude, or neither finitude nor infinitude. For there are four kinds of finitude-infinitude-speakers: the finitude-speaker, the infinitude-speaker, the finitude-infinitude-speaker, the neither-finitude-nor-infinitude-speaker. Thus, some, without expanding the counterpart sign of the world-system boundary, take that as "the world" and perceive the world as finite. But in a kasina expanded to the world-system boundary, they perceive it as infinite. Without expanding upwards and downwards, but expanding sideways, they perceive it as finite upwards and downwards, and infinite sideways. Some, however, because the self, perceived as the world, is sometimes heard to be seen as infinite by great sages who have attained special knowledge, therefore it is not finite. But because it is sometimes heard to be seen as finite by those very same ones, therefore it is not infinite. Thus, they perceive the world as neither finite nor infinite. Some say that if this self were finite, the accomplishment of tasks like remembering those reborn in distant lands would not occur. If it were infinite, then one standing here would experience pleasure and pain in divine realms, hells, and so on. If it were both finite and infinite, there would be a combination of the faults of negating both. Therefore, the self is neither finite nor infinite, and thus, by way of reasoning, they perceive it as neither finite nor infinite. Here, it is indeed appropriate that the first three speakers are called finitude-infinitude-ists because their views arise concerning finitude, infinitude, and finitude-infinitude. But how is the last one, whose view arises by way of negating both, a finitude-infinitude-ist? Precisely because its view arises by way of negating both. Because even the view that negates finitude and infinitude has finitude and infinitude as its object. Thus, it arose concerning that. Indeed, it was said below, "doctrines of arising," concerning this very meaning. Even so, it is fitting for the last two doctrines to be "finite-infinite," because these doctrines have both as their object, in terms of finite and infinite. But how are the first two doctrines separately "finite-infinite"? By way of figurative expression. Indeed, the term "finite-infinite," when applied to the collected finite-infinite doctrines, by its established usage there, also applies to each of the finite-infinite doctrines individually, just as the term "eight liberations" applies to each of the formless absorptions, and just as in the world, "a hundred spears." Here, "Amarāvikkhepikā" means "immortal" because it does not die, it is not cut off. What is that? It is the view and speech of one holding a view, boundless in its arising, saying: "It is not thus for me, it is not so for me, it is not otherwise for me, it is not not for me, it is not not-not for me." (Dī. Ni. 1.62) By "It is not thus for me," and so on, there is a varied, manifold scattering, a throwing aside of others' doctrines, a "vikkhepa." A scattering by an immortal view or speech is "amarāvikkhepa." Those who have this are "amarāvikkhepikā." Or, they scatter with an immortal view or speech, thus they are "amarāvikkhepino." Indeed, "amarāvikkhepino" are "amarāvikkhepikā." Or, "amarā" is a type of fish. It cannot be caught as it swims about in the water, surfacing and diving. Just so, this doctrine, not standing firm in one nature, swims about here and there, it does not come to be grasped, thus it is called "amarāvikkhepa," like the scattering of an amarā fish. Indeed, this "amarāvikkhepika," when asked "Is this wholesome?" or "unwholesome?", answers nothing. When asked "Is this wholesome?", he says, "It is not thus for me." Then, when asked "Is it unwholesome?", he says, "It is not so for me."