English
Here, those who hold the view that "one is released by the temporary release of jhāna, and is being released by the eradicating release at the moment of the path," regarding them, the question "released and being released?" is for the proponent of the view, and the affirmation is for the other. Again, "in part?" is the question for the proponent of the view. Here, "in part" is a neuter noun of becoming. Just as something released, is it partly or in part not released? Is it thus partly released, partly not released? Why does he ask thus? Because it is stated as "released and being released" in a differentiated manner. Just as mats being made are differentiated and partly made and partly unmade, so too this falls into being partly released and partly unreleased. Then the opponent, denying the first question because of the absence of parts in the mind like in mats, affirms in the second that the release of one being released is not yet complete. Or he denies it referring to the moment of mundane jhāna. For at that time, it is not being released by eradicating release. He affirms it referring to the moment of supramundane jhāna. For at that time, it is being released by the part of release that is eradicating release, such is the view. Then the proponent of the view says, "If you have only one mind that is partly released and partly unreleased, then in that case, he who becomes a stream-enterer with only one mind, even he becomes partly a stream-enterer, partly not a stream-enterer," to challenge, he says beginning with "partly a stream-enterer." The other, not seeing that distinction, rejects it. The same method applies in the remaining turns. In the question about the moment of arising, if... Only one mind is freed and being freed, In one moment it is freed, in one being freed. What is this kind of mind? is the meaning. 367. In the Suttasādhana, the first sutta is for the opponent. Therein, his intention is this: "being freed" is a descriptive designation. Therefore, that mind, when that yogi knows thus, sees thus, is freed from these āsavas, is called "being freed." The second sutta is for one's own side. Therein, his intention is this: if, because of the statement "is freed," there is the freed and the being freed, here, because of the absence of the statement "is being freed," there would only be the freed, not the being freed. Now, "just as you have 'being freed' due to descriptive freedom, is there also 'being stained' etc. due to descriptive passion etc.?" Thus, to question, again, "is there a mind?" etc. is begun. The opponent, not seeing such a mind, rejected everything. Then, the proponent, making him understand, "there are only two categories, there is no third," said, "surely, there is the stained and the unstained," etc. Its meaning: surely, good sir, a mind associated with passion is stained, dissociated is unstained, thus there are only two categories, there is no third category called "being stained"? The same method applies to the hateful, etc. Then, he, acknowledging, stood still. To show that there are only two categories even in the case of freedom, he said, "if indeed there is the stained," etc. Its meaning: if you accept these two categories, then accept these also: the unfreed and the freed. For a mind associated with defilements is unfreed, dissociated is freed. In reality, there is no third category called "being freed." Explanation of the discourse on being freed. 5. Explanation of the Eighth Discourse 368. Now, the eighth discourse begins. Therein, for those who hold the view that, due to the absence of the arising of defilements in the moment of the fruition of the path of stream-entry for the one who is an eighth person, two attachments are abandoned, just as now among the Andhakas and the Sammitiyas; for them, one or the other... Regarding the question about the heretic, concerning the arising of views from the moment of the path, the other acknowledges. Then, because this view is abandoned only by the Stream-enterer, not by one established in the path, therefore, the argument of the proponent is that the eighth person is a Stream-enterer. The same method applies to the question about doubt. Regarding the question about latent tendencies, their doctrine is that a latent tendency is different from an obsession, therefore it is rejected with "no indeed." Regarding the question about clinging to rites and rituals, he does not see the usage of "obsession with clinging to rites and rituals," therefore he rejects it. His doctrine is that only the obsession is abandoned. 369. Regarding the question of whether the path is cultivated, he cultivates it at that moment, it is not cultivated. Therefore, he rejects it. Regarding the argument beginning with "by a non-path," he rejects it, referring to the fact that it is abandoned by the first path itself. For if it were abandoned by a non-path, it would follow that the one of the lineage and individuals would also be abandoned. The question "will it arise?" is from the opponent, the answer is from the proponent. The rest is all straightforward in meaning. Explanation of the Eighth Person Discourse. 6. Explanation of the Eighth Person's Discourse on the Faculties 371. Now, there is the Eighth Person's Discourse on the Faculties. There, regarding those whose doctrine is that "the eighth person obtains the faculties at the moment of the path, but they are not yet obtained by him," just like the blind at present; concerning them, the proponent asks, "Is there no faculty of faith?" The other acknowledges. However, when asked "Is there no faith?" he rejects it, having discerned the difference between the faculty of faith and faith itself. The same method applies to the rest. However, to show that just as one who has mind also has the faculty of mind, so too, one who has faith and so on also has the faculty of faith and so on, the statement beginning with "one who has mind has the faculty of mind" is begun. All of that is straightforward in meaning, along with the scriptural support. Explanation of the Eighth Person's Discourse on the Faculties. 7. Explanation of the Discourse on the Divine Eye 373. Now, there is the Discourse on the Divine Eye. There, regarding those whose fourth jhāna is supported by the Dhamma, "The flesh eye itself is the divine eye" is a belief, like that of some blind people and sectarians today. Regarding them, the question about the flesh eye is for the debater, the affirmation for the other. Again, asked "Is the flesh eye the divine eye, is the divine eye the flesh eye?" he denies that it is only that. In questions such as "What kind?" he denies it because of the absence of a single nature in both. In "What is the object?" for both, the object is the form element. But the flesh eye sees only what is within range. The other sees what is out of range, even beyond mountains. And for the divine eye, even the subtlest form is an object, not so for the other. Thus, their power and range are dissimilar. Asked "Having been grasped, is it ungrasped?" because the flesh eye is grasped, the divine eye is ungrasped, and he does not want the flesh eye to be the divine eye, therefore he denies it. Asked a second time, because relying on the saying "The arising of the flesh eye is the path to the divine eye," the divine eye arises due to the flesh eye, and he wants it to be the clarity of the four great elements of the form realm, therefore he affirms it. Asked "Having been of the sense-sphere?" because he does not want the flesh eye to be the divine eye, therefore he denies it. Asked a second time, because it arises due to the form-sphere jhāna, he affirms that it is called of the form-sphere by birth. Asked "Having been of the form-sphere, is it of the formless-sphere?" he denies it because, after that, in the moment of the formless-sphere through cultivation, there is no form-sphere consciousness. Asked a second time, he affirms it because of the belief that it arises having been the clarity of the four great elements of the formless realm. But he does not want it to be unconditioned, therefore he denies it. 374. "The divine eye is supported by Dhamma" means supported by sense-sphere Dhamma. Again, "supported by Dhamma" means supported by supramundane Dhamma. Asked "Are there only two eyes?" even though the divine eye... The one who is against the Dhamma does not want the eye of wisdom to exist, but denies its existence. When asked again, he acknowledges that the physical eye, when supported by the Dhamma, becomes the divine eye, having attained it. The rest is self-explanatory. Explanation of the Discourse on the Divine Eye. 8. Explanation of the Discourse on the Divine Ear 375. Now comes the discourse on the divine ear. When asked if there is only one ear, he denies the existence of two. When asked again, he acknowledges it because that same ear, supported by the Dhamma, is called the divine ear. The rest is as explained below. Explanation of the Discourse on the Divine Ear. 9. Explanation of the Discourse on the Knowledge of Beings Passing According to Their Deeds 377. Now comes the discourse on the knowledge of beings passing according to their deeds. Here, those who, taking the sutta unwisely, "With the divine eye, purified... he understands beings passing according to their deeds" (D.N. 1.246; Patis. Ma. 1.106), hold the view that the knowledge of beings passing according to their deeds is itself the divine eye, the question is directed to the proponent of their own view, and the affirmation to the other. When asked again whether he also keeps in mind the knowledge of beings passing according to their deeds, he denies it because one mind cannot have two objects. When asked a second time, he acknowledges it in terms of different moments of consciousness. Then, not giving any opportunity for a loophole, when asked if there are two contacts, he denies it.